Noam Hazon

Yael Sabato, Amos Azaria, Noam Hazon

Nowadays, the diffusion of information through social networks is a powerful phenomenon. One common way to model diffusions in social networks is the Independent Cascade (IC) model. Given a set of infected nodes according to the IC model, a natural problem is the source detection problem, in which the goal is to identify the unique node that has started the diffusion. Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) is a common approach for tackling the source detection problem, but it is computationally hard. In this work, we propose an efficient method for the source detection problem under the MLE approach, which is based on computing the stationary distribution of a Markov chain. Using simulations, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our method compared to other state-of-the-art methods from the literature, both on random and real-world networks.

Hodaya Barr, Yohai Trabelsi, Sarit Kraus et al.

In many settings, there is an organizer who would like to divide a set of agents into $k$ coalitions, and cares about the friendships within each coalition. Specifically, the organizer might want to maximize utilitarian social welfare, maximize egalitarian social welfare, or simply guarantee that every agent will have at least one friend within his coalition. However, in many situations, the organizer is not familiar with the friendship connections, and he needs to obtain them from the agents. In this setting, a manipulative agent may falsely report friendship connections in order to increase his utility. In this paper, we analyze the complexity of finding manipulation in such $k$-coalitional games on graphs. We also introduce a new type of manipulation, socially-aware manipulation, in which the manipulator would like to increase his utility without decreasing the social welfare. We then study the complexity of finding socially-aware manipulation in our setting. Finally, we examine the frequency of socially-aware manipulation and the running time of our algorithms via simulation results.

Ido Kahana, Erel Segal-Halevi, Noam Hazon

Many decision processes run for a long and unknown duration: in each round new requests arrive, an irrevocable choice must be made immediately, and the system is judged by ongoing fairness requirements. Examples include food banks allocating donated items as they arrive, computing systems repeatedly scheduling scarce resources across users, and institutions making repeated public decisions (e.g., which proposals or cases to prioritize) while remaining fair over time. A key challenge in such settings is that fairness requirements are often naturally \emph{scale-dependent}. For example, in fair item allocation, it is common to require that the unfairness is bounded by the highest values of items seen so far. Thus, the scale of fairness changes over time. We propose a general approach to online fairness based on \emph{deficits}, which measure each requirement's current shortfall relative to a time-varying benchmark. Within this framework, we analyze a simple fully online rule that, in each round, chooses the action that best improves the next-round deficit profile. We prove anytime (prefix-wise) guarantees: after every round, all tracked requirements remain satisfied up to a slack that grows only on the order of $\sqrt{t}$ (up to logarithmic factors), and we show this growth is unavoidable in general. We instantiate the framework for online allocation of indivisible goods (yielding natural relaxations of proportionality and envy-freeness) and for online public decision-making. In contrast to previous works on online fair allocation, our rule does not need to know the horizon (the total number of rounds), nor any other information on the future (e.g. the maximum item value). Moreover, our guarantees hold perpetually, at each individual time step.

Meir Nizri, Amos Azaria, Chirag Gupta et al.

Calibration has been proposed as a way to enhance the reliability and adoption of machine learning classifiers. We study a particular aspect of this proposal: how does calibrating a classification model affect the decisions made by non-expert humans consuming the model's predictions? We perform a Human-Computer-Interaction (HCI) experiment to ascertain the effect of calibration on (i) trust in the model, and (ii) the correlation between decisions and predictions. We also propose further corrections to the reported calibrated scores based on Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory from behavioral economics, and study the effect of these corrections on trust and decision-making. We find that calibration is not sufficient on its own; the prospect theory correction is crucial for increasing the correlation between human decisions and the model's predictions. While this increased correlation suggests higher trust in the model, responses to ``Do you trust the model more?" are unaffected by the method used.

Ido Kahana, Noam Hazon

In many situations, several agents need to make a sequence of decisions. For example, a group of workers that needs to decide where their weekly meeting should take place. In such situations, a decision-making mechanism must consider fairness notions. In this paper, we analyze the fairness of three known mechanisms: round-robin, maximum Nash welfare, and leximin. We consider both offline and online settings, and concentrate on the fairness notion of proportionality and its relaxations. Specifically, in the offline setting, we show that the three mechanisms fail to find a proportional or approximate-proportional outcome, even if such an outcome exists. We thus introduce a new fairness property that captures this requirement, and show that a variant of the leximin mechanism satisfies the new fairness property. In the online setting, we show that it is impossible to guarantee proportionality or its relaxations. We thus consider a natural restriction on the agents' preferences, and show that the leximin mechanism guarantees the best possible additive approximation to proportionality and satisfies all the relaxations of proportionality.

David Zar, Noam Hazon, Amos Azaria

Transportation services play a crucial part in the development of modern smart cities. In particular, on-demand ridesharing services, which group together passengers with similar itineraries, are already operating in several metropolitan areas. These services can be of significant social and environmental benefit, by reducing travel costs, road congestion and CO2 emissions. Unfortunately, despite their advantages, not many people opt to use these ridesharing services. We believe that increasing the user satisfaction from the service will cause more people to utilize it, which, in turn, will improve the quality of the service, such as the waiting time, cost, travel time, and service availability. One possible way for increasing user satisfaction is by providing appropriate explanations comparing the alternative modes of transportation, such as a private taxi ride and public transportation. For example, a passenger may be more satisfied from a shared-ride if she is told that a private taxi ride would have cost her 50% more. Therefore, the problem is to develop an agent that provides explanations that will increase the user satisfaction. We model our environment as a signaling game and show that a rational agent, which follows the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, must reveal all of the information regarding the possible alternatives to the passenger. In addition, we develop a machine learning based agent that, when given a shared-ride along with its possible alternatives, selects the explanations that are most likely to increase user satisfaction. Using feedback from humans we show that our machine learning based agent outperforms the rational agent and an agent that randomly chooses explanations, in terms of user satisfaction.

Sarit Kraus, Amos Azaria, Jelena Fiosina et al.

Explanation is necessary for humans to understand and accept decisions made by an AI system when the system's goal is known. It is even more important when the AI system makes decisions in multi-agent environments where the human does not know the systems' goals since they may depend on other agents' preferences. In such situations, explanations should aim to increase user satisfaction, taking into account the system's decision, the user's and the other agents' preferences, the environment settings and properties such as fairness, envy and privacy. Generating explanations that will increase user satisfaction is very challenging; to this end, we propose a new research direction: xMASE. We then review the state of the art and discuss research directions towards efficient methodologies and algorithms for generating explanations that will increase users' satisfaction from AI system's decisions in multi-agent environments.

Noam Hazon, Mira Gonen, Max Kleb

We consider an agent seeking to obtain an item, potentially available at different locations in a physical environment. The traveling costs between locations are known in advance, but there is only probabilistic knowledge regarding the possible prices of the item at any given location. Given such a setting, the problem is to find a plan that maximizes the probability of acquiring the good while minimizing both travel and purchase costs. Sample applications include agents in search-and-rescue or exploration missions, e.g., a rover on Mars seeking to mine a specific mineral. These probabilistic physical search problems have been previously studied, but we present the first approximation and heuristic algorithms for solving such problems on general graphs. We establish an interesting connection between these problems and classical graph-search problems, which led us to provide the approximation algorithms and hardness of approximation results for our settings. We further suggest several heuristics for practical use, and demonstrate their effectiveness with simulation on real graph structure and synthetic graphs.