Sarah Ball

Tobias Holtdirk, Pietro Marcolongo, Anna Steinberg Schulten et al.

Reproducibility in the social and behavioral sciences is typically evaluated by independent researchers who reanalyze the original data to assess whether the published findings can be recovered. However, such approaches are resource-intensive and difficult to scale. Here, we show that large language models (LLMs) can automate reproducibility assessments. Using N=76 published studies with predefined claims from the behavioral and social sciences, we compare LLM-generated analysis with the original findings and human reanalysis. For 7 studies, the LLM could not produce a viable effect size estimate. For the remaining studies, our LLM pipeline recovered the original effect sizes in 41% of studies using a +/-0.05 tolerance in Cohen's d. Further, our LLM pipeline reached the same qualitative conclusion as the original study in 96% of cases, where conclusions indicate whether the reanalysis supports the original claim. For comparison, human reanalysts recovered the original effect sizes in 34% of studies and reached the same qualitative conclusion in 74% of cases. Together, these results show that LLMs can serve as a scalable tool for automated reproducibility assessment and provide a foundation for systematic auditing of empirical results in the social and behavioral sciences.

Sarah Ball, Greg Gluch, Shafi Goldwasser et al.

With the increased deployment of large language models (LLMs), one concern is their potential misuse for generating harmful content. Our work studies the alignment challenge, with a focus on filters to prevent the generation of unsafe information. Two natural points of intervention are the filtering of the input prompt before it reaches the model, and filtering the output after generation. Our main results demonstrate computational challenges in filtering both prompts and outputs. First, we show that there exist LLMs for which there are no efficient prompt filters: adversarial prompts that elicit harmful behavior can be easily constructed, which are computationally indistinguishable from benign prompts for any efficient filter. Our second main result identifies a natural setting in which output filtering is computationally intractable. All of our separation results are under cryptographic hardness assumptions. In addition to these core findings, we also formalize and study relaxed mitigation approaches, demonstrating further computational barriers. We conclude that safety cannot be achieved by designing filters external to the LLM internals (architecture and weights); in particular, black-box access to the LLM will not suffice. Based on our technical results, we argue that an aligned AI system's intelligence cannot be separated from its judgment.