David G. Rand

Kobi Hackenburg, Ben M. Tappin, Luke Hewitt et al.

There are widespread fears that conversational AI could soon exert unprecedented influence over human beliefs. Here, in three large-scale experiments (N=76,977), we deployed 19 LLMs-including some post-trained explicitly for persuasion-to evaluate their persuasiveness on 707 political issues. We then checked the factual accuracy of 466,769 resulting LLM claims. Contrary to popular concerns, we show that the persuasive power of current and near-future AI is likely to stem more from post-training and prompting methods-which boosted persuasiveness by as much as 51% and 27% respectively-than from personalization or increasing model scale. We further show that these methods increased persuasion by exploiting LLMs' unique ability to rapidly access and strategically deploy information and that, strikingly, where they increased AI persuasiveness they also systematically decreased factual accuracy.

Daniel Thilo Schroeder, Meeyoung Cha, Andrea Baronchelli et al.

Public opinion manipulation has entered a new phase, amplifying its roots in rhetoric and propaganda. Advances in large language models (LLMs) and autonomous agents now let influence campaigns reach unprecedented scale and precision. Researchers warn AI could foster mass manipulation. Generative tools can expand propaganda output without sacrificing credibility and inexpensively create election falsehoods that are rated as more human-like than those written by humans. Techniques meant to refine AI reasoning, such as chain-of-thought prompting, can just as effectively be used to generate more convincing falsehoods. Enabled by these capabilities, another disruptive threat is emerging: swarms of collaborative, malicious AI agents. Fusing LLM reasoning with multi-agent architectures, these systems are capable of coordinating autonomously, infiltrating communities, and fabricating consensus cheaply. By adaptively mimicking human social dynamics, they threaten democracy.

Mohammed Alsobay, David G. Rand, Duncan J. Watts et al.

Punishment as a mechanism for promoting cooperation has been studied extensively for more than two decades, but its effectiveness remains a matter of dispute. Here, we examine how punishment's impact varies across cooperative settings through a large-scale integrative experiment. We vary 14 parameters that characterize public goods games, sampling 360 experimental conditions and collecting 147,618 decisions from 7,100 participants. Our results reveal striking heterogeneity in punishment effectiveness: while punishment consistently increases contributions, its impact on payoffs (i.e., efficiency) ranges from dramatically enhancing welfare (up to 43% improvement) to severely undermining it (up to 44% reduction) depending on the cooperative context. To characterize these patterns, we developed models that outperformed human forecasters (laypeople and domain experts) in predicting punishment outcomes in new experiments. Communication emerged as the most predictive feature, followed by contribution framing (opt-out vs. opt-in), contribution type (variable vs. all-or-nothing), game length (number of rounds), peer outcome visibility (whether participants can see others' earnings), and the availability of a reward mechanism. Interestingly, however, most of these features interact to influence punishment effectiveness rather than operating independently. For example, the extent to which longer games increase the effectiveness of punishment depends on whether groups can communicate. Together, our results refocus the debate over punishment from whether or not it "works" to the specific conditions under which it does and does not work. More broadly, our study demonstrates how integrative experiments can be combined with machine learning to uncover generalizable patterns, potentially involving interactions between multiple features, and help generate novel explanations in complex social phenomena.

Farnaz Jahanbakhsh, Amy X. Zhang, Adam J. Berinsky et al.

When users on social media share content without considering its veracity, they may unwittingly be spreading misinformation. In this work, we investigate the design of lightweight interventions that nudge users to assess the accuracy of information as they share it. Such assessment may deter users from posting misinformation in the first place, and their assessments may also provide useful guidance to friends aiming to assess those posts themselves. In support of lightweight assessment, we first develop a taxonomy of the reasons why people believe a news claim is or is not true; this taxonomy yields a checklist that can be used at posting time. We conduct evaluations to demonstrate that the checklist is an accurate and comprehensive encapsulation of people's free-response rationales. In a second experiment, we study the effects of three behavioral nudges -- 1) checkboxes indicating whether headings are accurate, 2) tagging reasons (from our taxonomy) that a post is accurate via a checklist and 3) providing free-text rationales for why a headline is or is not accurate -- on people's intention of sharing the headline on social media. From an experiment with 1668 participants, we find that both providing accuracy assessment and rationale reduce the sharing of false content. They also reduce the sharing of true content, but to a lesser degree that yields an overall decrease in the fraction of shared content that is false. Our findings have implications for designing social media and news sharing platforms that draw from richer signals of content credibility contributed by users. In addition, our validated taxonomy can be used by platforms and researchers as a way to gather rationales in an easier fashion than free-response.