Sumit Kumar Pandey

Kishan Chand Gupta, Sumit Kumar Pandey, Susanta Samanta

The optimal branch number of MDS matrices makes them a preferred choice for designing diffusion layers in many block ciphers and hash functions. Consequently, various methods have been proposed for designing MDS matrices, including search and direct methods. While exhaustive search is suitable for small order MDS matrices, direct constructions are preferred for larger orders due to the vast search space involved. In the literature, there has been extensive research on the direct construction of MDS matrices using both recursive and nonrecursive methods. On the other hand, in lightweight cryptography, Near-MDS (NMDS) matrices with sub-optimal branch numbers offer a better balance between security and efficiency as a diffusion layer compared to MDS matrices. However, no direct construction method is available in the literature for constructing recursive NMDS matrices. This paper introduces some direct constructions of NMDS matrices in both nonrecursive and recursive settings. Additionally, it presents some direct constructions of nonrecursive MDS matrices from the generalized Vandermonde matrices. We propose a method for constructing involutory MDS and NMDS matrices using generalized Vandermonde matrices. Furthermore, we prove some folklore results that are used in the literature related to the NMDS code.

Shashank Shreedhar Bhatt, Tanmay Rajore, Khushboo Aggarwal et al.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in enterprise settings where they interact with multiple users and are trained or fine-tuned on sensitive internal data. While fine-tuning enhances performance by internalizing domain knowledge, it also introduces a critical security risk: leakage of confidential training data to unauthorized users. These risks are exacerbated when LLMs are combined with Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) pipelines that dynamically fetch contextual documents at inference time. We demonstrate data exfiltration attacks on AI assistants where adversaries can exploit current fine-tuning and RAG architectures to leak sensitive information by leveraging the lack of access control enforcement. We show that existing defenses, including prompt sanitization, output filtering, system isolation, and training-level privacy mechanisms, are fundamentally probabilistic and fail to offer robust protection against such attacks. We take the position that only a deterministic and rigorous enforcement of fine-grained access control during both fine-tuning and RAG-based inference can reliably prevent the leakage of sensitive data to unauthorized recipients. We introduce a framework centered on the principle that any content used in training, retrieval, or generation by an LLM is explicitly authorized for \emph{all users involved in the interaction}. Our approach offers a simple yet powerful paradigm shift for building secure multi-user LLM systems that are grounded in classical access control but adapted to the unique challenges of modern AI workflows. Our solution has been deployed in Microsoft Copilot Tuning, a product offering that enables organizations to fine-tune models using their own enterprise-specific data.