Jonathan Schneider

Khashayar Gatmiry, Jon Schneider, Stefanie Jegelka

Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) algorithms are a popular class of learning algorithms for online linear optimization (OLO) that guarantee sub-linear regret, but the choice of regularizer can significantly impact dimension-dependent factors in the regret bound. We present an algorithm that takes as input convex and symmetric action sets and loss sets for a specific OLO instance, and outputs a regularizer such that running FTRL with this regularizer guarantees regret within a universal constant factor of the best possible regret bound. In particular, for any choice of (convex, symmetric) action set and loss set we prove that there exists an instantiation of FTRL which achieves regret within a constant factor of the best possible learning algorithm, strengthening the universality result of Srebro et al., 2011. Our algorithm requires preprocessing time and space exponential in the dimension $d$ of the OLO instance, but can be run efficiently online assuming a membership and linear optimization oracle for the action and loss sets, respectively (and is fully polynomial time for the case of constant dimension $d$). We complement this with a lower bound showing that even deciding whether a given regularizer is $α$-strongly-convex with respect to a given norm is NP-hard.

Khashayar Gatmiry, Jon Schneider

We study a variant of prediction with expert advice where the learner's action at round $t$ is only allowed to depend on losses on a specific subset of the rounds (where the structure of which rounds' losses are visible at time $t$ is provided by a directed "feedback graph" known to the learner). We present a novel learning algorithm for this setting based on a strategy of partitioning the losses across sub-cliques of this graph. We complement this with a lower bound that is tight in many practical settings, and which we conjecture to be within a constant factor of optimal. For the important class of transitive feedback graphs, we prove that this algorithm is efficiently implementable and obtains the optimal regret bound (up to a universal constant).

Negin Golrezaei, Vahideh Manshadi, Jon Schneider et al.

In many online platforms, customers' decisions are substantially influenced by product rankings as most customers only examine a few top-ranked products. Concurrently, such platforms also use the same data corresponding to customers' actions to learn how these products must be ranked or ordered. These interactions in the underlying learning process, however, may incentivize sellers to artificially inflate their position by employing fake users, as exemplified by the emergence of click farms. Motivated by such fraudulent behavior, we study the ranking problem of a platform that faces a mixture of real and fake users who are indistinguishable from one another. We first show that existing learning algorithms---that are optimal in the absence of fake users---may converge to highly sub-optimal rankings under manipulation by fake users. To overcome this deficiency, we develop efficient learning algorithms under two informational environments: in the first setting, the platform is aware of the number of fake users, and in the second setting, it is agnostic to the number of fake users. For both these environments, we prove that our algorithms converge to the optimal ranking, while being robust to the aforementioned fraudulent behavior; we also present worst-case performance guarantees for our methods, and show that they significantly outperform existing algorithms. At a high level, our work employs several novel approaches to guarantee robustness such as: (i) constructing product-ordering graphs that encode the pairwise relationships between products inferred from the customers' actions; and (ii) implementing multiple levels of learning with a judicious amount of bi-directional cross-learning between levels.