Bingxu Mu

Xinzi Cao, Jianyang Zhai, Pengfei Li et al.

To meet the ever-increasing demand for computational efficiency, Neural Processing Units (NPUs) have become critical in modern AI infrastructure. However, unlocking their full potential requires developing high-performance compute kernels using vendor-specific Domain-Specific Languages (DSLs), a task that demands deep hardware expertise and is labor-intensive. While Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promise in general code generation, they struggle with the strict constraints and scarcity of training data in the NPU domain. Our preliminary study reveals that state-of-the-art general-purpose LLMs fail to generate functional complex kernels for Ascend NPUs, yielding a near-zero success rate. To address these challenges, we propose AscendKernelGen, a generation-evaluation integrated framework for NPU kernel development. We introduce Ascend-CoT, a high-quality dataset incorporating chain-of-thought reasoning derived from real-world kernel implementations, and KernelGen-LM, a domain-adaptive model trained via supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning with execution feedback. Furthermore, we design NPUKernelBench, a comprehensive benchmark for assessing compilation, correctness, and performance across varying complexity levels. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach significantly bridges the gap between general LLMs and hardware-specific coding. Specifically, the compilation success rate on complex Level-2 kernels improves from 0% to 95.5% (Pass@10), while functional correctness achieves 64.3% compared to the baseline's complete failure. These results highlight the critical role of domain-specific reasoning and rigorous evaluation in automating accelerator-aware code generation.

Bingxu Mu, Zhenxing Niu, Le Wang et al.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are known to be vulnerable to both backdoor attacks as well as adversarial attacks. In the literature, these two types of attacks are commonly treated as distinct problems and solved separately, since they belong to training-time and inference-time attacks respectively. However, in this paper we find an intriguing connection between them: for a model planted with backdoors, we observe that its adversarial examples have similar behaviors as its triggered images, i.e., both activate the same subset of DNN neurons. It indicates that planting a backdoor into a model will significantly affect the model's adversarial examples. Based on these observations, a novel Progressive Backdoor Erasing (PBE) algorithm is proposed to progressively purify the infected model by leveraging untargeted adversarial attacks. Different from previous backdoor defense methods, one significant advantage of our approach is that it can erase backdoor even when the clean extra dataset is unavailable. We empirically show that, against 5 state-of-the-art backdoor attacks, our PBE can effectively erase the backdoor without obvious performance degradation on clean samples and significantly outperforms existing defense methods.