John E. Hummel

Valerio Biscione, Dong Yin, Gaurav Malhotra et al.

Multiple benchmarks have been developed to assess the alignment between deep neural networks (DNNs) and human vision. In almost all cases these benchmarks are observational in the sense they are composed of behavioural and brain responses to naturalistic images that have not been manipulated to test hypotheses regarding how DNNs or humans perceive and identify objects. Here we introduce the toolbox MindSet: Vision, consisting of a collection of image datasets and related scripts designed to test DNNs on 30 psychological findings. In all experimental conditions, the stimuli are systematically manipulated to test specific hypotheses regarding human visual perception and object recognition. In addition to providing pre-generated datasets of images, we provide code to regenerate these datasets, offering many configurable parameters which greatly extend the dataset versatility for different research contexts, and code to facilitate the testing of DNNs on these image datasets using three different methods (similarity judgments, out-of-distribution classification, and decoder method), accessible at https://github.com/MindSetVision/mindset-vision. We test ResNet-152 on each of these methods as an example of how the toolbox can be used.

John E. Hummel, Rachel F. Heaton

What is it about human brains that allows us to reason symbolically whereas most other animals cannot? There is evidence that dynamic binding, the ability to combine neurons into groups on the fly, is necessary for symbolic thought, but there is also evidence that it is not sufficient. We propose that two kinds of hierarchical integration (integration of multiple role-bindings into multiplace predicates, and integration of multiple correspondences into structure mappings) are minimal requirements, on top of basic dynamic binding, to realize symbolic thought. We tested this hypothesis in a systematic collection of 17 simulations that explored the ability of cognitive architectures with and without the capacity for multi-place predicates and structure mapping to perform various kinds of tasks. The simulations were as generic as possible, in that no task could be performed based on any diagnostic features, depending instead on the capacity for multi-place predicates and structure mapping. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that, along with dynamic binding, multi-place predicates and structure mapping are minimal requirements for basic symbolic thought. These results inform our understanding of how human brains give rise to symbolic thought and speak to the differences between biological intelligence, which tends to generalize broadly from very few training examples, and modern approaches to machine learning, which typically require millions or billions of training examples. The results we report also have important implications for bio-inspired artificial intelligence.

Leonidas A. A. Doumas, Guillermo Puebla, Andrea E. Martin et al.

People readily generalize knowledge to novel domains and stimuli. We present a theory, instantiated in a computational model, based on the idea that cross-domain generalization in humans is a case of analogical inference over structured (i.e., symbolic) relational representations. The model is an extension of the LISA and DORA models of relational inference and learning. The resulting model learns both the content and format (i.e., structure) of relational representations from non-relational inputs without supervision, when augmented with the capacity for reinforcement learning, leverages these representations to learn individual domains, and then generalizes to new domains on the first exposure (i.e., zero-shot learning) via analogical inference. We demonstrate the capacity of the model to learn structured relational representations from a variety of simple visual stimuli, and to perform cross-domain generalization between video games (Breakout and Pong) and between several psychological tasks. We demonstrate that the model's trajectory closely mirrors the trajectory of children as they learn about relations, accounting for phenomena from the literature on the development of children's reasoning and analogy making. The model's ability to generalize between domains demonstrates the flexibility afforded by representing domains in terms of their underlying relational structure, rather than simply in terms of the statistical relations between their inputs and outputs.