Derek Shiller

h-index4
2papers
101citations

2 Papers

2.4AIFeb 22
Beyond Behavioural Trade-Offs: Mechanistic Tracing of Pain-Pleasure Decisions in an LLM

Francesca Bianco, Derek Shiller

Prior behavioural work suggests that some LLMs alter choices when options are framed as causing pain or pleasure, and that such deviations can scale with stated intensity. To bridge behavioural evidence (what the model does) with mechanistic interpretability (what computations support it), we investigate how valence-related information is represented and where it is causally used inside a transformer. Using Gemma-2-9B-it and a minimalist decision task modelled on prior work, we (i) map representational availability with layer-wise linear probing across streams, (ii) test causal contribution with activation interventions (steering; patching/ablation), and (iii) quantify dose-response effects over an epsilon grid, reading out both the 2-3 logit margin and digit-pair-normalised choice probabilities. We find that (a) valence sign (pain vs. pleasure) is perfectly linearly separable across stream families from very early layers (L0-L1), while a lexical baseline retains substantial signal; (b) graded intensity is strongly decodable, with peaks in mid-to-late layers and especially in attention/MLP outputs, and decision alignment is highest slightly before the final token; (c) additive steering along a data-derived valence direction causally modulates the 2-3 margin at late sites, with the largest effects observed in late-layer attention outputs (attn_out L14); and (d) head-level patching/ablation suggests that these effects are distributed across multiple heads rather than concentrated in a single unit. Together, these results link behavioural sensitivity to identifiable internal representations and intervention-sensitive sites, providing concrete mechanistic targets for more stringent counterfactual tests and broader replication. This work supports a more evidence-driven (a) debate on AI sentience and welfare, and (b) governance when setting policy, auditing standards, and safety safeguards.

5.8AINov 20, 2025
Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence? A Framework for Classifying Objections and Constraints

Andres Campero, Derek Shiller, Jaan Aru et al.

We develop a taxonomical framework for classifying challenges to the possibility of consciousness in digital artificial intelligence systems. This framework allows us to identify the level of granularity at which a given challenge is intended (the levels we propose correspond to Marr's levels) and to disambiguate its degree of force: is it a challenge to computational functionalism that leaves the possibility of digital consciousness open (degree 1), a practical challenge to digital consciousness that suggests improbability without claiming impossibility (degree 2), or an argument claiming that digital consciousness is strictly impossible (degree 3)? We apply this framework to 14 prominent examples from the scientific and philosophical literature. Our aim is not to take a side in the debate, but to provide structure and a tool for disambiguating between challenges to computational functionalism and challenges to digital consciousness, as well as between different ways of parsing such challenges.