Junjie Shan

Junyuan Zhang, Bin Wang, Qintong Zhang et al.

Table recognition (TR) aims to transform table images into semi-structured representations such as HTML or Markdown. As a core component of document parsing, TR has long relied on supervised learning, with recent efforts dominated by fine-tuning vision-language models (VLMs) using labeled data. While VLMs have brought TR to the next level, pushing performance further demands large-scale labeled data that is costly to obtain. Consequently, although proprietary models have continuously pushed the performance boundary, open-source models, often trained with limited resources and, in practice, the only viable option for many due to privacy regulations, still lag far behind. To bridge this gap, we introduce TRivia, a self-supervised fine-tuning method that enables pretrained VLMs to learn TR directly from unlabeled table images in the wild. Built upon Group Relative Policy Optimization, TRivia automatically identifies unlabeled samples that most effectively facilitate learning and eliminates the need for human annotations through a question-answering-based reward mechanism. An attention-guided module generates diverse questions for each table image, and the ability to interpret the recognition results and answer them correctly provides feedback to optimize the TR model. This closed-loop process allows the TR model to autonomously learn to recognize, structure, and reason over tables without labeled data. Leveraging this pipeline, we present TRivia-3B, an open-sourced, compact, and state-of-the-art TR model that surpasses existing systems (e.g., Gemini 2.5 Pro, MinerU2.5) on three popular benchmarks. Model and code are released at: https://github.com/opendatalab/TRivia

Jialin Lu, Junjie Shan, Ziqi Zhao et al.

As object detection becomes integral to many safety-critical applications, understanding its vulnerabilities is essential. Backdoor attacks, in particular, pose a serious threat by implanting hidden triggers in victim models, which adversaries can later exploit to induce malicious behaviors during inference. However, current understanding is limited to single-target attacks, where adversaries must define a fixed malicious behavior (target) before training, making inference-time adaptability impossible. Given the large output space of object detection (including object existence prediction, bounding box estimation, and classification), the feasibility of flexible, inference-time model control remains unexplored. This paper introduces AnywhereDoor, a multi-target backdoor attack for object detection. Once implanted, AnywhereDoor allows adversaries to make objects disappear, fabricate new ones, or mislabel them, either across all object classes or specific ones, offering an unprecedented degree of control. This flexibility is enabled by three key innovations: (i) objective disentanglement to scale the number of supported targets; (ii) trigger mosaicking to ensure robustness even against region-based detectors; and (iii) strategic batching to address object-level data imbalances that hinder manipulation. Extensive experiments demonstrate that AnywhereDoor grants attackers a high degree of control, improving attack success rates by 26% compared to adaptations of existing methods for such flexible control.

Jialin Lu, Junjie Shan, Ziqi Zhao et al.

As object detection becomes integral to many safety-critical applications, understanding its vulnerabilities is essential. Backdoor attacks, in particular, pose a serious threat by implanting hidden triggers in victim models, which adversaries can later exploit to induce malicious behaviors during inference. However, current understanding is limited to single-target attacks, where adversaries must define a fixed malicious behavior (target) before training, making inference-time adaptability impossible. Given the large output space of object detection (including object existence prediction, bounding box estimation, and classification), the feasibility of flexible, inference-time model control remains unexplored. This paper introduces AnywhereDoor, a multi-target backdoor attack for object detection. Once implanted, AnywhereDoor allows adversaries to make objects disappear, fabricate new ones, or mislabel them, either across all object classes or specific ones, offering an unprecedented degree of control. This flexibility is enabled by three key innovations: (i) objective disentanglement to scale the number of supported targets; (ii) trigger mosaicking to ensure robustness even against region-based detectors; and (iii) strategic batching to address object-level data imbalances that hinder manipulation. Extensive experiments demonstrate that AnywhereDoor grants attackers a high degree of control, improving attack success rates by 26% compared to adaptations of existing methods for such flexible control.