Sebastian Porsdam Mann

Brian D. Earp, Sebastian Porsdam Mann, Mateo Aboy et al. · oxford

How we should design and interact with social artificial intelligence depends on the socio-relational role the AI is meant to emulate or occupy. In human society, relationships such as teacher-student, parent-child, neighbors, siblings, or employer-employee are governed by specific norms that prescribe or proscribe cooperative functions including hierarchy, care, transaction, and mating. These norms shape our judgments of what is appropriate for each partner. For example, workplace norms may allow a boss to give orders to an employee, but not vice versa, reflecting hierarchical and transactional expectations. As AI agents and chatbots powered by large language models are increasingly designed to serve roles analogous to human positions - such as assistant, mental health provider, tutor, or romantic partner - it is imperative to examine whether and how human relational norms should extend to human-AI interactions. Our analysis explores how differences between AI systems and humans, such as the absence of conscious experience and immunity to fatigue, may affect an AI's capacity to fulfill relationship-specific functions and adhere to corresponding norms. This analysis, which is a collaborative effort by philosophers, psychologists, relationship scientists, ethicists, legal experts, and AI researchers, carries important implications for AI systems design, user behavior, and regulation. While we accept that AI systems can offer significant benefits such as increased availability and consistency in certain socio-relational roles, they also risk fostering unhealthy dependencies or unrealistic expectations that could spill over into human-human relationships. We propose that understanding and thoughtfully shaping (or implementing) suitable human-AI relational norms will be crucial for ensuring that human-AI interactions are ethical, trustworthy, and favorable to human well-being.

Sebastian Porsdam Mann, Joel Seah Jiehao, Stephen R. Latham et al.

Institutional review boards (IRBs) play a crucial role in ensuring the ethical conduct of human subjects research, but face challenges including inconsistency, delays, and inefficiencies. We propose the development and implementation of application-specific large language models (LLMs) to facilitate IRB review processes. These IRB-specific LLMs would be fine-tuned on IRB-specific literature and institutional datasets, and equipped with retrieval capabilities to access up-to-date, context-relevant information. We outline potential applications, including pre-review screening, preliminary analysis, consistency checking, and decision support. While addressing concerns about accuracy, context sensitivity, and human oversight, we acknowledge remaining challenges such as over-reliance on AI and the need for transparency. By enhancing the efficiency and quality of ethical review while maintaining human judgment in critical decisions, IRB-specific LLMs offer a promising tool to improve research oversight. We call for pilot studies to evaluate the feasibility and impact of this approach.

Brian D. Earp, Haotian Yuan, Julian Koplin et al.

The increasing use of generative AI in scientific writing raises urgent questions about attribution and intellectual credit. When a researcher employs ChatGPT to draft a manuscript, the resulting text may echo ideas from sources the author has never encountered. If an AI system reproduces insights from, for example, an obscure 1975 paper without citation, does this constitute plagiarism? We argue that such cases exemplify the 'provenance problem': a systematic breakdown in the chain of scholarly credit. Unlike conventional plagiarism, this phenomenon does not involve intent to deceive (researchers may disclose AI use and act in good faith) yet still benefit from the uncredited intellectual contributions of others. This dynamic creates a novel category of attributional harm that current ethical and professional frameworks fail to address. As generative AI becomes embedded across disciplines, the risk that significant ideas will circulate without recognition threatens both the reputational economy of science and the demands of epistemic justice. This Perspective analyzes how AI challenges established norms of authorship, introduces conceptual tools for understanding the provenance problem, and proposes strategies to preserve integrity and fairness in scholarly communication.

Clint Hurshman, Sebastian Porsdam Mann, Julian Savulescu et al.

The use of large language models (LLMs) in bioethical, scientific, and medical writing remains controversial. While there is broad agreement in some circles that LLMs cannot count as authors, there is no consensus about whether and how humans using LLMs can count as authors. In many fields, authorship is distributed among large teams of researchers, some of whom, including paradigmatic senior authors who guide and determine the scope of a project and ultimately vouch for its integrity, may not write a single word. In this paper, we argue that LLM use (under specific conditions) is analogous to a form of senior authorship. On this view, the use of LLMs, even to generate complete drafts of research papers, can be considered a legitimate form of authorship according to the accepted criteria in many fields. We conclude that either such use should be recognized as legitimate, or current criteria for authorship require fundamental revision. AI use declaration: GPT-5 was used to help format Box 1. AI was not used for any other part of the preparation or writing of this manuscript.