Jamiu Adekunle Idowu

Jamiu Adekunle Idowu, Ahmed Almasoud

Automated essay scoring (AES) systems increasingly rely on large language models, yet little is known about how architectural choices shape their performance across different essay quality levels. This paper evaluates single-agent and multi-agent LLM architectures for essay grading using the ASAP 2.0 corpus. Our multi-agent system decomposes grading into three specialist agents (Content, Structure, Language) coordinated by a Chairman Agent that implements rubric-aligned logic including veto rules and score capping. We test both architectures in zero-shot and few-shot conditions using GPT-5.1. Results show that the multi-agent system is significantly better at identifying weak essays while the single-agent system performs better on mid-range essays. Both architectures struggle with high-quality essays. Critically, few-shot calibration emerges as the dominant factor in system performance -- providing just two examples per score level improves QWK by approximately 26% for both architectures. These findings suggest architectural choice should align with specific deployment priorities, with multi-agent AI particularly suited for diagnostic screening of at-risk students, while single-agent models provide a cost-effective solution for general assessment.

Jamiu Adekunle Idowu, Ahmed Almasoud, Ayman Alfahid

As multi-agent AI systems become increasingly autonomous, evidence shows they can develop collusive strategies similar to those long observed in human markets and institutions. While human domains have accumulated centuries of anti-collusion mechanisms, it remains unclear how these can be adapted to AI settings. This paper addresses that gap by (i) developing a taxonomy of human anti-collusion mechanisms, including sanctions, leniency & whistleblowing, monitoring & auditing, market design, and governance and (ii) mapping them to potential interventions for multi-agent AI systems. For each mechanism, we propose implementation approaches. We also highlight open challenges, such as the attribution problem (difficulty attributing emergent coordination to specific agents) identity fluidity (agents being easily forked or modified) the boundary problem (distinguishing beneficial cooperation from harmful collusion) and adversarial adaptation (agents learning to evade detection).