Saugata Ghose

Geraldo F. Oliveira, Juan Gómez-Luna, Saugata Ghose et al.

Neural networks (NNs) are growing in importance and complexity. A neural network's performance (and energy efficiency) can be bound either by computation or memory resources. The processing-in-memory (PIM) paradigm, where computation is placed near or within memory arrays, is a viable solution to accelerate memory-bound NNs. However, PIM architectures vary in form, where different PIM approaches lead to different trade-offs. Our goal is to analyze, discuss, and contrast DRAM-based PIM architectures for NN performance and energy efficiency. To do so, we analyze three state-of-the-art PIM architectures: (1) UPMEM, which integrates processors and DRAM arrays into a single 2D chip; (2) Mensa, a 3D-stack-based PIM architecture tailored for edge devices; and (3) SIMDRAM, which uses the analog principles of DRAM to execute bit-serial operations. Our analysis reveals that PIM greatly benefits memory-bound NNs: (1) UPMEM provides 23x the performance of a high-end GPU when the GPU requires memory oversubscription for a general matrix-vector multiplication kernel; (2) Mensa improves energy efficiency and throughput by 3.0x and 3.1x over the Google Edge TPU for 24 Google edge NN models; and (3) SIMDRAM outperforms a CPU/GPU by 16.7x/1.4x for three binary NNs. We conclude that the ideal PIM architecture for NN models depends on a model's distinct attributes, due to the inherent architectural design choices.

Geraldo F. Oliveira, Amirali Boroumand, Saugata Ghose et al.

Today's computing systems require moving data back-and-forth between computing resources (e.g., CPUs, GPUs, accelerators) and off-chip main memory so that computation can take place on the data. Unfortunately, this data movement is a major bottleneck for system performance and energy consumption. One promising execution paradigm that alleviates the data movement bottleneck in modern and emerging applications is processing-in-memory (PIM), where the cost of data movement to/from main memory is reduced by placing computation capabilities close to memory. Naively employing PIM to accelerate data-intensive workloads can lead to sub-optimal performance due to the many design constraints PIM substrates impose. Therefore, many recent works co-design specialized PIM accelerators and algorithms to improve performance and reduce the energy consumption of (i) applications from various application domains; and (ii) various computing environments, including cloud systems, mobile systems, and edge devices. We showcase the benefits of co-designing algorithms and hardware in a way that efficiently takes advantage of the PIM paradigm for two modern data-intensive applications: (1) machine learning inference models for edge devices and (2) hybrid transactional/analytical processing databases for cloud systems. We follow a two-step approach in our system design. In the first step, we extensively analyze the computation and memory access patterns of each application to gain insights into its hardware/software requirements and major sources of performance and energy bottlenecks in processor-centric systems. In the second step, we leverage the insights from the first step to co-design algorithms and hardware accelerators to enable high-performance and energy-efficient data-centric architectures for each application.

Ryan Wong, Ben Feinberg, Saugata Ghose

Analog processing-using-memory (PUM; a.k.a. in-memory computing) makes use of electrical interactions inside memory arrays to perform bulk matrix-vector multiplication (MVM) operations. However, many popular matrix-based kernels need to execute non-MVM operations, which analog PUM cannot directly perform. To retain its energy efficiency, analog PUM architectures augment memory arrays with CMOS-based domain-specific fixed-function hardware to provide complete kernel functionality, but the difficulty of integrating such specialized CMOS logic with memory arrays has largely limited analog PUM to being an accelerator for machine learning inference, or for closely related kernels. An opportunity exists to harness analog PUM for general-purpose computation: recent works have shown that memory arrays can also perform Boolean PUM operations, albeit with very different supporting hardware and electrical signals than analog PUM. We propose DARTH-PUM, a general-purpose hybrid PUM architecture that tackles key hardware and software challenges to integrating analog PUM and digital PUM. We propose optimized peripheral circuitry, coordinating hardware to manage and interface between both types of PUM, an easy-to-use programming interface, and low-cost support for flexible data widths. These design elements allow us to build a practical PUM architecture that can execute kernels fully in memory, and can scale easily to cater to domains ranging from embedded applications to large-scale data-driven computing. We show how three popular applications (AES encryption, convolutional neural networks, large-language models) can map to and benefit from DARTH-PUM, with speedups of 59.4x, 14.8x, and 40.8x over an analog+CPU baseline.

Amirali Boroumand, Saugata Ghose, Berkin Akin et al.

Emerging edge computing platforms often contain machine learning (ML) accelerators that can accelerate inference for a wide range of neural network (NN) models. These models are designed to fit within the limited area and energy constraints of the edge computing platforms, each targeting various applications (e.g., face detection, speech recognition, translation, image captioning, video analytics). To understand how edge ML accelerators perform, we characterize the performance of a commercial Google Edge TPU, using 24 Google edge NN models (which span a wide range of NN model types) and analyzing each NN layer within each model. We find that the Edge TPU suffers from three major shortcomings: (1) it operates significantly below peak computational throughput, (2) it operates significantly below its theoretical energy efficiency, and (3) its memory system is a large energy and performance bottleneck. Our characterization reveals that the one-size-fits-all, monolithic design of the Edge TPU ignores the high degree of heterogeneity both across different NN models and across different NN layers within the same NN model, leading to the shortcomings we observe. We propose a new acceleration framework called Mensa. Mensa incorporates multiple heterogeneous edge ML accelerators (including both on-chip and near-data accelerators), each of which caters to the characteristics of a particular subset of NN models and layers. During NN inference, for each NN layer, Mensa decides which accelerator to schedule the layer on, taking into account both the optimality of each accelerator for the layer and layer-to-layer communication costs. Averaged across all 24 Google edge NN models, Mensa improves energy efficiency and throughput by 3.0x and 3.1x over the Edge TPU, and by 2.4x and 4.3x over Eyeriss~v2, a state-of-the-art accelerator.

Lois Orosa, Yaohua Wang, Mohammad Sadrosadati et al.

DRAM is the dominant main memory technology used in modern computing systems. Computing systems implement a memory controller that interfaces with DRAM via DRAM commands. DRAM executes the given commands using internal components (e.g., access transistors, sense amplifiers) that are orchestrated by DRAM internal timings, which are fixed foreach DRAM command. Unfortunately, the use of fixed internal timings limits the types of operations that DRAM can perform and hinders the implementation of new functionalities and custom mechanisms that improve DRAM reliability, performance and energy. To overcome these limitations, we propose enabling programmable DRAM internal timings for controlling in-DRAM components. To this end, we design CODIC, a new low-cost DRAM substrate that enables fine-grained control over four previously fixed internal DRAM timings that are key to many DRAM operations. We implement CODIC with only minimal changes to the DRAM chip and the DDRx interface. To demonstrate the potential of CODIC, we propose two new CODIC-based security mechanisms that outperform state-of-the-art mechanisms in several ways: (1) a new DRAM Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) that is more robust and has significantly higher throughput than state-of-the-art DRAM PUFs, and (2) the first cold boot attack prevention mechanism that does not introduce any performance or energy overheads at runtime.

Amirali Boroumand, Saugata Ghose, Berkin Akin et al.

As the need for edge computing grows, many modern consumer devices now contain edge machine learning (ML) accelerators that can compute a wide range of neural network (NN) models while still fitting within tight resource constraints. We analyze a commercial Edge TPU using 24 Google edge NN models (including CNNs, LSTMs, transducers, and RCNNs), and find that the accelerator suffers from three shortcomings, in terms of computational throughput, energy efficiency, and memory access handling. We comprehensively study the characteristics of each NN layer in all of the Google edge models, and find that these shortcomings arise from the one-size-fits-all approach of the accelerator, as there is a high amount of heterogeneity in key layer characteristics both across different models and across different layers in the same model. We propose a new acceleration framework called Mensa. Mensa incorporates multiple heterogeneous ML edge accelerators (including both on-chip and near-data accelerators), each of which caters to the characteristics of a particular subset of models. At runtime, Mensa schedules each layer to run on the best-suited accelerator, accounting for both efficiency and inter-layer dependencies. As we analyze the Google edge NN models, we discover that all of the layers naturally group into a small number of clusters, which allows us to design an efficient implementation of Mensa for these models with only three specialized accelerators. Averaged across all 24 Google edge models, Mensa improves energy efficiency and throughput by 3.0x and 3.1x over the Edge TPU, and by 2.4x and 4.3x over Eyeriss v2, a state-of-the-art accelerator.

Abdullah Giray Yağlıkçı, Minesh Patel, Jeremie S. Kim et al.

Aggressive memory density scaling causes modern DRAM devices to suffer from RowHammer, a phenomenon where rapidly activating a DRAM row can cause bit-flips in physically-nearby rows. Recent studies demonstrate that modern DRAM chips, including chips previously marketed as RowHammer-safe, are even more vulnerable to RowHammer than older chips. Many works show that attackers can exploit RowHammer bit-flips to reliably mount system-level attacks to escalate privilege and leak private data. Therefore, it is critical to ensure RowHammer-safe operation on all DRAM-based systems. Unfortunately, state-of-the-art RowHammer mitigation mechanisms face two major challenges. First, they incur increasingly higher performance and/or area overheads when applied to more vulnerable DRAM chips. Second, they require either proprietary information about or modifications to the DRAM chip design. In this paper, we show that it is possible to efficiently and scalably prevent RowHammer bit-flips without knowledge of or modification to DRAM internals. We introduce BlockHammer, a low-cost, effective, and easy-to-adopt RowHammer mitigation mechanism that overcomes the two key challenges by selectively throttling memory accesses that could otherwise cause RowHammer bit-flips. The key idea of BlockHammer is to (1) track row activation rates using area-efficient Bloom filters and (2) use the tracking data to ensure that no row is ever activated rapidly enough to induce RowHammer bit-flips. By doing so, BlockHammer (1) makes it impossible for a RowHammer bit-flip to occur and (2) greatly reduces a RowHammer attack's impact on the performance of co-running benign applications. Compared to state-of-the-art RowHammer mitigation mechanisms, BlockHammer provides competitive performance and energy when the system is not under a RowHammer attack and significantly better performance and energy when the system is under attack.

Lois Orosa, Yaohua Wang, Ivan Puddu et al.

DRAM manufacturers have been prioritizing memory capacity, yield, and bandwidth for years, while trying to keep the design complexity as simple as possible. DRAM chips do not carry out any computation or other important functions, such as security. Processors implement most of the existing security mechanisms that protect the system against security threats, because 1) executing security mechanisms usually require non-trivial computational capabilities (e.g., encryption), and 2) commodity DRAM chips are not designed to perform computations or tasks other than data storage. In this work, we advocate for DRAM as a key component for providing security mechanisms to the system. To this end, we propose Dataplant, a new class of low-cost, high-performance, and reliable security primitives that can be integrated in commodity DRAM chips with minimal changes. The main idea of Dataplant is to slightly modify the internal DRAM timing signals to expose the inherent process variation found in all DRAM chips for generating unpredictable but reproducible values (e.g., keys) within DRAM. We use Dataplant to build two new security mechanisms. First, a new Dataplant-based physical unclonable function (PUF) with non-destructive read-out, low evaluation latency, robust responses, resiliency to temperature changes, and data-independent responses. Second, a new cold boot attack prevention mechanism that automatically destroys all data within DRAM on every power cycle with zero run-time energy and latency overheads. Using a combination of detailed simulations and experiments with 136 real commodity DRAM chips, we show that our Dataplant-based PUF has 1.8x higher throughput than the best state-of-the-art DRAM PUFs. We also demonstrate that our Dataplant-based cold boot attack protection mechanism is 19.5x faster and consumes 2.54x less energy when compared to existing mechanisms.