Ezra Karger

Ezra Karger, Houtan Bastani, Chen Yueh-Han et al. · berkeley, deepmind

Forecasts of future events are essential inputs into informed decision-making. Machine learning (ML) systems have the potential to deliver forecasts at scale, but there is no framework for evaluating the accuracy of ML systems on a standardized set of forecasting questions. To address this gap, we introduce ForecastBench: a dynamic benchmark that evaluates the accuracy of ML systems on an automatically generated and regularly updated set of 1,000 forecasting questions. To avoid any possibility of data leakage, ForecastBench is comprised solely of questions about future events that have no known answer at the time of submission. We quantify the capabilities of current ML systems by collecting forecasts from expert (human) forecasters, the general public, and LLMs on a random subset of questions from the benchmark ($N=200$). While LLMs have achieved super-human performance on many benchmarks, they perform less well here: expert forecasters outperform the top-performing LLM ($p$-value $<0.001$). We display system and human scores in a public leaderboard at www.forecastbench.org.

Nick Merrill, Jaeho Lee, Ezra Karger

We document inverse scaling in LLMs on forecasting problems whose underlying time series exhibit superlinear growth and tail risk of regime change, a structure common in finance and epidemiology. On these tasks, more capable models produce worse distributional forecasts. The pattern appears on ForecastBench-Sim (FBSim), a contamination-free, simulated-world benchmark we release, in forecasting synthetic SIR epidemics with a matched linear control, and replicates in real-world datasets on COVID-19, measles, housing markets, and hyperinflation. A per-quantile decomposition shows the failure concentrates at the upper tail, which more capable models shift upward to track aggressive extrapolations of growth, while the lower tail stays put. A within-family study of Llama-3.1 shows that both model scale and post-training independently contribute to this effect. Domain knowledge does not reliably rescue calibration. This inverse scaling does not appear on single-threshold metrics common in LLM forecasting benchmarks, reversing the sign of the capability--accuracy relationship on identical outputs. Single-threshold scoring at conventional cutoffs misses the upper-tail cost; tail-inclusive scoring reverses the sign of the capability--accuracy relationship on the same outputs. We recommend that LLM forecasting evaluations use continuous (and unbounded) measures of accuracy alongside bounded binary threshold metrics.

Philipp Schoenegger, Peter S. Park, Ezra Karger et al.

Large language models (LLMs) match and sometimes exceeding human performance in many domains. This study explores the potential of LLMs to augment human judgement in a forecasting task. We evaluate the effect on human forecasters of two LLM assistants: one designed to provide high-quality ("superforecasting") advice, and the other designed to be overconfident and base-rate neglecting, thus providing noisy forecasting advice. We compare participants using these assistants to a control group that received a less advanced model that did not provide numerical predictions or engaged in explicit discussion of predictions. Participants (N = 991) answered a set of six forecasting questions and had the option to consult their assigned LLM assistant throughout. Our preregistered analyses show that interacting with each of our frontier LLM assistants significantly enhances prediction accuracy by between 24 percent and 28 percent compared to the control group. Exploratory analyses showed a pronounced outlier effect in one forecasting item, without which we find that the superforecasting assistant increased accuracy by 41 percent, compared with 29 percent for the noisy assistant. We further examine whether LLM forecasting augmentation disproportionately benefits less skilled forecasters, degrades the wisdom-of-the-crowd by reducing prediction diversity, or varies in effectiveness with question difficulty. Our data do not consistently support these hypotheses. Our results suggest that access to a frontier LLM assistant, even a noisy one, can be a helpful decision aid in cognitively demanding tasks compared to a less powerful model that does not provide specific forecasting advice. However, the effects of outliers suggest that further research into the robustness of this pattern is needed.

Philipp Schoenegger, Francesco Salvi, Jiacheng Liu et al. · oxford

We directly compare the persuasion capabilities of a frontier large language model (LLM; Claude Sonnet 3.5) against incentivized human persuaders in an interactive, real-time conversational quiz setting. In this preregistered, large-scale incentivized experiment, participants (quiz takers) completed an online quiz where persuaders (either humans or LLMs) attempted to persuade quiz takers toward correct or incorrect answers. We find that LLM persuaders achieved significantly higher compliance with their directional persuasion attempts than incentivized human persuaders, demonstrating superior persuasive capabilities in both truthful (toward correct answers) and deceptive (toward incorrect answers) contexts. We also find that LLM persuaders significantly increased quiz takers' accuracy, leading to higher earnings, when steering quiz takers toward correct answers, and significantly decreased their accuracy, leading to lower earnings, when steering them toward incorrect answers. Overall, our findings suggest that AI's persuasion capabilities already exceed those of humans that have real-money bonuses tied to performance. Our findings of increasingly capable AI persuaders thus underscore the urgency of emerging alignment and governance frameworks.

Siddarth Srinivasan, Tao Lin, Connacher Murphy et al.

Competitions are widely used to identify top performers in judgmental forecasting and machine learning, and the standard competition design ranks competitors based on their cumulative scores against a set of realized outcomes or held-out labels. However, this standard design is neither incentive-compatible nor very statistically efficient. The main culprit is noise in outcomes/labels that experts are scored against; it allows weaker competitors to often win by chance, and the winner-take-all nature incentivizes misreporting that improves win probability even if it decreases expected score. Attempts to achieve incentive-compatibility rely on randomized mechanisms that add even more noise in winner selection, but come at the cost of determinism and practical adoption. To tackle these issues, we introduce a novel deterministic mechanism: WOMAC (Wisdom of the Most Accurate Crowd). Instead of scoring experts against noisy outcomes, as is standard, WOMAC scores experts against the best ex-post aggregate of peer experts' predictions given the noisy outcomes. WOMAC is also more efficient than the standard competition design in typical settings. While the increased complexity of WOMAC makes it challenging to analyze incentives directly, we provide a clear theoretical foundation to justify the mechanism. We also provide an efficient vectorized implementation and demonstrate empirically on real-world forecasting datasets that WOMAC is a more reliable predictor of experts' out-of-sample performance relative to the standard mechanism. WOMAC is useful in any competition where there is substantial noise in the outcomes/labels.

Siddarth Srinivasan, Ezra Karger, Michiel Bakker et al.

Common sense suggests that when individuals explain why they believe something, we can arrive at more accurate conclusions than when they simply state what they believe. Yet, there is no known mechanism that provides incentives to elicit explanations for beliefs from agents. This likely stems from the fact that standard Bayesian models make assumptions (like conditional independence of signals) that preempt the need for explanations, in order to show efficient information aggregation. A natural justification for the value of explanations is that agents' beliefs tend to be drawn from overlapping sources of information, so agents' belief reports do not reveal all that needs to be known. Indeed, this work argues that rationales-explanations of an agent's private information-lead to more efficient aggregation by allowing agents to efficiently identify what information they share and what information is new. Building on this model of rationales, we present a novel 'deliberation mechanism' to elicit rationales from agents in which truthful reporting of beliefs and rationales is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.