Uri Andrews

Uri Andrews, Luca San Mauro, John Spoerl

In Dung-style abstract argumentation, various semantics capture notions of acceptability of arguments. The admissibility semantics capture the notion that an argument can be consistently defended from any potential counterargument. Weak semantics often relax the demands of admissibility by restricting which counterarguments must be taken seriously (e.g., discounting self-defeating or otherwise incoherent attacks). Many prominent proposals for weak semantics remain extension-based in a stronger sense. While these semantics discount attacks from arguments which are considered unreasonable, they still require a uniform defense against all reasonable arguments, even if they are collectively inconsistent. This uniformity can be too demanding when defensibility is inherently strategic, and thus the appropriate reply depends on the opponent's line of attack. We introduce tenability, a family of dialogue-based semantics that formalize when a designated argument (or a set of arguments) can be maintained in debate by a proponent against any conflict-free attack which the opponent may present. The approach is motivated by three natural benchmark patterns: self-defeating attack, floating assignment, and disjunctive reinstatement, on which tenability behaves differently from all weak semantics previously considered in the literature. We define three variants -- static tenability, tenability, and strong tenability -- via monotone commitment games over finite conflict-free moves, differing in the obligations imposed on the disputants. We establish the relative strength of these notions, prove implications and separations with previously studied weak semantics, and we analyze computational complexity on finite frameworks: deciding static tenability is $Π^P_2$-complete, while deciding tenability and strong tenability is PSPACE-complete.

Uri Andrews, Luca San Mauro

Argumentation frameworks, consisting of arguments and an attack relation representing conflicts, are fundamental for formally studying reasoning under conflicting information. We use methods from mathematical logic, specifically computability and set theory, to analyze the grounded extension, a widely-used model of maximally skeptical reasoning, defined as the least fixed-point of a natural defense operator. Without additional constraints, finding this fixed-point requires transfinite iterations. We identify the exact ordinal number corresponding to the length of this iterative process and determine the complexity of deciding grounded acceptance, showing it to be maximally complex. This shows a marked distinction from the finite case where the grounded extension is polynomial-time computable, thus simpler than other reasoning problems explored in formal argumentation.

Uri Andrews, Luca San Mauro

Abstract argumentation frameworks (AFs) provide a formal setting to analyze many forms of reasoning with conflicting information. While the expressiveness of general infinite AFs make them a tempting tool for modeling many kinds of reasoning scenarios, the computational intractability of solving infinite AFs limit their use, even in many theoretical applications. We investigate the complexity of computational problems related to infinite but finitary argumentations frameworks, that is, infinite AFs where each argument is attacked by only finitely many others. Our results reveal a surprising scenario. On one hand, we see that the assumption of being finitary does not automatically guarantee a drop in complexity. However, for the admissibility-based semantics, we find a remarkable combinatorial constraint which entails a dramatic decrease in complexity. We conclude that for many forms of reasoning, the finitary infinite AFs provide a natural setting for reasoning which balances well the competing goals of being expressive enough to be applied to many reasoning settings while being computationally tractable enough for the analysis within the framework to be useful.

Uri Andrews, Luca San Mauro

Argumentation frameworks (AFs) are a foundational tool in artificial intelligence for modeling structured reasoning and conflict. SCC-recursiveness is a well-known design principle in which the evaluation of arguments is decomposed according to the strongly connected components (SCCs) of the attack graph, proceeding recursively from "higher" to "lower" components. While SCC-recursive semantics such as \cft and \stgt have proven effective for finite AFs, Baumann and Spanring showed the failure of SCC-recursive semantics to generalize reliably to infinite AFs due to issues with well-foundedness. We propose two approaches to extending SCC-recursiveness to the infinite setting. We systematically evaluate these semantics using Baroni and Giacomin's established criteria, showing in particular that directionality fails in general. We then examine these semantics' behavior in finitary frameworks, where we find some of our semantics satisfy directionality. These results advance the theory of infinite argumentation and lay the groundwork for reasoning systems capable of handling unbounded or evolving domains.

Uri Andrews, Luca San Mauro

Dialectical systems are a mathematical formalism for modeling an agent updating a knowledge base seeking consistency. Introduced in the 1970s by Roberto Magari, they were originally conceived to capture how a working mathematician or a research community refines beliefs in the pursuit of truth. Dialectical systems also serve as natural models for the belief change of an automated agent, offering a unifying, computable framework for dynamic belief management. The literature distinguishes three main models of dialectical systems: (d-)dialectical systems based on revising beliefs when they are seen to be inconsistent, p-dialectical systems based on revising beliefs based on finding a counterexample, and q-dialectical systems which can do both. We answer an open problem in the literature by proving that q-dialectical systems are strictly more powerful than p-dialectical systems, which are themselves known to be strictly stronger than (d-)dialectical systems. This result highlights the complementary roles of counterexample and contradiction in automated belief revision, and thus also in the reasoning processes of mathematicians and research communities.