Nancy Kanwisher

Tyler Bonnen, Stephanie Fu, Yutong Bai et al. · berkeley

We introduce a benchmark to directly evaluate the alignment between human observers and vision models on a 3D shape inference task. We leverage an experimental design from the cognitive sciences which requires zero-shot visual inferences about object shape: given a set of images, participants identify which contain the same/different objects, despite considerable viewpoint variation. We draw from a diverse range of images that include common objects (e.g., chairs) as well as abstract shapes (i.e., procedurally generated `nonsense' objects). After constructing over 2000 unique image sets, we administer these tasks to human participants, collecting 35K trials of behavioral data from over 500 participants. This includes explicit choice behaviors as well as intermediate measures, such as reaction time and gaze data. We then evaluate the performance of common vision models (e.g., DINOv2, MAE, CLIP). We find that humans outperform all models by a wide margin. Using a multi-scale evaluation approach, we identify underlying similarities and differences between models and humans: while human-model performance is correlated, humans allocate more time/processing on challenging trials. All images, data, and code can be accessed via our project page.

Kyle Mahowald, Anna A. Ivanova, Idan A. Blank et al.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have come closest among all models to date to mastering human language, yet opinions about their linguistic and cognitive capabilities remain split. Here, we evaluate LLMs using a distinction between formal linguistic competence -- knowledge of linguistic rules and patterns -- and functional linguistic competence -- understanding and using language in the world. We ground this distinction in human neuroscience, which has shown that formal and functional competence rely on different neural mechanisms. Although LLMs are surprisingly good at formal competence, their performance on functional competence tasks remains spotty and often requires specialized fine-tuning and/or coupling with external modules. We posit that models that use language in human-like ways would need to master both of these competence types, which, in turn, could require the emergence of mechanisms specialized for formal linguistic competence, distinct from functional competence.

Thomas P. O'Connell, Tyler Bonnen, Yoni Friedman et al.

Humans effortlessly infer the 3D shape of objects. What computations underlie this ability? Although various computational models have been proposed, none of them capture the human ability to match object shape across viewpoints. Here, we ask whether and how this gap might be closed. We begin with a relatively novel class of computational models, 3D neural fields, which encapsulate the basic principles of classic analysis-by-synthesis in a deep neural network (DNN). First, we find that a 3D Light Field Network (3D-LFN) supports 3D matching judgments well aligned to humans for within-category comparisons, adversarially-defined comparisons that accentuate the 3D failure cases of standard DNN models, and adversarially-defined comparisons for algorithmically generated shapes with no category structure. We then investigate the source of the 3D-LFN's ability to achieve human-aligned performance through a series of computational experiments. Exposure to multiple viewpoints of objects during training and a multi-view learning objective are the primary factors behind model-human alignment; even conventional DNN architectures come much closer to human behavior when trained with multi-view objectives. Finally, we find that while the models trained with multi-view learning objectives are able to partially generalize to new object categories, they fall short of human alignment. This work provides a foundation for understanding human shape inferences within neurally mappable computational architectures.

Colton Casto, Anna Ivanova, Evelina Fedorenko et al.

Language understanding entails not just extracting the surface-level meaning of the linguistic input, but constructing rich mental models of the situation it describes. Here we propose that because processing within the brain's core language system is fundamentally limited, deeply understanding language requires exporting information from the language system to other brain regions that compute perceptual and motor representations, construct mental models, and store our world knowledge and autobiographical memories. We review the existing evidence for this hypothesis, and argue that recent progress in cognitive neuroscience provides both the conceptual foundation and the methods to directly test it, thus opening up a new strategy to reveal what it means, cognitively and neurally, to understand language.

Daniel M. Bear, Elias Wang, Damian Mrowca et al.

While current vision algorithms excel at many challenging tasks, it is unclear how well they understand the physical dynamics of real-world environments. Here we introduce Physion, a dataset and benchmark for rigorously evaluating the ability to predict how physical scenarios will evolve over time. Our dataset features realistic simulations of a wide range of physical phenomena, including rigid and soft-body collisions, stable multi-object configurations, rolling, sliding, and projectile motion, thus providing a more comprehensive challenge than previous benchmarks. We used Physion to benchmark a suite of models varying in their architecture, learning objective, input-output structure, and training data. In parallel, we obtained precise measurements of human prediction behavior on the same set of scenarios, allowing us to directly evaluate how well any model could approximate human behavior. We found that vision algorithms that learn object-centric representations generally outperform those that do not, yet still fall far short of human performance. On the other hand, graph neural networks with direct access to physical state information both perform substantially better and make predictions that are more similar to those made by humans. These results suggest that extracting physical representations of scenes is the main bottleneck to achieving human-level and human-like physical understanding in vision algorithms. We have publicly released all data and code to facilitate the use of Physion to benchmark additional models in a fully reproducible manner, enabling systematic evaluation of progress towards vision algorithms that understand physical environments as robustly as people do.

Daniel Harari, Tao Gao, Nancy Kanwisher et al.

Humans are remarkably adept at interpreting the gaze direction of other individuals in their surroundings. This skill is at the core of the ability to engage in joint visual attention, which is essential for establishing social interactions. How accurate are humans in determining the gaze direction of others in lifelike scenes, when they can move their heads and eyes freely, and what are the sources of information for the underlying perceptual processes? These questions pose a challenge from both empirical and computational perspectives, due to the complexity of the visual input in real-life situations. Here we measure empirically human accuracy in perceiving the gaze direction of others in lifelike scenes, and study computationally the sources of information and representations underlying this cognitive capacity. We show that humans perform better in face-to-face conditions compared with recorded conditions, and that this advantage is not due to the availability of input dynamics. We further show that humans are still performing well when only the eyes-region is visible, rather than the whole face. We develop a computational model, which replicates the pattern of human performance, including the finding that the eyes-region contains on its own, the required information for estimating both head orientation and direction of gaze. Consistent with neurophysiological findings on task-specific face regions in the brain, the learned computational representations reproduce perceptual effects such as the Wollaston illusion, when trained to estimate direction of gaze, but not when trained to recognize objects or faces.