Kalana Kalupahana

Francesco Emanuele Stradi, Kalana Kalupahana, Matteo Castiglioni et al.

We study the constrained variant of the \emph{multi-armed bandit} (MAB) problem, in which the learner aims not only at minimizing the total loss incurred during the learning dynamic, but also at controlling the violation of multiple \emph{unknown} constraints, under both \emph{full} and \emph{bandit feedback}. We consider a non-stationary environment that subsumes both stochastic and adversarial models and where, at each round, both losses and constraints are drawn from distributions that may change arbitrarily over time. In such a setting, it is provably not possible to guarantee both sublinear regret and sublinear violation. Accordingly, prior work has mainly focused either on settings with stochastic constraints or on relaxing the benchmark with fully adversarial constraints (\emph{e.g.}, via competitive ratios with respect to the optimum). We provide the first algorithms that achieve optimal rates of regret and \emph{positive} constraint violation when the constraints are stochastic while the losses may vary arbitrarily, and that simultaneously yield guarantees that degrade smoothly with the degree of adversariality of the constraints. Specifically, under \emph{full feedback} we propose an algorithm attaining $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}+C)$ regret and $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}+C)$ {positive} violation, where $C$ quantifies the amount of non-stationarity in the constraints. We then show how to extend these guarantees when only bandit feedback is available for the losses. Finally, when \emph{bandit feedback} is available for the constraints, we design an algorithm achieving $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}+C)$ {positive} violation and $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}+C\sqrt{T})$ regret.

Kalana Kalupahana, Francesco Emanuele Stradi, Matteo Castiglioni et al.

We design the first regret guarantees for robust dynamic pricing that decouple the dependence on the corruption $C$ and the time horizon $T$. In dynamic pricing, a seller with unlimited supply of a good interacts with a stream of buyers over \( T \) rounds, with the goal of maximizing revenue. At each round $t$, the seller posts a price $p_t$, and the buyer purchases the good only if their unknown valuation $v^\star$ exceeds this price. The seller observes only the binary feedback $\mathbb{I} \left\{ p_t \leq v^\star \right\}$, indicating whether a sale occurred. In the \emph{robust} pricing setting, a malicious adversary is allowed to corrupt this feedback in at most $C$ rounds. Even if the learner knows the corruption $C$, the best known regret bound is $\mathcal{O}(C\log\log T)$ by Gupta et al. [2025]. This leaves as an open problem to ``decouple'' the dependence on $C$ and $T$. In this work, we resolve this open problem. In particular, we develop a robust variant of binary search that achieves regret $\mathcal{O}(C+\log T)$ when the corruption $C$ is known and $\mathcal{O}(C+\log^2 T)$ when the corruption is unknown.