Christopher Ackerman

Christopher Ackerman, Nina Panickssery

It has been reported that LLMs can recognize their own writing. As this has potential implications for AI safety, yet is relatively understudied, we investigate the phenomenon, seeking to establish whether it robustly occurs at the behavioral level, how the observed behavior is achieved, and whether it can be controlled. First, we find that the Llama3-8b-Instruct chat model - but not the base Llama3-8b model - can reliably distinguish its own outputs from those of humans, and present evidence that the chat model is likely using its experience with its own outputs, acquired during post-training, to succeed at the writing recognition task. Second, we identify a vector in the residual stream of the model that is differentially activated when the model makes a correct self-written-text recognition judgment, show that the vector activates in response to information relevant to self-authorship, present evidence that the vector is related to the concept of "self" in the model, and demonstrate that the vector is causally related to the model's ability to perceive and assert self-authorship. Finally, we show that the vector can be used to control both the model's behavior and its perception, steering the model to claim or disclaim authorship by applying the vector to the model's output as it generates it, and steering the model to believe or disbelieve it wrote arbitrary texts by applying the vector to them as the model reads them.

Christopher Ackerman

The ability to represent oneself and others as agents with knowledge, intentions, and belief states that guide their behavior - Theory of Mind - is a human universal that enables us to navigate - and manipulate - the social world. It is supported by our ability to form mental models of ourselves and others. Its ubiquity in human affairs entails that LLMs have seen innumerable examples of it in their training data and therefore may have learned to mimic it, but whether they have actually learned causal models that they can deploy in arbitrary settings is unclear. We therefore develop a novel experimental paradigm that requires that subjects form representations of the mental states of themselves and others and act on them strategically rather than merely describe them. We test a wide range of leading open and closed source LLMs released since 2024, as well as human subjects, on this paradigm. We find that 1) LLMs released before mid-2025 fail at all of our tasks, 2) more recent LLMs achieve human-level performance on modeling the cognitive states of others, and 3) even frontier LLMs fail at our self-modeling task - unless afforded a scratchpad in the form of a reasoning trace. We further demonstrate cognitive load effects on other-modeling tasks, offering suggestive evidence that LLMs are using something akin to limited-capacity working memory to hold these mental representations in mind during a single forward pass. Finally, we explore the mechanisms by which reasoning models succeed at the self- and other-modeling tasks, and show that they readily engage in strategic deception.

Christopher Ackerman

The possibility of LLM self-awareness and even sentience is gaining increasing public attention and has major safety and policy implications, but the science of measuring them is still in a nascent state. Here we introduce a novel methodology for quantitatively evaluating metacognitive abilities in LLMs. Taking inspiration from research on metacognition in nonhuman animals, our approach eschews model self-reports and instead tests to what degree models can strategically deploy knowledge of internal states. Using two experimental paradigms, we demonstrate that frontier LLMs introduced since early 2024 show increasingly strong evidence of certain metacognitive abilities, specifically the ability to assess and utilize their own confidence in their ability to answer factual and reasoning questions correctly and the ability to anticipate what answers they would give and utilize that information appropriately. We buttress these behavioral findings with an analysis of the token probabilities returned by the models, which suggests the presence of an upstream internal signal that could provide the basis for metacognition. We further find that these abilities 1) are limited in resolution, 2) emerge in context-dependent manners, and 3) seem to be qualitatively different from those of humans. We also report intriguing differences across models of similar capabilities, suggesting that LLM post-training may have a role in developing metacognitive abilities.