Devika Jay

Clifford F, Devika Jay, Abhishek Sarkar et al.

As Reinforcement Learning (RL) agents are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, ensuring their behavior is transparent and trustworthy is paramount. A key component of trust is explainability, yet much of the work in Explainable RL (XRL) focuses on local, single-step decisions. This paper addresses the critical need for explaining an agent's long-term behavior through trajectory-level analysis. We introduce a novel framework that ranks entire trajectories by defining and aggregating a new state-importance metric. This metric combines the classic Q-value difference with a "radical term" that captures the agent's affinity to reach its goal, providing a more nuanced measure of state criticality. We demonstrate that our method successfully identifies optimal trajectories from a heterogeneous collection of agent experiences. Furthermore, by generating counterfactual rollouts from critical states within these trajectories, we show that the agent's chosen path is robustly superior to alternatives, thereby providing a powerful "Why this, and not that?" explanation. Our experiments in standard OpenAI Gym environments validate that our proposed importance metric is more effective at identifying optimal behaviors compared to classic approaches, offering a significant step towards trustworthy autonomous systems.

Jahnvi Patel, Devika Jay, Balaraman Ravindran et al.

In real time electricity markets, the objective of generation companies while bidding is to maximize their profit. The strategies for learning optimal bidding have been formulated through game theoretical approaches and stochastic optimization problems. Similar studies in reactive power markets have not been reported so far because the network voltage operating conditions have an increased impact on reactive power markets than on active power markets. Contrary to active power markets, the bids of rivals are not directly related to fuel costs in reactive power markets. Hence, the assumption of a suitable probability distribution function is unrealistic, making the strategies adopted in active power markets unsuitable for learning optimal bids in reactive power market mechanisms. Therefore, a bidding strategy is to be learnt from market observations and experience in imperfect oligopolistic competition-based markets. In this paper, a pioneer work on learning optimal bidding strategies from observation and experience in a three-stage reactive power market is reported.