Zoé Christoff

Edoardo Baccini, Zoé Christoff, Nina Gierasimczuk et al.

The principle of minimal change in belief revision theory requires that, when accepting new information, one keeps one's belief state as close to the initial belief state as possible. This is precisely what the method known as minimal revision does. However, unlike less conservative belief revision methods, minimal revision falls short in learning power: It cannot learn everything that can be learned by other learning methods. We begin by showing that, despite this limitation, minimal revision is still a successful learning method in a wide range of situations. Firstly, it can learn any problem that is finitely identifiable. Secondly, it can learn with positive and negative data, as long as one considers finitely many possibilities. We then characterize the prior plausibility assignments (over finitely many possibilities) that enable one to learn via minimal revision, and do the same for conditioning and lexicographic upgrade. Finally, we show that not all of our results still hold when learning from possibly erroneous information.

Zoé Christoff, Davide Grossi

The paper provides an analysis of the voting method known as delegable proxy voting, or liquid democracy. The analysis first positions liquid democracy within the theory of binary aggregation. It then focuses on two issues of the system: the occurrence of delegation cycles; and the effect of delegations on individual rationality when voting on logically interdependent propositions. It finally points to proposals on how the system may be modified in order to address the above issues.

Zoé Christoff, Davide Grossi

The paper proposes an analysis of liquid democracy (or, delegable proxy voting) from the perspective of binary aggregation and of binary diffusion models. We show how liquid democracy on binary issues can be embedded into the framework of binary aggregation with abstentions, enabling the transfer of known results about the latter---such as impossibility theorems---to the former. This embedding also sheds light on the relation between delegation cycles in liquid democracy and the probability of collective abstentions, as well as the issue of individual rationality in a delegable proxy voting setting. We then show how liquid democracy on binary issues can be modeled and analyzed also as a specific process of dynamics of binary opinions on networks. These processes---called Boolean DeGroot processes---are a special case of the DeGroot stochastic model of opinion diffusion. We establish the convergence conditions of such processes and show they provide some novel insights on how the effects of delegation cycles and individual rationality could be mitigated within liquid democracy. The study is a first attempt to provide theoretical foundations to the delgable proxy features of the liquid democracy voting system. Our analysis suggests recommendations on how the system may be modified to make it more resilient with respect to the handling of delegation cycles and of inconsistent majorities.