Hang Fu

CR
h-index15
5papers
18citations
Novelty71%
AI Score52

5 Papers

CVJun 9, 2024Code
HDMba: Hyperspectral Remote Sensing Imagery Dehazing with State Space Model

Hang Fu, Genyun Sun, Yinhe Li et al.

Haze contamination in hyperspectral remote sensing images (HSI) can lead to spatial visibility degradation and spectral distortion. Haze in HSI exhibits spatial irregularity and inhomogeneous spectral distribution, with few dehazing networks available. Current CNN and Transformer-based dehazing methods fail to balance global scene recovery, local detail retention, and computational efficiency. Inspired by the ability of Mamba to model long-range dependencies with linear complexity, we explore its potential for HSI dehazing and propose the first HSI Dehazing Mamba (HDMba) network. Specifically, we design a novel window selective scan module (WSSM) that captures local dependencies within windows and global correlations between windows by partitioning them. This approach improves the ability of conventional Mamba in local feature extraction. By modeling the local and global spectral-spatial information flow, we achieve a comprehensive analysis of hazy regions. The DehazeMamba layer (DML), constructed by WSSM, and residual DehazeMamba (RDM) blocks, composed of DMLs, are the core components of the HDMba framework. These components effectively characterize the complex distribution of haze in HSIs, aiding in scene reconstruction and dehazing. Experimental results on the Gaofen-5 HSI dataset demonstrate that HDMba outperforms other state-of-the-art methods in dehazing performance. The code will be available at https://github.com/RsAI-lab/HDMba.

30.0CRApr 26
Spore: Efficient and Training-Free Privacy Extraction Attack on LLMs via Inference-Time Hybrid Probing

Yu Cui, Ruiqing Yue, Hang Fu et al.

With the wide adoption of personal AI assistants such as OpenClaw, privacy leakage in user interaction contexts with large language model (LLM) agents has become a critical issue. Existing privacy attacks against LLMs primarily target training data, while research on inference-time contextual privacy risks in LLM agent memory remains limited. Moreover, prior methods often incur high attack costs, requiring multiple queries or relying on white-box assumptions, which limits their practicality in real-world deployments. To address these issues, we propose a training-free privacy extraction attack targeting LLM agent memory, which we name \textsc{Spore}. \textsc{Spore} is compatible with both black-box and gray-box settings. In the black-box setting, \textsc{Spore} can efficiently extract a small candidate set via a single query to recover the original private information. In the gray-box setting, \textsc{Spore} allows the attacker to leverage multi-ranked tokens for more accurate and faster privacy extraction. We provide an information-theoretic analysis of \textsc{Spore} and show that it achieves high query efficiency with substantial per query information leakage. Experiments on multiple frontier LLMs show that \textsc{Spore} outperforms attack success rate over existing state-of-the-art (SOTA) schemes. It also maintains low attack cost and remains stable across different model parameter settings. We further evaluate the robustness of \textsc{Spore} against existing defense mechanisms. Our results show that \textsc{Spore} consistently bypasses both detection and strong safety alignment, demonstrating resilient performance in diverse defensive settings and real-world safety threats.

CLMar 25, 2025
ImF: Implicit Fingerprint for Large Language Models

Jiaxuan Wu, Wanli Peng, Hang Fu et al.

Training large language models (LLMs) is resource-intensive and expensive, making protecting intellectual property (IP) for LLMs crucial. Recently, embedding fingerprints into LLMs has emerged as a prevalent method for establishing model ownership. However, existing fingerprinting techniques typically embed identifiable patterns with weak semantic coherence, resulting in fingerprints that significantly differ from the natural question-answering (QA) behavior inherent to LLMs. This discrepancy undermines the stealthiness of the embedded fingerprints and makes them vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In this paper, we first demonstrate the critical vulnerability of existing fingerprint embedding methods by introducing a novel adversarial attack named Generation Revision Intervention (GRI) attack. GRI attack exploits the semantic fragility of current fingerprinting methods, effectively erasing fingerprints by disrupting their weakly correlated semantic structures. Our empirical evaluation highlights that traditional fingerprinting approaches are significantly compromised by the GRI attack, revealing severe limitations in their robustness under realistic adversarial conditions. To advance the state-of-the-art in model fingerprinting, we propose a novel model fingerprint paradigm called Implicit Fingerprints (ImF). ImF leverages steganography techniques to subtly embed ownership information within natural texts, subsequently using Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting to construct semantically coherent and contextually natural QA pairs. This design ensures that fingerprints seamlessly integrate with the standard model behavior, remaining indistinguishable from regular outputs and substantially reducing the risk of accidental triggering and targeted removal. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation of ImF on 15 diverse LLMs, spanning different architectures and varying scales.

AISep 14, 2025
Free-MAD: Consensus-Free Multi-Agent Debate

Yu Cui, Hang Fu, Haibin Zhang et al.

Multi-agent debate (MAD) is an emerging approach to improving the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Existing MAD methods rely on multiple rounds of interaction among agents to reach consensus, and the final output is selected by majority voting in the last round. However, this consensus-based design faces several limitations. First, multiple rounds of communication increases token overhead and limits scalability. Second, due to the inherent conformity of LLMs, agents that initially produce correct responses may be influenced by incorrect ones during the debate process, causing error propagation. Third, majority voting introduces randomness and unfairness in the decision-making phase, and can degrade the reasoning performance. To address these issues, we propose \textsc{Free-MAD}, a novel MAD framework that eliminates the need for consensus among agents. \textsc{Free-MAD} introduces a novel score-based decision mechanism that evaluates the entire debate trajectory rather than relying on the last round only. This mechanism tracks how each agent's reasoning evolves, enabling more accurate and fair outcomes. In addition, \textsc{Free-MAD} reconstructs the debate phase by introducing anti-conformity, a mechanism that enables agents to mitigate excessive influence from the majority. Experiments on eight benchmark datasets demonstrate that \textsc{Free-MAD} significantly improves reasoning performance while requiring only a single-round debate and thus reducing token costs. We also show that compared to existing MAD approaches, \textsc{Free-MAD} exhibits improved robustness in real-world attack scenarios.

CRJun 24, 2025
Retrieval-Confused Generation is a Good Defender for Privacy Violation Attack of Large Language Models

Wanli Peng, Xin Chen, Hang Fu et al.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have made a profound impact on our society and also raised new security concerns. Particularly, due to the remarkable inference ability of LLMs, the privacy violation attack (PVA), revealed by Staab et al., introduces serious personal privacy issues. Existing defense methods mainly leverage LLMs to anonymize the input query, which requires costly inference time and cannot gain satisfactory defense performance. Moreover, directly rejecting the PVA query seems like an effective defense method, while the defense method is exposed, promoting the evolution of PVA. In this paper, we propose a novel defense paradigm based on retrieval-confused generation (RCG) of LLMs, which can efficiently and covertly defend the PVA. We first design a paraphrasing prompt to induce the LLM to rewrite the "user comments" of the attack query to construct a disturbed database. Then, we propose the most irrelevant retrieval strategy to retrieve the desired user data from the disturbed database. Finally, the "data comments" are replaced with the retrieved user data to form a defended query, leading to responding to the adversary with some wrong personal attributes, i.e., the attack fails. Extensive experiments are conducted on two datasets and eight popular LLMs to comprehensively evaluate the feasibility and the superiority of the proposed defense method.