Edward Koh

Xavier Cadet, Edward Koh, Peter Chin

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly studied in multi-turn, multi-agent scenarios, yet most existing setups emphasize open-ended role-play rather than controlled evaluation. We introduce AsymPuzl, a minimal but expressive two-agent puzzle environment designed to isolate communication under information asymmetry. Each agent observes complementary but incomplete views of a symbolic puzzle and must exchange messages to solve it cooperatively. Using a diverse set of current-generation and open-source LLMs, we show that (i) strong models such as GPT-5 and Claude-4.0 reliably converge across puzzle sizes on the solution by sharing complete information in two turns, (ii) weaker models often ignore partner messages or over-correct their hypotheses, and (iii) feedback design is non-trivial: simple self-feedback improves success rates, while detailed joint feedback can hurt performance. These findings show that even in simple cooperative tasks, LLM communication strategies diverge and depend on the granularity of feedback signals. AsymPuzl thus provides a testbed for probing the limits of multi-turn cooperation and opens avenues for studying coordination mechanisms.

Xavier Cadet, Simona Boboila, Edward Koh et al.

Cyber resilience is the ability of a system to recover from an attack with minimal impact on system operations. However, characterizing a network's resilience under a cyber attack is challenging, as there are no formal definitions of resilience applicable to diverse network topologies and attack patterns. In this work, we propose a quantifiable formulation of resilience that considers multiple defender operational goals, the criticality of various network resources for daily operations, and provides interpretability to security operators about their system's resilience under attack. We evaluate our approach within the CybORG environment, a reinforcement learning (RL) framework for autonomous cyber defense, analyzing trade-offs between resilience, costs, and prioritization of operational goals. Furthermore, we introduce methods to aggregate resilience metrics across time-variable attack patterns and multiple network topologies, comprehensively characterizing system resilience. Using insights gained from our resilience metrics, we design RL autonomous defensive agents and compare them against several heuristic baselines, showing that proactive network hardening techniques and prompt recovery of compromised machines are critical for effective cyber defenses.