Yuhui Wang

Qingyuan Wu, Simon Sinong Zhan, Yixuan Wang et al.

In environments with delayed observation, state augmentation by including actions within the delay window is adopted to retrieve Markovian property to enable reinforcement learning (RL). However, state-of-the-art (SOTA) RL techniques with Temporal-Difference (TD) learning frameworks often suffer from learning inefficiency, due to the significant expansion of the augmented state space with the delay. To improve learning efficiency without sacrificing performance, this work introduces a novel framework called Variational Delayed Policy Optimization (VDPO), which reformulates delayed RL as a variational inference problem. This problem is further modelled as a two-step iterative optimization problem, where the first step is TD learning in the delay-free environment with a small state space, and the second step is behaviour cloning which can be addressed much more efficiently than TD learning. We not only provide a theoretical analysis of VDPO in terms of sample complexity and performance, but also empirically demonstrate that VDPO can achieve consistent performance with SOTA methods, with a significant enhancement of sample efficiency (approximately 50\% less amount of samples) in the MuJoCo benchmark.

Chao Wen, Miao Xu, Zhilin Zhang et al.

In online advertising, auto-bidding has become an essential tool for advertisers to optimize their preferred ad performance metrics by simply expressing high-level campaign objectives and constraints. Previous works designed auto-bidding tools from the view of single-agent, without modeling the mutual influence between agents. In this paper, we instead consider this problem from a distributed multi-agent perspective, and propose a general $\underline{M}$ulti-$\underline{A}$gent reinforcement learning framework for $\underline{A}$uto-$\underline{B}$idding, namely MAAB, to learn the auto-bidding strategies. First, we investigate the competition and cooperation relation among auto-bidding agents, and propose a temperature-regularized credit assignment to establish a mixed cooperative-competitive paradigm. By carefully making a competition and cooperation trade-off among agents, we can reach an equilibrium state that guarantees not only individual advertiser's utility but also the system performance (i.e., social welfare). Second, to avoid the potential collusion behaviors of bidding low prices underlying the cooperation, we further propose bar agents to set a personalized bidding bar for each agent, and then alleviate the revenue degradation due to the cooperation. Third, to deploy MAAB in the large-scale advertising system with millions of advertisers, we propose a mean-field approach. By grouping advertisers with the same objective as a mean auto-bidding agent, the interactions among the large-scale advertisers are greatly simplified, making it practical to train MAAB efficiently. Extensive experiments on the offline industrial dataset and Alibaba advertising platform demonstrate that our approach outperforms several baseline methods in terms of social welfare and revenue.