Jana Schaich Borg

Leena Mathur, Jenny T. Liang, Vasudha Varadarajan et al.

AI researchers have been advancing socially intelligent AI agents (Social-AI) across embodiments, from chatbots to physical robots. As Social-AI is increasingly deployed in everyday settings, decisions about the roles these agents should play will depend on how laypeople perceive them. However, public perceptions of social intelligence in AI agents and the acceptability of these agents remain largely understudied. We present a mixed-methods survey of adults in the United States (N=200) that examines social intelligence as a perceived construct in AI agents. Our survey investigates the extent to which participants believe current AI agents have social intelligence, abilities of agents that participants associate with social intelligence, contextual factors influencing participant acceptance of Social-AI agents, and concerns participants hold about these technologies. Participants widely reported having already encountered AI agents they perceived as socially intelligent and grounded their judgments in observable behaviors, more than beliefs about AI agency or intent. We identified a support-adoption gap in acceptability judgments: participants supported the existence of Social-AI agents for others far more than for their own personal use. Our analysis uncovers layperson concerns about Social-AI, informing AI governance regarding appropriate deployment contexts, agent roles, and risks to end users.

Kyle Boerstler, Vijay Keswani, Lok Chan et al.

Preference elicitation frameworks feature heavily in the research on participatory ethical AI tools and provide a viable mechanism to enquire and incorporate the moral values of various stakeholders. As part of the elicitation process, surveys about moral preferences, opinions, and judgments are typically administered only once to each participant. This methodological practice is reasonable if participants' responses are stable over time such that, all other relevant factors being held constant, their responses today will be the same as their responses to the same questions at a later time. However, we do not know how often that is the case. It is possible that participants' true moral preferences change, are subject to temporary moods or whims, or are influenced by environmental factors we don't track. If participants' moral responses are unstable in such ways, it would raise important methodological and theoretical issues for how participants' true moral preferences, opinions, and judgments can be ascertained. We address this possibility here by asking the same survey participants the same moral questions about which patient should receive a kidney when only one is available ten times in ten different sessions over two weeks, varying only presentation order across sessions. We measured how often participants gave different responses to simple (Study One) and more complicated (Study Two) repeated scenarios. On average, the fraction of times participants changed their responses to controversial scenarios was around 10-18% across studies, and this instability is observed to have positive associations with response time and decision-making difficulty. We discuss the implications of these results for the efficacy of moral preference elicitation, highlighting the role of response instability in causing value misalignment between stakeholders and AI tools trained on their moral judgments.

Vijay Keswani, Vincent Conitzer, Hoda Heidari et al.

Computational preference elicitation methods are tools used to learn people's preferences quantitatively in a given context. Recent works on preference elicitation advocate for active learning as an efficient method to iteratively construct queries (framed as comparisons between context-specific cases) that are likely to be most informative about an agent's underlying preferences. In this work, we argue that the use of active learning for moral preference elicitation relies on certain assumptions about the underlying moral preferences, which can be violated in practice. Specifically, we highlight the following common assumptions (a) preferences are stable over time and not sensitive to the sequence of presented queries, (b) the appropriate hypothesis class is chosen to model moral preferences, and (c) noise in the agent's responses is limited. While these assumptions can be appropriate for preference elicitation in certain domains, prior research on moral psychology suggests they may not be valid for moral judgments. Through a synthetic simulation of preferences that violate the above assumptions, we observe that active learning can have similar or worse performance than a basic random query selection method in certain settings. Yet, simulation results also demonstrate that active learning can still be viable if the degree of instability or noise is relatively small and when the agent's preferences can be approximately represented with the hypothesis class used for learning. Our study highlights the nuances associated with effective moral preference elicitation in practice and advocates for the cautious use of active learning as a methodology to learn moral preferences.

Vijay Keswani, Cyrus Cousins, Breanna Nguyen et al.

Alignment methods in moral domains seek to elicit moral preferences of human stakeholders and incorporate them into AI. This presupposes moral preferences as static targets, but such preferences often evolve over time. Proper alignment of AI to dynamic human preferences should ideally account for "legitimate" changes to moral reasoning, while ignoring changes related to attention deficits, cognitive biases, or other arbitrary factors. However, common AI alignment approaches largely neglect temporal changes in preferences, posing serious challenges to proper alignment, especially in high-stakes applications of AI, e.g., in healthcare domains, where misalignment can jeopardize the trustworthiness of the system and yield serious individual and societal harms. This work investigates the extent to which people's moral preferences change over time, and the impact of such changes on AI alignment. Our study is grounded in the kidney allocation domain, where we elicit responses to pairwise comparisons of hypothetical kidney transplant patients from over 400 participants across 3-5 sessions. We find that, on average, participants change their response to the same scenario presented at different times around 6-20% of the time (exhibiting "response instability"). Additionally, we observe significant shifts in several participants' retrofitted decision-making models over time (capturing "model instability"). The predictive performance of simple AI models decreases as a function of both response and model instability. Moreover, predictive performance diminishes over time, highlighting the importance of accounting for temporal changes in preferences during training. These findings raise fundamental normative and technical challenges relevant to AI alignment, highlighting the need to better understand the object of alignment (what to align to) when user preferences change significantly over time.

Jing-Jing Li, Valentina Pyatkin, Max Kleiman-Weiner et al. · allen-ai, cmu

The ideal AI safety moderation system would be both structurally interpretable (so its decisions can be reliably explained) and steerable (to align to safety standards and reflect a community's values), which current systems fall short on. To address this gap, we present SafetyAnalyst, a novel AI safety moderation framework. Given an AI behavior, SafetyAnalyst uses chain-of-thought reasoning to analyze its potential consequences by creating a structured "harm-benefit tree," which enumerates harmful and beneficial actions and effects the AI behavior may lead to, along with likelihood, severity, and immediacy labels that describe potential impacts on stakeholders. SafetyAnalyst then aggregates all effects into a harmfulness score using 28 fully interpretable weight parameters, which can be aligned to particular safety preferences. We applied this framework to develop an open-source LLM prompt safety classification system, distilled from 18.5 million harm-benefit features generated by frontier LLMs on 19k prompts. On comprehensive benchmarks, we show that SafetyAnalyst (average F1=0.81) outperforms existing moderation systems (average F1$<$0.72) on prompt safety classification, while offering the additional advantages of interpretability, transparency, and steerability.

Jana Schaich Borg, Hannah Read

Interest is growing in artificial empathy, but so is confusion about what artificial empathy is or needs to be. This confusion makes it challenging to navigate the technical and ethical issues that accompany empathic AI development. Here, we outline a framework for thinking about empathic AI based on the premise that different constellations of capabilities associated with empathy are important for different empathic AI applications. We describe distinctions of capabilities that we argue belong under the empathy umbrella, and show how three medical empathic AI use cases require different sets of these capabilities. We conclude by discussing why appreciation of the diverse capabilities under the empathy umbrella is important for both AI creators and users.

Jiarui Liu, Yueqi Song, Yunze Xiao et al. · allen-ai, cmu

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in morally sensitive domains, it is crucial to understand how persona traits affect their moral reasoning and persuasive behavior. We present the first large-scale study of multi-dimensional persona effects in AI-AI debates over real-world moral dilemmas. Using a 6-dimensional persona space (age, gender, country, class, ideology, and personality), we simulate structured debates between AI agents over 131 relationship-based cases. Our results show that personas affect initial moral stances and debate outcomes, with political ideology and personality traits exerting the strongest influence. Persuasive success varies across traits, with liberal and open personalities reaching higher consensus and win rates. While logit-based confidence grows during debates, emotional and credibility-based appeals diminish, indicating more tempered argumentation over time. These trends mirror findings from psychology and cultural studies, reinforcing the need for persona-aware evaluation frameworks for AI moral reasoning.

Vijay Keswani, Vincent Conitzer, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong et al.

A growing body of work in Ethical AI attempts to capture human moral judgments through simple computational models. The key question we address in this work is whether such simple AI models capture {the critical} nuances of moral decision-making by focusing on the use case of kidney allocation. We conducted twenty interviews where participants explained their rationale for their judgments about who should receive a kidney. We observe participants: (a) value patients' morally-relevant attributes to different degrees; (b) use diverse decision-making processes, citing heuristics to reduce decision complexity; (c) can change their opinions; (d) sometimes lack confidence in their decisions (e.g., due to incomplete information); and (e) express enthusiasm and concern regarding AI assisting humans in kidney allocation decisions. Based on these findings, we discuss challenges of computationally modeling moral judgments {as a stand-in for human input}, highlight drawbacks of current approaches, and suggest future directions to address these issues.

Cyrus Cousins, Vijay Keswani, Vincent Conitzer et al.

Recent AI work trends towards incorporating human-centric objectives, with the explicit goal of aligning AI models to personal preferences and societal values. Using standard preference elicitation methods, researchers and practitioners build models of human decisions and judgments, which are then used to align AI behavior with that of humans. However, models commonly used in such elicitation processes often do not capture the true cognitive processes of human decision making, such as when people use heuristics to simplify information associated with a decision problem. As a result, models learned from people's decisions often do not align with their cognitive processes, and can not be used to validate the learning framework for generalization to other decision-making tasks. To address this limitation, we take an axiomatic approach to learning cognitively faithful decision processes from pairwise comparisons. Building on the vast literature characterizing the cognitive processes that contribute to human decision-making, and recent work characterizing such processes in pairwise comparison tasks, we define a class of models in which individual features are first processed and compared across alternatives, and then the processed features are then aggregated via a fixed rule, such as the Bradley-Terry rule. This structured processing of information ensures such models are realistic and feasible candidates to represent underlying human decision-making processes. We demonstrate the efficacy of this modeling approach in learning interpretable models of human decision making in a kidney allocation task, and show that our proposed models match or surpass the accuracy of prior models of human pairwise decision-making.

Adrien Meynard, Gayan Seneviratna, Elliot Doyle et al.

Diverse disciplines are interested in how the coordination of interacting agents' movements, emotions, and physiology over time impacts social behavior. Here, we describe a new multivariate procedure for automating the investigation of this kind of behaviorally-relevant "interactional synchrony", and introduce a novel interactional synchrony measure based on features of dynamic time warping (DTW) paths. We demonstrate that our DTW path-based measure of interactional synchrony between facial action units of two people interacting freely in a natural social interaction can be used to predict how much trust they will display in a subsequent Trust Game. We also show that our approach outperforms univariate head movement models, models that consider participants' facial action units independently, and models that use previously proposed synchrony or similarity measures. The insights of this work can be applied to any research question that aims to quantify the temporal coordination of multiple signals over time, but has immediate applications in psychology, medicine, and robotics.

Duncan C McElfresh, Lok Chan, Kenzie Doyle et al.

AI systems are often used to make or contribute to important decisions in a growing range of applications, including criminal justice, hiring, and medicine. Since these decisions impact human lives, it is important that the AI systems act in ways which align with human values. Techniques for preference modeling and social choice help researchers learn and aggregate peoples' preferences, which are used to guide AI behavior; thus, it is imperative that these learned preferences are accurate. These techniques often assume that people are willing to express strict preferences over alternatives; which is not true in practice. People are often indecisive, and especially so when their decision has moral implications. The philosophy and psychology literature shows that indecision is a measurable and nuanced behavior -- and that there are several different reasons people are indecisive. This complicates the task of both learning and aggregating preferences, since most of the relevant literature makes restrictive assumptions on the meaning of indecision. We begin to close this gap by formalizing several mathematical \emph{indecision} models based on theories from philosophy, psychology, and economics; these models can be used to describe (indecisive) agent decisions, both when they are allowed to express indecision and when they are not. We test these models using data collected from an online survey where participants choose how to (hypothetically) allocate organs to patients waiting for a transplant.

Rachel Freedman, Jana Schaich Borg, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong et al.

The efficient and fair allocation of limited resources is a classical problem in economics and computer science. In kidney exchanges, a central market maker allocates living kidney donors to patients in need of an organ. Patients and donors in kidney exchanges are prioritized using ad-hoc weights decided on by committee and then fed into an allocation algorithm that determines who gets what--and who does not. In this paper, we provide an end-to-end methodology for estimating weights of individual participant profiles in a kidney exchange. We first elicit from human subjects a list of patient attributes they consider acceptable for the purpose of prioritizing patients (e.g., medical characteristics, lifestyle choices, and so on). Then, we ask subjects comparison queries between patient profiles and estimate weights in a principled way from their responses. We show how to use these weights in kidney exchange market clearing algorithms. We then evaluate the impact of the weights in simulations and find that the precise numerical values of the weights we computed matter little, other than the ordering of profiles that they imply. However, compared to not prioritizing patients at all, there is a significant effect, with certain classes of patients being (de)prioritized based on the human-elicited value judgments.

Lok Chan, Kenzie Doyle, Duncan McElfresh et al.

Given AI's growing role in modeling and improving decision-making, how and when to present users with feedback is an urgent topic to address. We empirically examined the effect of feedback from false AI on moral decision-making about donor kidney allocation. We found some evidence that judgments about whether a patient should receive a kidney can be influenced by feedback about participants' own decision-making perceived to be given by AI, even if the feedback is entirely random. We also discovered different effects between assessments presented as being from human experts and assessments presented as being from AI.