Jou Barzdukas

Dani Roytburg, Matthew Bozoukov, Matthew Nguyen et al.

Recent research has shown that large language models (LLMs) favor their own outputs when acting as judges, undermining the integrity of automated post-training and evaluation workflows. However, it is difficult to disentangle which evaluation biases are explained by narcissism versus general experimental confounds, distorting measurements of self-preference bias. We discover a core methodological confound which could reduce measurement error by 89.6%. Specifically, LLM evaluators may deliver self-preferring verdicts when the judge responds to queries which they completed incorrectly themselves; this would be true regardless of whether one of their responses is their own. To decouple self-preference signals from noisy outputs on hard problems, we introduce an Evaluator Quality Baseline, which compares the probability that a judge incorrectly votes for itself against the probability that it votes for an incorrect response from another model. Evaluating this simple baseline on 37,448 queries, only 51% of initial findings retain statistical significance. Finally, we turn towards characterizing the entropy of "easy" versus "hard" evaluation votes from LLM judges. Our corrective baseline enables future research on self-preference by eliminating noisy data from potential solutions. More widely, this work contributes to the growing body of work on cataloging and isolating judge-bias effects.

Dani Roytburg, Matthew Bozoukov, Matthew Nguyen et al.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly serve as automated evaluators, yet they suffer from "self-preference bias": a tendency to favor their own outputs over those of other models. This bias undermines fairness and reliability in evaluation pipelines, particularly for tasks like preference tuning and model routing. We investigate whether lightweight steering vectors can mitigate this problem at inference time without retraining. We introduce a curated dataset that distinguishes self-preference bias into justified examples of self-preference and unjustified examples of self-preference, and we construct steering vectors using two methods: Contrastive Activation Addition (CAA) and an optimization-based approach. Our results show that steering vectors can reduce unjustified self-preference bias by up to 97\%, substantially outperforming prompting and direct preference optimization baselines. Yet steering vectors are unstable on legitimate self-preference and unbiased agreement, implying self-preference spans multiple or nonlinear directions. This underscores both their promise and limits as safeguards for LLM-as-judges and motivates more robust interventions.