Filippo Torresan

Filippo Torresan, Ryota Kanai, Manuel Baltieri

Active inference proposes expected free energy as an objective for planning and decision-making to adequately balance exploitative and explorative drives in learning agents. The exploitative drive, or what an agent wants to achieve, is formalised as the Kullback-Leibler divergence between a variational probability distribution, updated at each inference step, and a preference probability distribution that indicates what states or observations are more likely for the agent, hence determining the agent's goal in a certain environment. In the literature, the questions of how the preference distribution should be specified and of how a certain specification impacts inference and learning in an active inference agent have been given hardly any attention. In this work, we consider four possible ways of defining the preference distribution, either providing the agents with hard or soft goals and either involving or not goal shaping (i.e., intermediate goals). We compare the performances of four agents, each given one of the possible preference distributions, in a grid world navigation task. Our results show that goal shaping enables the best performance overall (i.e., it promotes exploitation) while sacrificing learning about the environment's transition dynamics (i.e., it hampers exploration).

Filippo Torresan, Keisuke Suzuki, Ryota Kanai et al.

Active inference is a formal approach to study cognition based on the notion that adaptive agents can be seen as engaging in a process of approximate Bayesian inference, via the minimisation of variational and expected free energies. Minimising the former provides an account of perceptual processes and learning as evidence accumulation, while minimising the latter describes how agents select their actions over time. In this way, adaptive agents are able to maximise the likelihood of preferred observations or states, given a generative model of the environment. In the literature, however, different strategies have been proposed to describe how agents can plan their future actions. While they all share the notion that some kind of expected free energy offers an appropriate way to score policies, sequences of actions, in terms of their desirability, there are different ways to consider the contribution of past motor experience to the agent's future behaviour. In some approaches, agents are assumed to know their own actions, and use such knowledge to better plan for the future. In other approaches, agents are unaware of their actions, and must infer their motor behaviour from recent observations in order to plan for the future. This difference reflects a standard point of departure in two leading frameworks in motor control based on the presence, or not, of an efference copy signal representing knowledge about an agent's own actions. In this work we compare the performances of action-aware and action-unaware agents in two navigations tasks, showing how action-unaware agents can achieve performances comparable to action-aware ones while at a severe disadvantage.

Filippo Torresan, Manuel Baltieri

Complex adaptive agents consistently achieve their goals by solving problems that seem to require an understanding of causal information, information pertaining to the causal relationships that exist among elements of combined agent-environment systems. Causal cognition studies and describes the main characteristics of causal learning and reasoning in human and non-human animals, offering a conceptual framework to discuss cognitive performances based on the level of apparent causal understanding of a task. Despite the use of formal intervention-based models of causality, including causal Bayesian networks, psychological and behavioural research on causal cognition does not yet offer a computational account that operationalises how agents acquire a causal understanding of the world. Machine and reinforcement learning research on causality, especially involving disentanglement as a candidate process to build causal representations, represent on the one hand a concrete attempt at designing causal artificial agents that can shed light on the inner workings of natural causal cognition. In this work, we connect these two areas of research to build a unifying framework for causal cognition that will offer a computational perspective on studies of animal cognition, and provide insights in the development of new algorithms for causal reinforcement learning in AI.