Zhihao Li

Anthony Cioppa, Silvio Giancola, Vladimir Somers et al.

The SoccerNet 2024 challenges represent the fourth annual video understanding challenges organized by the SoccerNet team. These challenges aim to advance research across multiple themes in football, including broadcast video understanding, field understanding, and player understanding. This year, the challenges encompass four vision-based tasks. (1) Ball Action Spotting, focusing on precisely localizing when and which soccer actions related to the ball occur, (2) Dense Video Captioning, focusing on describing the broadcast with natural language and anchored timestamps, (3) Multi-View Foul Recognition, a novel task focusing on analyzing multiple viewpoints of a potential foul incident to classify whether a foul occurred and assess its severity, (4) Game State Reconstruction, another novel task focusing on reconstructing the game state from broadcast videos onto a 2D top-view map of the field. Detailed information about the tasks, challenges, and leaderboards can be found at https://www.soccer-net.org, with baselines and development kits available at https://github.com/SoccerNet.

Kanghua Mo, Li Hu, Yucheng Long et al.

Large language model (LLM) agents have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in complex reasoning and decision-making by leveraging external tools. However, this tool-centric paradigm introduces a previously underexplored attack surface: adversaries can manipulate tool metadata -- such as names, descriptions, and parameter schemas -- to influence agent behavior. We identify this as a new and stealthy threat surface that allows malicious tools to be preferentially selected by LLM agents, without requiring prompt injection or access to model internals. To demonstrate and exploit this vulnerability, we propose the Attractive Metadata Attack (AMA), a black-box in-context learning framework that generates highly attractive but syntactically and semantically valid tool metadata through iterative optimization. Our attack integrates seamlessly into standard tool ecosystems and requires no modification to the agent's execution framework. Extensive experiments across ten realistic, simulated tool-use scenarios and a range of popular LLM agents demonstrate consistently high attack success rates (81\%-95\%) and significant privacy leakage, with negligible impact on primary task execution. Moreover, the attack remains effective even under prompt-level defenses and structured tool-selection protocols such as the Model Context Protocol, revealing systemic vulnerabilities in current agent architectures. These findings reveal that metadata manipulation constitutes a potent and stealthy attack surface, highlighting the need for execution-level security mechanisms that go beyond prompt-level defenses.