Shubhorup Biswas

Dewi Gould, Francis Rhys Ward, Anders Cairns Woodruff et al.

Many efforts to ensure frontier AI models are safe rely on monitoring their chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning. If models become able to perform sufficiently complex reasoning internally, without explicit thinking tokens, this would undermine such oversight. We measure how well frontier models reason without CoT across a suite of over 30,000 questions spanning 43 benchmarks in domains including math, coding, puzzles, causality, theory-of-mind, and strategic reasoning. To compare models against humans, we estimate the $50\%$-task-completion time horizon (TH): the human time required for tasks a model completes with $50\%$ success rate. We complement this with a $50\%$ reasoning token horizon: the minimum number of o3-mini reasoning tokens needed for tasks a model solves with $50\%$ success rate. We find that the no-CoT $50\%$ TH of frontier models has been doubling roughly every year over the past six years, with GPT-5.5's TH reaching over 3 minutes and reasoning token horizon exceeding 1,500 tokens. Our median estimates predict that frontier no-CoT THs could exceed 7 minutes by 2028, and 25 minutes by 2030, though these projections carry substantial uncertainty. We recommend frontier developers track this explicitly.

Rauno Arike, Raja Mehta Moreno, Rohan Subramani et al.

Frontier language model agents can exhibit misaligned behaviors, including deception, exploiting reward hacks, and pursuing hidden objectives. To control potentially misaligned agents, we can use LLMs themselves to monitor for misbehavior. In this paper, we study how information access affects LLM monitor performance. While one might expect that monitors perform better when they have access to more of the monitored agents' reasoning and actions, we find that contemporary systems often perform better with less information, a phenomenon we call the less-is-more effect for automated oversight. We demonstrate this phenomenon, and analyze the conditions under which it occurs, in three evaluation environments where agents must conduct sabotage while evading monitors. Motivated by the less-is-more effect, we introduce extract-and-evaluate (EaE) monitoring--a new hierarchical approach where one monitor isolates relevant excerpts from the monitored agent's trajectory and a separate monitor scores them. In BigCodeBench-Sabotage with GPT-4.1-mini as the monitor model, EaE improves sabotage detection rates by 16.8 percentage points over the next-best monitor without increasing the false positive rate. In other settings, EaE either outperforms or is competitive with baselines. In addition, we find that agents unaware of being monitored can be caught much more easily and that monitors scoring longer reasoning traces gain more from information filtering. Lastly, we conduct a cost-performance analysis and find that Gemini and Claude models with monitoring techniques that involve information filtering occupy much of the Pareto frontier.