Lucius Caviola

Noemi Dreksler, Lucius Caviola, David Chalmers et al.

We surveyed 582 AI researchers who have published in leading AI venues and 838 nationally representative US participants about their views on the potential development of AI systems with subjective experience and how such systems should be treated and governed. When asked to estimate the chances that such systems will exist on specific dates, the median responses were 1% (AI researchers) and 5% (public) by 2024, 25% and 30% by 2034, and 70% and 60% by 2100, respectively. The median member of the public thought there was a higher chance that AI systems with subjective experience would never exist (25%) than the median AI researcher did (10%). Both groups perceived a need for multidisciplinary expertise to assess AI subjective experience. Although support for welfare protections for such AI systems exceeded opposition, it remained far lower than support for protections for animals or the environment. Attitudes toward moral and governance issues were divided in both groups, especially regarding whether such systems should be created and what rights or protections they should receive. Yet a majority of respondents in both groups agreed that safeguards against the potential risks from AI systems with subjective experience should be implemented by AI developers now, and if created, AI systems with subjective experience should treat others well, behave ethically, and be held accountable. Overall, these results suggest that both AI researchers and the public regard the emergence of AI systems with subjective experience as a possibility this century, though substantial uncertainty and disagreement remain about the timeline and appropriate response.

Monika Jotautaitė, Lucius Caviola, David A. Brewster et al.

As large language models (LLMs) become more widely deployed, it is crucial to examine their ethical tendencies. Building on research on fairness and discrimination in AI, we investigate whether LLMs exhibit speciesist bias -- discrimination based on species membership -- and how they value non-human animals. We systematically examine this issue across three paradigms: (1) SpeciesismBench, a 1,003-item benchmark assessing recognition and moral evaluation of speciesist statements; (2) established psychological measures comparing model responses with those of human participants; (3) text-generation tasks probing elaboration on, or resistance to, speciesist rationalizations. In our benchmark, LLMs reliably detected speciesist statements but rarely condemned them, often treating speciesist attitudes as morally acceptable. On psychological measures, results were mixed: LLMs expressed slightly lower explicit speciesism than people, yet in direct trade-offs they more often chose to save one human over multiple animals. A tentative interpretation is that LLMs may weight cognitive capacity rather than species per se: when capacities were equal, they showed no species preference, and when an animal was described as more capable, they tended to prioritize it over a less capable human. In open-ended text generation tasks, LLMs frequently normalized or rationalized harm toward farmed animals while refusing to do so for non-farmed animals. These findings suggest that while LLMs reflect a mixture of progressive and mainstream human views, they nonetheless reproduce entrenched cultural norms around animal exploitation. We argue that expanding AI fairness and alignment frameworks to explicitly include non-human moral patients is essential for reducing these biases and preventing the entrenchment of speciesist attitudes in AI systems and the societies they influence.