Zhilin Zhang

Kefan Su, Yusen Huo, Zhilin Zhang et al.

Decision-making in large-scale games is an essential research area in artificial intelligence (AI) with significant real-world impact. However, the limited access to realistic large-scale game environments has hindered research progress in this area. In this paper, we present AuctionNet, a benchmark for bid decision-making in large-scale ad auctions derived from a real-world online advertising platform. AuctionNet is composed of three parts: an ad auction environment, a pre-generated dataset based on the environment, and performance evaluations of several baseline bid decision-making algorithms. More specifically, the environment effectively replicates the integrity and complexity of real-world ad auctions through the interaction of several modules: the ad opportunity generation module employs deep generative networks to bridge the gap between simulated and real-world data while mitigating the risk of sensitive data exposure; the bidding module implements diverse auto-bidding agents trained with different decision-making algorithms; and the auction module is anchored in the classic Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction but also allows for customization of auction mechanisms as needed. To facilitate research and provide insights into the environment, we have also pre-generated a substantial dataset based on the environment. The dataset contains 10 million ad opportunities, 48 diverse auto-bidding agents, and over 500 million auction records. Performance evaluations of baseline algorithms such as linear programming, reinforcement learning, and generative models for bid decision-making are also presented as a part of AuctionNet. We believe that AuctionNet is applicable not only to research on bid decision-making in ad auctions but also to the general area of decision-making in large-scale games.

Zhen Gong, Lvyin Niu, Yang Zhao et al.

Online bidding and auction are crucial aspects of the online advertising industry. Conventionally, there is only one slot for ad display and most current studies focus on it. Nowadays, multi-slot display advertising is gradually becoming popular where many ads could be displayed in a list and shown as a whole to users. However, multi-slot display advertising leads to different cost-effectiveness. Advertisers have the incentive to adjust bid prices so as to win the most economical ad positions. In this study, we introduce bid shading into multi-slot display advertising for bid price adjustment with a Multi-task End-to-end Bid Shading(MEBS) method. We prove the optimality of our method theoretically and examine its performance experimentally. Through extensive offline and online experiments, we demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our method, and we obtain a 7.01% lift in Gross Merchandise Volume, a 7.42% lift in Return on Investment, and a 3.26% lift in ad buy count.

Zhijian Duan, Yusen Huo, Tianyu Wang et al.

In online advertising, advertisers commonly utilize auto-bidding services to bid for impression opportunities. A typical objective of the auto-bidder is to optimize the advertiser's cumulative value of winning impressions within specified budget constraints. However, such a problem is challenging due to the complex bidding environment faced by diverse advertisers. To address this challenge, we introduce ABPlanner, a few-shot adaptable budget planner designed to improve budget-constrained auto-bidding. ABPlanner is based on a hierarchical bidding framework that decomposes the bidding process into shorter, manageable stages. Within this framework, ABPlanner allocates the budget across all stages, allowing a low-level auto-bidder to bids based on the budget allocation plan. The adaptability of ABPlanner is achieved through a sequential decision-making approach, inspired by in-context reinforcement learning. For each advertiser, ABPlanner adjusts the budget allocation plan episode by episode, using data from previous episodes as prompt for current decisions. This enables ABPlanner to quickly adapt to different advertisers with few-shot data, providing a sample-efficient solution. Extensive simulation experiments and real-world A/B testing validate the effectiveness of ABPlanner, demonstrating its capability to enhance the cumulative value achieved by auto-bidders.

Zhijian Duan, Haoran Sun, Yichong Xia et al.

Identifying high-revenue mechanisms that are both dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) and individually rational (IR) is a fundamental challenge in auction design. While theoretical approaches have encountered bottlenecks in multi-item auctions, there has been much empirical progress in automated designing such mechanisms using machine learning. However, existing research primarily focuses on randomized auctions, with less attention given to the more practical deterministic auctions. Therefore, this paper investigates the automated design of deterministic auctions and introduces OD-VVCA, an objective decomposition approach for automated designing Virtual Valuations Combinatorial Auctions (VVCAs). Firstly, we restrict our mechanism to deterministic VVCAs, which are inherently DSIC and IR. Afterward, we utilize a parallelizable dynamic programming algorithm to compute the allocation and revenue outcomes of a VVCA efficiently. We then decompose the revenue objective function into continuous and piecewise constant discontinuous components, optimizing each using distinct methods. Extensive experiments show that OD-VVCA achieves high revenue in multi-item auctions, especially in large-scale settings where it outperforms both randomized and deterministic baselines, indicating its efficacy and scalability.