Jing Dong

GT
h-index14
6papers
84citations
Novelty58%
AI Score31

6 Papers

6.6GTJun 19, 2023
Taming the Exponential Action Set: Sublinear Regret and Fast Convergence to Nash Equilibrium in Online Congestion Games

Jing Dong, Jingyu Wu, Siwei Wang et al.

The congestion game is a powerful model that encompasses a range of engineering systems such as traffic networks and resource allocation. It describes the behavior of a group of agents who share a common set of $F$ facilities and take actions as subsets with $k$ facilities. In this work, we study the online formulation of congestion games, where agents participate in the game repeatedly and observe feedback with randomness. We propose CongestEXP, a decentralized algorithm that applies the classic exponential weights method. By maintaining weights on the facility level, the regret bound of CongestEXP avoids the exponential dependence on the size of possible facility sets, i.e., $\binom{F}{k} \approx F^k$, and scales only linearly with $F$. Specifically, we show that CongestEXP attains a regret upper bound of $O(kF\sqrt{T})$ for every individual player, where $T$ is the time horizon. On the other hand, exploiting the exponential growth of weights enables CongestEXP to achieve a fast convergence rate. If a strict Nash equilibrium exists, we show that CongestEXP can converge to the strict Nash policy almost exponentially fast in $O(F\exp(-t^{1-α}))$, where $t$ is the number of iterations and $α\in (1/2, 1)$.

3.7CVApr 12, 2024Code
Counterfactual Explanations for Face Forgery Detection via Adversarial Removal of Artifacts

Yang Li, Songlin Yang, Wei Wang et al.

Highly realistic AI generated face forgeries known as deepfakes have raised serious social concerns. Although DNN-based face forgery detection models have achieved good performance, they are vulnerable to latest generative methods that have less forgery traces and adversarial attacks. This limitation of generalization and robustness hinders the credibility of detection results and requires more explanations. In this work, we provide counterfactual explanations for face forgery detection from an artifact removal perspective. Specifically, we first invert the forgery images into the StyleGAN latent space, and then adversarially optimize their latent representations with the discrimination supervision from the target detection model. We verify the effectiveness of the proposed explanations from two aspects: (1) Counterfactual Trace Visualization: the enhanced forgery images are useful to reveal artifacts by visually contrasting the original images and two different visualization methods; (2) Transferable Adversarial Attacks: the adversarial forgery images generated by attacking the detection model are able to mislead other detection models, implying the removed artifacts are general. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method achieves over 90% attack success rate and superior attack transferability. Compared with naive adversarial noise methods, our method adopts both generative and discriminative model priors, and optimize the latent representations in a synthesis-by-analysis way, which forces the search of counterfactual explanations on the natural face manifold. Thus, more general counterfactual traces can be found and better adversarial attack transferability can be achieved.

2.3GTApr 4, 2024
Convergence to Nash Equilibrium and No-regret Guarantee in (Markov) Potential Games

Jing Dong, Baoxiang Wang, Yaoliang Yu

In this work, we study potential games and Markov potential games under stochastic cost and bandit feedback. We propose a variant of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm with sufficient exploration and recursive gradient estimation, which provably converges to the Nash equilibrium while attaining sublinear regret for each individual player. Our algorithm simultaneously achieves a Nash regret and a regret bound of $O(T^{4/5})$ for potential games, which matches the best available result, without using additional projection steps. Through carefully balancing the reuse of past samples and exploration of new samples, we then extend the results to Markov potential games and improve the best available Nash regret from $O(T^{5/6})$ to $O(T^{4/5})$. Moreover, our algorithm requires no knowledge of the game, such as the distribution mismatch coefficient, which provides more flexibility in its practical implementation. Experimental results corroborate our theoretical findings and underscore the practical effectiveness of our method.

18.2MLJul 4, 2020
Accelerating Nonconvex Learning via Replica Exchange Langevin Diffusion

Yi Chen, Jinglin Chen, Jing Dong et al.

Langevin diffusion is a powerful method for nonconvex optimization, which enables the escape from local minima by injecting noise into the gradient. In particular, the temperature parameter controlling the noise level gives rise to a tradeoff between ``global exploration'' and ``local exploitation'', which correspond to high and low temperatures. To attain the advantages of both regimes, we propose to use replica exchange, which swaps between two Langevin diffusions with different temperatures. We theoretically analyze the acceleration effect of replica exchange from two perspectives: (i) the convergence in χ^2-divergence, and (ii) the large deviation principle. Such an acceleration effect allows us to faster approach the global minima. Furthermore, by discretizing the replica exchange Langevin diffusion, we obtain a discrete-time algorithm. For such an algorithm, we quantify its discretization error in theory and demonstrate its acceleration effect in practice.

14.8OCJan 23, 2020
Replica Exchange for Non-Convex Optimization

Jing Dong, Xin T. Tong

Gradient descent (GD) is known to converge quickly for convex objective functions, but it can be trapped at local minima. On the other hand, Langevin dynamics (LD) can explore the state space and find global minima, but in order to give accurate estimates, LD needs to run with a small discretization step size and weak stochastic force, which in general slow down its convergence. This paper shows that these two algorithms and their non-swapping variants. can ``collaborate" through a simple exchange mechanism, in which they swap their current positions if LD yields a lower objective function. This idea can be seen as the singular limit of the replica-exchange technique from the sampling literature. We show that this new algorithm converges to the global minimum linearly with high probability, assuming the objective function is strongly convex in a neighborhood of the unique global minimum. By replacing gradients with stochastic gradients, and adding a proper threshold to the exchange mechanism, our algorithm can also be used in online settings. We also study non-swapping variants of the algorithm, which achieve similar performance. We further verify our theoretical results through some numerical experiments and observe superior performance of the proposed algorithm over running GD or LD alone.

6.6LGOct 12, 2019
Uncertainty Quantification and Exploration for Reinforcement Learning

YI Zhu, Jing Dong, Henry Lam

We investigate statistical uncertainty quantification for reinforcement learning (RL) and its implications in exploration policy. Despite ever-growing literature on RL applications, fundamental questions about inference and error quantification, such as large-sample behaviors, appear to remain quite open. In this paper, we fill in the literature gap by studying the central limit theorem behaviors of estimated Q-values and value functions under various RL settings. In particular, we explicitly identify closed-form expressions of the asymptotic variances, which allow us to efficiently construct asymptotically valid confidence regions for key RL quantities. Furthermore, we utilize these asymptotic expressions to design an effective exploration strategy, which we call Q-value-based Optimal Computing Budget Allocation (Q-OCBA). The policy relies on maximizing the relative discrepancies among the Q-value estimates. Numerical experiments show superior performances of our exploration strategy than other benchmark policies.