Jun Wang

Longkang Li, Hui-Ling Zhen, Mingxuan Yuan et al.

Automatic industrial scheduling, aiming at optimizing the sequence of jobs over limited resources, is widely needed in manufacturing industries. However, existing scheduling systems heavily rely on heuristic algorithms, which either generate ineffective solutions or compute inefficiently when job scale increases. Thus, it is of great importance to develop new large-scale algorithms that are not only efficient and effective, but also capable of satisfying complex constraints in practice. In this paper, we propose a Bilevel Deep reinforcement learning Scheduler, \textit{BDS}, in which the higher level is responsible for exploring an initial global sequence, whereas the lower level is aiming at exploitation for partial sequence refinements, and the two levels are connected by a sliding-window sampling mechanism. In the implementation, a Double Deep Q Network (DDQN) is used in the upper level and Graph Pointer Network (GPN) lies within the lower level. After the theoretical guarantee for the convergence of BDS, we evaluate it in an industrial automatic warehouse scenario, with job number up to $5000$ in each production line. It is shown that our proposed BDS significantly outperforms two most used heuristics, three strong deep networks, and another bilevel baseline approach. In particular, compared with the most used greedy-based heuristic algorithm in real world which takes nearly an hour, our BDS can decrease the makespan by 27.5\%, 28.6\% and 22.1\% for 3 largest datasets respectively, with computational time less than 200 seconds.

Ping Chen, Jun Xu, Jun Wang et al.

Fine-grained Address Space Randomization has been considered as an effective protection against code reuse attacks such as ROP/JOP. However, it only employs a one-time randomization, and such a limitation has been exploited by recent just-in-time ROP and side channel ROP, which collect gadgets on-the-fly and dynamically compile them for malicious purposes. To defeat these advanced code reuse attacks, we propose a new defense principle: instantly obsoleting the address-code associations. We have initialized this principle with a novel technique called virtual space page table remapping and implemented the technique in a system CHAMELEON. CHAMELEON periodically re-randomizes the locations of code pages on-the-fly. A set of techniques are proposed to achieve our goal, including iterative instrumentation that instruments a to-be-protected binary program to generate a re-randomization compatible binary, runtime virtual page shuffling, and function reordering and instruction rearranging optimizations. We have tested CHAMELEON with over a hundred binary programs. Our experiments show that CHAMELEON can defeat all of our tested exploits by both preventing the exploit from gathering sufficient gadgets, and blocking the gadgets execution. Regarding the interval of our re-randomization, it is a parameter and can be set as short as 100ms, 10ms or 1ms. The experiment results show that CHAMELEON introduces on average 11.1%, 12.1% and 12.9% performance overhead for these parameters, respectively.