Yi Hui Chen

Rui Wang, Hongru Wang, Fei Mi et al.

Numerous works are proposed to align large language models (LLMs) with human intents to better fulfill instructions, ensuring they are trustful and helpful. Nevertheless, some human instructions are often malicious or misleading and following them will lead to untruthful and unsafe responses. Previous work rarely focused on understanding how LLMs manage instructions based on counterfactual premises, referred to here as \textit{inductive instructions}, which may stem from users' false beliefs or malicious intents. In this paper, we aim to reveal the behaviors of LLMs towards \textit{inductive instructions} and enhance their truthfulness and helpfulness accordingly. Specifically, we first introduce a benchmark of \underline{\textbf{Indu}}ctive {In\underline{\textbf{st}}ruct}ions (\textsc{\textbf{INDust}}), where the false knowledge is incorporated into instructions in multiple different styles. After extensive human and automatic evaluations, we uncovered a universal vulnerability among LLMs in processing inductive instructions. Additionally, we identified that different inductive styles affect the models' ability to identify the same underlying errors, and the complexity of the underlying assumptions also influences the model's performance. Motivated by these results, we propose \textsc{Dual-critique} prompting to improve LLM robustness against inductive instructions. Our experiments demonstrate that \textsc{Dual-critique} prompting significantly bolsters the robustness of a diverse array of LLMs, even when confronted with varying degrees of inductive instruction complexity and differing inductive styles.

Alejandro Mera, Yi Hui Chen, Ruimin Sun et al.

Embedded and Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices have seen an increase in adoption in many domains. The security of these devices is of great importance as they are often used to control critical infrastructure, medical devices, and vehicles. Existing solutions to isolate microcontroller (MCU) resources in order to increase their security face significant challenges such as specific hardware unavailability, Memory Protection Unit (MPU) limitations and a significant lack of Direct Memory Access (DMA) support. Nevertheless, DMA is fundamental for the power and performance requirements of embedded applications. In this paper, we present D-Box, a systematic approach to enable secure DMA operations for compartmentalization solutions of embedded applications using real-time operating systems (RTOS). D-Box defines a reference architecture and a workflow to protect DMA operations holistically. It provides practical methods to harden the kernel and define capability-based security policies for easy definition of DMA operations with strong security properties. We implemented a D-Box prototype for the Cortex-M3/M4 on top of the popular FreeRTOS-MPU (F-MPU). The D-Box procedures and a stricter security model enabled DMA operations, yet it exposed 41 times less ROP (return-orienting-programming) gadgets when compared with the standard F-MPU. D-Box adds only a 2% processor overhead while reducing the power consumption of peripheral operation benchmarks by 18.2%. The security properties and performance of D-Box were tested and confirmed on a real-world case study of a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) application.