Yixin Sun

Bichen Wang, Yixin Sun, Junzhe Wang et al.

The mismatch between the growing demand for psychological counseling and the limited availability of services has motivated research into the application of Large Language Models (LLMs) in this domain. Consequently, there is a need for a robust and unified benchmark to assess the counseling competence of various LLMs. Existing works, however, are limited by unprofessional client simulation, static question-and-answer evaluation formats, and unidimensional metrics. These limitations hinder their effectiveness in assessing a model's comprehensive ability to handle diverse and complex clients. To address this gap, we introduce \textbf{CARE-Bench}, a dynamic and interactive automated benchmark. It is built upon diverse client profiles derived from real-world counseling cases and simulated according to expert guidelines. CARE-Bench provides a multidimensional performance evaluation grounded in established psychological scales. Using CARE-Bench, we evaluate several general-purpose LLMs and specialized counseling models, revealing their current limitations. In collaboration with psychologists, we conduct a detailed analysis of the reasons for LLMs' failures when interacting with clients of different types, which provides directions for developing more comprehensive, universal, and effective counseling models.

Yixin Sun, Li Li, Wenke E et al.

Detecting traversable pathways in unstructured outdoor environments remains a significant challenge for autonomous robots, especially in critical applications such as wide-area search and rescue, as well as incident management scenarios like forest fires. Existing datasets and models primarily target urban settings or wide, vehicle-traversable off-road tracks, leaving a substantial gap in addressing the complexity of narrow, trail-like off-road scenarios. To address this, we introduce the Trail-based Off-road Multimodal Dataset (TOMD), a comprehensive dataset specifically designed for such environments. TOMD features high-fidelity multimodal sensor data -- including 128-channel LiDAR, stereo imagery, GNSS, IMU, and illumination measurements -- collected through repeated traversals under diverse conditions. We also propose a dynamic multiscale data fusion model for accurate traversable pathway prediction. The study analyzes the performance of early, cross, and mixed fusion strategies under varying illumination levels. Results demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach and the relevance of illumination in segmentation performance. We publicly release TOMD at https://github.com/yyyxs1125/TMOD to support future research in trail-based off-road navigation.

Wenke E, Chao Yuan, Li Li et al.

We present Dur360BEV, a novel spherical camera autonomous driving dataset equipped with a high-resolution 128-channel 3D LiDAR and a RTK-refined GNSS/INS system, along with a benchmark architecture designed to generate Bird-Eye-View (BEV) maps using only a single spherical camera. This dataset and benchmark address the challenges of BEV generation in autonomous driving, particularly by reducing hardware complexity through the use of a single 360-degree camera instead of multiple perspective cameras. Within our benchmark architecture, we propose a novel spherical-image-to-BEV module that leverages spherical imagery and a refined sampling strategy to project features from 2D to 3D. Our approach also includes an innovative application of focal loss, specifically adapted to address the extreme class imbalance often encountered in BEV segmentation tasks, that demonstrates improved segmentation performance on the Dur360BEV dataset. The results show that our benchmark not only simplifies the sensor setup but also achieves competitive performance.

Yixin Sun, Maria Apostolaki, Henry Birge-Lee et al.

Attacks on Internet routing are typically viewed through the lens of availability and confidentiality, assuming an adversary that either discards traffic or performs eavesdropping. Yet, a strategic adversary can use routing attacks to compromise the security of critical Internet applications like Tor, certificate authorities, and the bitcoin network. In this paper, we survey such application-specific routing attacks and argue that both application-layer and network-layer defenses are essential and urgently needed. While application-layer defenses are easier to deploy in the short term, we hope that our work serves to provide much needed momentum for the deployment of network-layer defenses.

Ryan Wails, Yixin Sun, Aaron Johnson et al.

Many recent proposals for anonymous communication omit from their security analyses a consideration of the effects of time on important system components. In practice, many components of anonymity systems, such as the client location and network structure, exhibit changes and patterns over time. In this paper, we focus on the effect of such temporal dynamics on the security of anonymity networks. We present Tempest, a suite of novel attacks based on (1) client mobility, (2) usage patterns, and (3) changes in the underlying network routing. Using experimental analysis on real-world datasets, we demonstrate that these temporal attacks degrade user privacy across a wide range of anonymity networks, including deployed systems such as Tor; path-selection protocols for Tor such as DeNASA, TAPS, and Counter-RAPTOR; and network-layer anonymity protocols for Internet routing such as Dovetail and HORNET. The degradation is in some cases surprisingly severe. For example, a single host failure or network route change could quickly and with high certainty identify the client's ISP to a malicious host or ISP. The adversary behind each attack is relatively weak - generally passive and in control of one network location or a small number of hosts. Our findings suggest that designers of anonymity systems should rigorously consider the impact of temporal dynamics when analyzing anonymity.

Yixin Sun, Anne Edmundson, Nick Feamster et al.

Tor is vulnerable to network-level adversaries who can observe both ends of the communication to deanonymize users. Recent work has shown that Tor is susceptible to the previously unknown active BGP routing attacks, called RAPTOR attacks, which expose Tor users to more network-level adversaries. In this paper, we aim to mitigate and detect such active routing attacks against Tor. First, we present a new measurement study on the resilience of the Tor network to active BGP prefix attacks. We show that ASes with high Tor bandwidth can be less resilient to attacks than other ASes. Second, we present a new Tor guard relay selection algorithm that incorporates resilience of relays into consideration to proactively mitigate such attacks. We show that the algorithm successfully improves the security for Tor clients by up to 36% on average (up to 166% for certain clients). Finally, we build a live BGP monitoring system that can detect routing anomalies on the Tor network in real time by performing an AS origin check and novel detection analytics. Our monitoring system successfully detects simulated attacks that are modeled after multiple known attack types as well as a real-world hijack attack (performed by us), while having low false positive rates.

Yixin Sun, Anne Edmundson, Laurent Vanbever et al.

The Tor network is a widely used system for anonymous communication. However, Tor is known to be vulnerable to attackers who can observe traffic at both ends of the communication path. In this paper, we show that prior attacks are just the tip of the iceberg. We present a suite of new attacks, called Raptor, that can be launched by Autonomous Systems (ASes) to compromise user anonymity. First, AS-level adversaries can exploit the asymmetric nature of Internet routing to increase the chance of observing at least one direction of user traffic at both ends of the communication. Second, AS-level adversaries can exploit natural churn in Internet routing to lie on the BGP paths for more users over time. Third, strategic adversaries can manipulate Internet routing via BGP hijacks (to discover the users using specific Tor guard nodes) and interceptions (to perform traffic analysis). We demonstrate the feasibility of Raptor attacks by analyzing historical BGP data and Traceroute data as well as performing real-world attacks on the live Tor network, while ensuring that we do not harm real users. In addition, we outline the design of two monitoring frameworks to counter these attacks: BGP monitoring to detect control-plane attacks, and Traceroute monitoring to detect data-plane anomalies. Overall, our work motivates the design of anonymity systems that are aware of the dynamics of Internet routing.