Justin Gilmer

Peter W. Battaglia, Jessica B. Hamrick, Victor Bapst et al.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has undergone a renaissance recently, making major progress in key domains such as vision, language, control, and decision-making. This has been due, in part, to cheap data and cheap compute resources, which have fit the natural strengths of deep learning. However, many defining characteristics of human intelligence, which developed under much different pressures, remain out of reach for current approaches. In particular, generalizing beyond one's experiences--a hallmark of human intelligence from infancy--remains a formidable challenge for modern AI. The following is part position paper, part review, and part unification. We argue that combinatorial generalization must be a top priority for AI to achieve human-like abilities, and that structured representations and computations are key to realizing this objective. Just as biology uses nature and nurture cooperatively, we reject the false choice between "hand-engineering" and "end-to-end" learning, and instead advocate for an approach which benefits from their complementary strengths. We explore how using relational inductive biases within deep learning architectures can facilitate learning about entities, relations, and rules for composing them. We present a new building block for the AI toolkit with a strong relational inductive bias--the graph network--which generalizes and extends various approaches for neural networks that operate on graphs, and provides a straightforward interface for manipulating structured knowledge and producing structured behaviors. We discuss how graph networks can support relational reasoning and combinatorial generalization, laying the foundation for more sophisticated, interpretable, and flexible patterns of reasoning. As a companion to this paper, we have released an open-source software library for building graph networks, with demonstrations of how to use them in practice.

Justin Gilmer, Ryan P. Adams, Ian Goodfellow et al.

Advances in machine learning have led to broad deployment of systems with impressive performance on important problems. Nonetheless, these systems can be induced to make errors on data that are surprisingly similar to examples the learned system handles correctly. The existence of these errors raises a variety of questions about out-of-sample generalization and whether bad actors might use such examples to abuse deployed systems. As a result of these security concerns, there has been a flurry of recent papers proposing algorithms to defend against such malicious perturbations of correctly handled examples. It is unclear how such misclassifications represent a different kind of security problem than other errors, or even other attacker-produced examples that have no specific relationship to an uncorrupted input. In this paper, we argue that adversarial example defense papers have, to date, mostly considered abstract, toy games that do not relate to any specific security concern. Furthermore, defense papers have not yet precisely described all the abilities and limitations of attackers that would be relevant in practical security. Towards this end, we establish a taxonomy of motivations, constraints, and abilities for more plausible adversaries. Finally, we provide a series of recommendations outlining a path forward for future work to more clearly articulate the threat model and perform more meaningful evaluation.

Samuel S. Schoenholz, Justin Gilmer, Surya Ganguli et al.

We study the behavior of untrained neural networks whose weights and biases are randomly distributed using mean field theory. We show the existence of depth scales that naturally limit the maximum depth of signal propagation through these random networks. Our main practical result is to show that random networks may be trained precisely when information can travel through them. Thus, the depth scales that we identify provide bounds on how deep a network may be trained for a specific choice of hyperparameters. As a corollary to this, we argue that in networks at the edge of chaos, one of these depth scales diverges. Thus arbitrarily deep networks may be trained only sufficiently close to criticality. We show that the presence of dropout destroys the order-to-chaos critical point and therefore strongly limits the maximum trainable depth for random networks. Finally, we develop a mean field theory for backpropagation and we show that the ordered and chaotic phases correspond to regions of vanishing and exploding gradient respectively.