Subhasish Mitra

Ioanna Vavelidou, Subho S. Banerjee, Eric X. Liu et al.

Hyperscaler reports of silent data corruptions (SDCs), presumed to be caused by silicon manufacturing defects, have motivated the development of functional tests for detecting defective CPUs. We present ITHICA, an approach for automatically generating functional tests for defect-induced errors from arbitrary programs by inserting intra-thread, instruction-level error checks, primarily leveraging instruction duplication and output comparison. Our key insight is that the most pernicious defects cause inconsistent errors: two executions of the same instruction within the same thread, given the same inputs, can produce different architectural outputs depending on the execution context in which they run. By exploiting this insight, ITHICA enables arbitrary programs to serve as tests and identifies affected instructions upon error detections. We use ITHICA to transform industrial hyperscaler test programs (our baseline), datacenter workloads, and common libraries into functional tests, and evaluate them on over 3,000 CPU servers. ITHICA error checks detect 39% more defective servers than native checks within the ITHICA tests derived from our baseline programs, and enable novel findings on defect behavior that challenge conclusions drawn by prior hyperscaler fleet studies.

Deming Chen, Vijay Ganesh, Weikai Li et al.

This report distills the discussions and recommendations from the NSF Workshop on AI for Electronic Design Automation (EDA), held on December 10, 2024 in Vancouver alongside NeurIPS 2024. Bringing together experts across machine learning and EDA, the workshop examined how AI-spanning large language models (LLMs), graph neural networks (GNNs), reinforcement learning (RL), neurosymbolic methods, etc.-can facilitate EDA and shorten design turnaround. The workshop includes four themes: (1) AI for physical synthesis and design for manufacturing (DFM), discussing challenges in physical manufacturing process and potential AI applications; (2) AI for high-level and logic-level synthesis (HLS/LLS), covering pragma insertion, program transformation, RTL code generation, etc.; (3) AI toolbox for optimization and design, discussing frontier AI developments that could potentially be applied to EDA tasks; and (4) AI for test and verification, including LLM-assisted verification tools, ML-augmented SAT solving, security/reliability challenges, etc. The report recommends NSF to foster AI/EDA collaboration, invest in foundational AI for EDA, develop robust data infrastructures, promote scalable compute infrastructure, and invest in workforce development to democratize hardware design and enable next-generation hardware systems. The workshop information can be found on the website https://ai4eda-workshop.github.io/.

Deming Chen, Jason Cong, Azalia Mirhoseini et al.

Artificial intelligence (AI) and hardware (HW) are advancing at unprecedented rates, yet their trajectories have become inseparably intertwined. The global research community lacks a cohesive, long-term vision to strategically coordinate the development of AI and HW. This fragmentation constrains progress toward holistic, sustainable, and adaptive AI systems capable of learning, reasoning, and operating efficiently across cloud, edge, and physical environments. The future of AI depends not only on scaling intelligence, but on scaling efficiency, achieving exponential gains in intelligence per joule, rather than unbounded compute consumption. Addressing this grand challenge requires rethinking the entire computing stack. This vision paper lays out a 10-year roadmap for AI+HW co-design and co-development, spanning algorithms, architectures, systems, and sustainability. We articulate key insights that redefine scaling around energy efficiency, system-level integration, and cross-layer optimization. We identify key challenges and opportunities, candidly assess potential obstacles and pitfalls, and propose integrated solutions grounded in algorithmic innovation, hardware advances, and software abstraction. Looking ahead, we define what success means in 10 years: achieving a 1000x improvement in efficiency for AI training and inference; enabling energy-aware, self-optimizing systems that seamlessly span cloud, edge, and physical AI; democratizing access to advanced AI infrastructure; and embedding human-centric principles into the design of intelligent systems. Finally, we outline concrete action items for academia, industry, government, and the broader community, calling for coordinated national initiatives, shared infrastructure, workforce development, cross-agency collaboration, and sustained public-private partnerships to ensure that AI+HW co-design becomes a unifying long-term mission.

Mohammad Rahmani Fadiheh, Alex Wezel, Johannes Mueller et al.

Hardware (HW) security issues have been emerging at an alarming rate in recent years. Transient execution attacks, in particular, pose a genuine threat to the security of modern computing systems. Despite recent advances, understanding the intricate implications of microarchitectural design decisions on processor security remains a great challenge and has caused a number of update cycles in the past. number of update cycles in the past. This papers addresses the need for a new approach to HW sign-off verification which guarantees the security of processors at the Register Transfer Level (RTL). To this end, we introduce a formal definition of security with respect to transient execution attacks, formulated as a HW property. We present a formal proof methodology based on Unique Program Execution Checking (UPEC) which can be used to systematically detect all vulnerabilities to transient execution attacks in RTL designs. UPEC does not exploit any a priori knowledge on known attacks and can therefore detect also vulnerabilities based on new, so far unknown, types of channels. This is demonstrated by two new attack scenarios discovered in our experiments with UPEC. UPEC scales to a wide range of HW designs, including in-order processors (RocketChip), pipelines with out-of-order writeback (Ariane), and processors with deep out-of-order speculative execution (BOOM). To the best of our knowledge, UPEC is the first RTL verification technique that exhaustively covers transient execution side channels in processors of realistic complexity.

Mohammad Rahmani Fadiheh, Dominik Stoffel, Clark Barrett et al.

Recent discovery of security attacks in advanced processors, known as Spectre and Meltdown, has resulted in high public alertness about security of hardware. The root cause of these attacks is information leakage across "covert channels" that reveal secret data without any explicit information flow between the secret and the attacker. Many sources believe that such covert channels are intrinsic to highly advanced processor architectures based on speculation and out-of-order execution, suggesting that such security risks can be avoided by staying away from high-end processors. This paper, however, shows that the problem is of wider scope: we present new classes of covert channel attacks which are possible in average-complexity processors with in-order pipelining, as they are mainstream in applications ranging from Internet-of-Things to Autonomous Systems. We present a new approach as a foundation for remedy against covert channels: while all previous attacks were found by clever thinking of human attackers, this paper presents an automated and exhaustive method called "Unique Program Execution Checking" which detects and locates vulnerabilities to covert channels systematically, including those to covert channels unknown so far.

Abbas Rahimi, Tony F. Wu, Haitong Li et al.

One viable solution for continuous reduction in energy-per-operation is to rethink functionality to cope with uncertainty by adopting computational approaches that are inherently robust to uncertainty. It requires a novel look at data representations, associated operations, and circuits, and at materials and substrates that enable them. 3D integrated nanotechnologies combined with novel brain-inspired computational paradigms that support fast learning and fault tolerance could lead the way. Recognizing the very size of the brain's circuits, hyperdimensional (HD) computing can model neural activity patterns with points in a HD space, that is, with hypervectors as large randomly generated patterns. At its very core, HD computing is about manipulating and comparing these patterns inside memory. Emerging nanotechnologies such as carbon nanotube field effect transistors (CNFETs) and resistive RAM (RRAM), and their monolithic 3D integration offer opportunities for hardware implementations of HD computing through tight integration of logic and memory, energy-efficient computation, and unique device characteristics. We experimentally demonstrate and characterize an end-to-end HD computing nanosystem built using monolithic 3D integration of CNFETs and RRAM. With our nanosystem, we experimentally demonstrate classification of 21 languages with measured accuracy of up to 98% on >20,000 sentences (6.4 million characters), training using one text sample (~100,000 characters) per language, and resilient operation (98% accuracy) despite 78% hardware errors in HD representation (outputs stuck at 0 or 1). By exploiting the unique properties of the underlying nanotechnologies, we show that HD computing, when implemented with monolithic 3D integration, can be up to 420X more energy-efficient while using 25X less area compared to traditional silicon CMOS implementations.

Tony F. Wu, Karthik Ganesan, Yunqing Alexander Hu et al.

There are increasing concerns about possible malicious modifications of integrated circuits (ICs) used in critical applications. Such attacks are often referred to as hardware Trojans. While many techniques focus on hardware Trojan detection during IC testing, it is still possible for attacks to go undetected. Using a combination of new design techniques and new memory technologies, we present a new approach that detects a wide variety of hardware Trojans during IC testing and also during system operation in the field. Our approach can also prevent a wide variety of attacks during synthesis, place-and-route, and fabrication of ICs. It can be applied to any digital system, and can be tuned for both traditional and split-manufacturing methods. We demonstrate its applicability for both ASICs and FPGAs. Using fabricated test chips with Trojan emulation capabilities and also using simulations, we demonstrate: 1. The area and power costs of our approach can range between 7.4-165% and 0.07-60%, respectively, depending on the design and the attacks targeted; 2. The speed impact can be minimal (close to 0%); 3. Our approach can detect 99.998% of Trojans (emulated using test chips) that do not require detailed knowledge of the design being attacked; 4. Our approach can prevent 99.98% of specific attacks (simulated) that utilize detailed knowledge of the design being attacked (e.g., through reverse-engineering). 5. Our approach never produces any false positives, i.e., it does not report attacks when the IC operates correctly.