CLAug 31, 2025
Neural Models and Language Model Prompting for the Multidimensional Evaluation of Open-Ended ConversationsMichelle Elizabeth, Alicja Kasicka, Natalia Krawczyk et al.
The growing number of generative AI-based dialogue systems has made their evaluation a crucial challenge. This paper presents our contribution to this important problem through the Dialogue System Technology Challenge (DSTC-12, Track 1), where we developed models to predict dialogue-level, dimension-specific scores. Given the constraint of using relatively small models (i.e. fewer than 13 billion parameters) our work follows two main strategies: employing Language Models (LMs) as evaluators through prompting, and training encoder-based classification and regression models. Our results show that while LM prompting achieves only modest correlations with human judgments, it still ranks second on the test set, outperformed only by the baseline. The regression and classification models, with significantly fewer parameters, demonstrate high correlation for some dimensions on the validation set. Although their performance decreases on the test set, it is important to note that the test set contains annotations with significantly different score ranges for some of the dimensions with respect to the train and validation sets.
CRMar 5
Cyber Threat Intelligence for Artificial Intelligence SystemsNatalia Krawczyk, Mateusz Szczepkowski, Adrian Brodzik et al.
As artificial intelligence (AI) becomes deeply embedded in critical services and everyday products, it is increasingly exposed to security threats which traditional cyber defenses were not designed to handle. In this paper, we investigate how cyber threat intelligence (CTI) may evolve to address attacks that target AI systems. We first analyze the assumptions and workflows of conventional threat intelligence with the needs of AI-focused defense, highlighting AI-specific assets and vulnerabilities. We then review and organize the current landscape of AI security knowledge. Based on this, we outline what an AI-oriented threat intelligence knowledge base should contain, describing concrete indicators of compromise (IoC) for different AI supply-chain phases and artifacts, and showing how such a knowledge base could support security tools. Finally, we discuss techniques for measuring similarity between collected indicators and newly observed AI artifacts. The review reveals gaps and quality issues in existing resources and identifies potential future research directions toward a practical threat intelligence framework tailored to AI.