5 Papers

GTFeb 12
Choose Your Agent: Tradeoffs in Adopting AI Advisors, Coaches, and Delegates in Multi-Party Negotiation

Kehang Zhu, Nithum Thain, Vivian Tsai et al.

As AI usage becomes more prevalent in social contexts, understanding agent-user interaction is critical to designing systems that improve both individual and group outcomes. We present an online behavioral experiment (N = 243) in which participants play three multi-turn bargaining games in groups of three. Each game, presented in randomized order, grants access to a single LLM assistance modality: proactive recommendations from an Advisor, reactive feedback from a Coach, or autonomous execution by a Delegate; all modalities are powered by an underlying LLM that achieves superhuman performance in an all-agent environment. On each turn, participants privately decide whether to act manually or use the AI modality available in that game. Despite preferring the Advisor modality, participants achieve the highest mean individual gains with the Delegate, demonstrating a preference-performance misalignment. Moreover, delegation generates positive externalities; even non-adopting users in access-to-delegate treatment groups benefit by receiving higher-quality offers. Mechanism analysis reveals that the Delegate agent acts as a market maker, injecting rational, Pareto-improving proposals that restructure the trading environment. Our research reveals a gap between agent capabilities and realized group welfare. While autonomous agents can exhibit super-human strategic performance, their impact on realized welfare gains can be constrained by interfaces, user perceptions, and adoption barriers. Assistance modalities should be designed as mechanisms with endogenous participation; adoption-compatible interaction rules are a prerequisite to improving human welfare with automated assistance.

CLDec 12, 2023
ComplexityNet: Increasing LLM Inference Efficiency by Learning Task Complexity

Henry Bae, Aghyad Deeb, Alex Fleury et al.

We present ComplexityNet, a streamlined language model designed for assessing task complexity. This model predicts the likelihood of accurate output by various language models, each with different capabilities. Our initial application of ComplexityNet involves the Mostly Basic Python Problems (MBPP) dataset. We pioneered the creation of the first set of labels to define task complexity. ComplexityNet achieved a notable 79% accuracy in determining task complexity, a significant improvement over the 34% accuracy of the original, non fine-tuned model. Furthermore, ComplexityNet effectively reduces computational resource usage by 90% compared to using the highest complexity model, while maintaining a high code generation accuracy of 86.7%. This study demonstrates that fine-tuning smaller models to categorize tasks based on their complexity can lead to a more balanced trade-off between accuracy and efficiency in the use of Large Language Models. Our findings suggest a promising direction for optimizing LLM applications, especially in resource-constrained environments.

GTJul 12, 2025
Learning from Synthetic Labs: Language Models as Auction Participants

Anand Shah, Kehang Zhu, Yanchen Jiang et al.

This paper investigates the behavior of simulated AI agents (large language models, or LLMs) in auctions, introducing a novel synthetic data-generating process to help facilitate the study and design of auctions. We find that LLMs -- when endowed with chain of thought reasoning capacity -- agree with the experimental literature in auctions across a variety of classic auction formats. In particular, we find that LLM bidders produce results consistent with risk-averse human bidders; that they perform closer to theoretical predictions in obviously strategy-proof auctions; and, that they succumb to the winner's curse in common value settings. On prompting, we find that LLMs are not very sensitive to naive changes in prompts (e.g., language, currency) but can improve dramatically towards theoretical predictions with the right mental model (i.e., the language of Nash deviations). We run 1,000$+$ auctions for less than $\$$400 with GPT-4 models (three orders of magnitude cheaper than modern auction experiments) and develop a framework flexible enough to run auction experiments with any LLM model and a wide range of auction design specifications, facilitating further experimental study by decreasing costs and serving as a proof-of-concept for the use of LLM proxies.

AIFeb 14, 2025
LLM-Powered Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Assignment

Ermis Soumalias, Yanchen Jiang, Kehang Zhu et al.

We study the potential of large language models (LLMs) as proxies for humans to simplify preference elicitation (PE) in combinatorial assignment. While traditional PE methods rely on iterative queries to capture preferences, LLMs offer a one-shot alternative with reduced human effort. We propose a framework for LLM proxies that can work in tandem with SOTA ML-powered preference elicitation schemes. Our framework handles the novel challenges introduced by LLMs, such as response variability and increased computational costs. We experimentally evaluate the efficiency of LLM proxies against human queries in the well-studied course allocation domain, and we investigate the model capabilities required for success. We find that our approach improves allocative efficiency by up to 20%, and these results are robust across different LLMs and to differences in quality and accuracy of reporting.

AISep 11, 2025
Strategic Tradeoffs Between Humans and AI in Multi-Agent Bargaining

Crystal Qian, Kehang Zhu, John Horton et al.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly embedded in collaborative human activities such as business negotiations and group coordination, it becomes critical to evaluate both the performance gains they can achieve and how they interact in dynamic, multi-agent environments. Unlike traditional statistical agents such as Bayesian models, which may excel under well-specified conditions, large language models (LLMs) can generalize across diverse, real-world scenarios, raising new questions about how their strategies and behaviors compare to those of humans and other agent types. In this work, we compare outcomes and behavioral dynamics across humans (N = 216), LLMs (GPT-4o, Gemini 1.5 Pro), and Bayesian agents in a dynamic negotiation setting under identical conditions. Bayesian agents extract the highest surplus through aggressive optimization, at the cost of frequent trade rejections. Humans and LLMs achieve similar overall surplus, but through distinct behaviors: LLMs favor conservative, concessionary trades with few rejections, while humans employ more strategic, risk-taking, and fairness-oriented behaviors. Thus, we find that performance parity -- a common benchmark in agent evaluation -- can conceal fundamental differences in process and alignment, which are critical for practical deployment in real-world coordination tasks. By establishing foundational behavioral baselines under matched conditions, this work provides a baseline for future studies in more applied, variable-rich environments.