Lydia Yiyu Chen

Nikolay Blagoev, Oğuzhan Ersoy, Wendelin Boehmer et al.

Reinforcement learning methods such as GRPO have seen great popularity in LLM post-training. In GRPO, models produce completions to a set of prompts, which are rewarded, and the policy is updated towards the relatively high reward completions. Due to the auto-regressive nature of models, the generation phase of such style of training can be extremely time consuming. As a solution, prior work has sought to distribute the inference step across many nodes, working parallel. These works assume primarily homogeneous models in the training in order to keep samples as close to on-policy as possible. This assumption may be impractical in decentralized systems, where parties with various computes and preferences may wish to collaborate on the same task. Thus, decentralized training requires an approach that can handle heterogeneous models - different models collaborating on the same tasks. However, this leads to highly off-policy samples presented during training, which prior work has identified that off-policy samples can hurt GRPO convergence. To enable heterogeneity, we propose Filtered Truncated Importance Sampling (F-TIS) - a GRPO-style training paradigm that can use off-policy samples to improve local model's learning. Our framework allows various models to collaborate in the same RL training run while being communication efficient. We extensively evaluate F-TIS in various heterogeneous setups and we show that it exhibits identical final model convergence to purely on-sample training. Furthermore, we observe in some setups better generalization on out-of-distribution tasks than on-policy training, increasing model's performance by up to 12\%.

Nikolay Blagoev, Lydia Yiyu Chen, Oğuzhan Ersoy

Data and pipeline parallelism are ubiquitous for training of Large Language Models (LLM) on distributed nodes. Driven by the need for cost-effective training, recent work explores efficient communication arrangement for end to end training. Motivated by LLM's resistance to layer skipping and layer reordering, in this paper, we explore stage (several consecutive layers) skipping in pipeline training, and challenge the conventional practice of sequential pipeline execution. We derive convergence and throughput constraints (guidelines) for pipelining with skipping and swapping pipeline stages. Based on these constraints, we propose SkipPipe, the first partial pipeline framework to reduce the end-to-end training time for LLMs while preserving the convergence. The core of SkipPipe is a path scheduling algorithm that optimizes the paths for individual microbatches and reduces idle time (due to microbatch collisions) on the distributed nodes, complying with the given stage skipping ratio. We extensively evaluate SkipPipe on LLaMa models from 500M to 8B parameters on up to 20 nodes. Our results show that SkipPipe reduces training iteration time by up to $55\%$ compared to full pipeline. Our partial pipeline training also improves resistance to layer omission during inference, experiencing a drop in perplexity of only $7\%$ when running only half the model. Our code is available at https://github.com/gensyn-ai/skippipe.

Nikolay Blagoev, Oğuzhan Ersoy, Lydia Yiyu Chen

Training LLMs on decentralized and wimpy computation nodes, e.g., multiple on-spot instances, lowers the training cost and enables model democratization. The inevitable challenge here is the churn of nodes due to failures and the operator's scheduling policies, leading to losing a stage - a part of the model. The conventional approaches to recover from failures are to either use checkpointing, where periodically a copy of the entire model is sent to an additional storage, or redundant computation. These approaches yield significant communication and/or computation overhead even in non-failure cases and scale poorly in settings with large models. In this paper, we propose, CheckFree, an efficient recovery method where a failing stage is substituted by a weighted average of the closest neighboring stages. In contrast to the state of the art, CheckFree requires no additional computation or storage. However, because of the nature of averaging neighbouring stages, it can only recover failures of intermediate stages. We further extend our method to CheckFree+ with out-of-order pipeline execution to tolerate crashes of the first and last stages. Thanks to out-of-order pipelining, behaviour of those stages is mimicked by their neighboring ones, which allows CheckFree+ to recover them by simply copying the weights from the immediate neighbour. To be able to recover the (de)embedding layers, CheckFree+ copies those layers to the neighboring stages, which requires relatively small storage overhead. We extensively evaluate our method on LLaMa models of model sizes from 124M to 1.5B with varying failure frequencies. In the case of low and medium failure rates (5-10%), CheckFree and CheckFree+ outperform both checkpointing and redundant computation in terms of convergence in wall-clock time by over 12%. Both of our proposals can be run via our code available at: https://github.com/gensyn-ai/CheckFree.

Nikolay Blagoev, Oğuzhan Ersoy, Lydia Yiyu Chen

Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) has demonstrated great utilization in post-training of Large Language Models (LLMs). In GRPO, prompts are answered by the model and, through reinforcement learning, preferred completions are learnt. Owing to the small communication volume, GRPO is inherently suitable for decentralised training as the prompts can be concurrently answered by multiple nodes and then exchanged in the forms of strings. In this work, we present the first adversarial attack in decentralised GRPO. We demonstrate that malicious parties can poison such systems by injecting arbitrary malicious tokens in benign models in both out-of-context and in-context attacks. Using empirical examples of math and coding tasks, we show that adversarial attacks can easily poison the benign nodes, polluting their local LLM post-training, achieving attack success rates up to 100% in as few as 50 iterations. We propose two ways to defend against these attacks, depending on whether all users train the same model or different models. We show that these defenses can achieve stop rates of up to 100%, making the attack impossible.