Vicent Pla

Erwin J. Sacoto-Cabrera, Luis Guijarro, Jose R. Vidal et al.

The provision of services by more than one operator over a common network infrastructure, as enabled by 5G network slicing, is analyzed. Two business models to be implemented by a network operator, who owns the network, and a virtual operator, who does not, are proposed. In one business model, named \emph{strategic}, the network operator provides service to its user base and the virtual operator provides service to its user base and pays a per-subscriber fee to the network operator. In the other business model, named \emph{monopolistic}, the network operator provides service to both user bases. The two proposals are analyzed by means of a model that captures both system and economic features. As regards the systems features, the slicing of the network is modeled by means of a Discriminatory Processor Sharing queue. As regards the economic features, the incentives are modeled by means of the user utilities and the operators' revenues; and game theory is used to model the strategic interaction between the users' subscription decision and the operators' pricing decision. In both business models, it is shown that the network operator can be provided with the appropriate economic incentives so that it acquiesces in serving the virtual operator's user base (monopolistic model) and in allowing the virtual operator to provide service over the network operator's infrastructure (strategic model). From the point of view of the users, the strategic model results in a higher subscription rate than the monopolistic model.

José-Ramón Vidal, Vicent Pla, Luis Guijarro et al.

Recent developments in cyber-physical systems have increased the importance of maximizing the freshness of the information about the physical environment. However, optimizing the access policies of Internet of Things devices to maximize the data freshness, measured as a function of the Age-of-Information (AoI) metric, is a challenging task. This work introduces two algorithms to optimize the information update process in cyber-physical systems operating under the generate-at-will model, by finding an online policy without knowing the characteristics of the transmission delay or the age cost function. The optimization seeks to minimize the time-average cost, which integrates the AoI at the receiver and the data transmission cost, making the approach suitable for a broad range of scenarios. Both algorithms employ policy gradient methods within the framework of model-free reinforcement learning (RL) and are specifically designed to handle continuous state and action spaces. Each algorithm minimizes the cost using a distinct strategy for deciding when to send an information update. Moreover, we demonstrate that it is feasible to apply the two strategies simultaneously, leading to an additional reduction in cost. The results demonstrate that the proposed algorithms exhibit good convergence properties and achieve a time-average cost within 3% of the optimal value, when the latter is computable. A comparison with other state-of-the-art methods shows that the proposed algorithms outperform them in one or more of the following aspects: being applicable to a broader range of scenarios, achieving a lower time-average cost, and requiring a computational cost at least one order of magnitude lower.

Luis Guijarro, Maurizio Naldi, Vicent Pla et al.

In Beyond5G and 6G networks, a common theme is that sensing will play a more significant role than ever before. Over this trend, Integrated Sensing and Communications (ISAC) is focused on unifying the sensing functionalities and the communications ones and to pursue direct tradeoffs between them as well as mutual performance gains. We frame the resource tradeoff between the SAC functionalities within an economic setting. We model a service provision by one operator to the users, the utility of which is derived from both SAC functionalities. The tradeoff between the resources that the operator assigns to the SAC functionalities is analyzed from the point of view of the service prices, quantities and profits. We demonstrate that equilibrium quantities and prices exist. And we provide relevant recommendations for enforcing regulatory limits of both power and bandwidth.

Luis Guijarro, Vicent Pla, Jose Ramon Vidal

We analyze the effects of enforcing vs. exempting access ISP from net neutrality regulations when platforms are present and operate two-sided pricing in their business models. This study is conducted in a scenario where users and Content Providers (CPs) have access to the internet by means of their serving ISPs and to a platform that intermediates and matches users and CPs, among other service offerings. Our hypothesis is that platform two-sided pricing interacts in a relevant manner with the access ISP, which may be allowed (an hypothetical non-neutrality scenario) or not (the current neutrality regulation status) to apply two-sided pricing on its service business model. We preliminarily conclude that the platforms are extracting surplus from the CPs under the current net neutrality regime for the ISP, and that the platforms would not be able to do so under the counter-factual situation where the ISPs could apply two-sided prices.