Sheldon Paul

2papers

2 Papers

32.0CRApr 19Code
A Unified Compliance Aggregator Framework for Automated Multi-Tool Security Assessment of Linux Systems

Sheldon Paul, Izzat Alsmadi

Assessing the security posture of modern computing systems typically requires the use of multiple specialized tools. These tools focus on different aspects such as configuration compliance, file integrity, and vulnerability exposure, and their outputs are often difficult to interpret collectively. This paper introduces the Unified Compliance Aggregator (UCA), a framework that integrates several open-source security tools into a single composite score representing overall system security. The proposed framework combines outputs from Lynis, OpenSCAP (STIG and CIS profiles), AIDE, Tripwire, and Nmap NSE. A normalization process converts heterogeneous outputs into a consistent 0 to 100 scale, followed by weighted aggregation. We also introduce a logarithmic scoring model for file integrity measurements to address limitations observed in prior linear approaches. Experiments were conducted on Ubuntu 22.04 across different hardening levels and environments. Results show consistent improvement in composite scores as systems are hardened, while also revealing contrasting behavior between compliance and file integrity tools. Two case studies, a basic web server and a DVWA-based system illustrate how the framework can be applied in practical scenarios.

CRJan 1
Security Hardening Using FABRIC: Implementing a Unified Compliance Aggregator for Linux Servers

Sheldon Paul, Izzat Alsmadi

This paper presents a unified framework for evaluating Linux security hardening on the FABRIC testbed through aggregation of heterogeneous security auditing tools. We deploy three Ubuntu 22.04 nodes configured at baseline, partial, and full hardening levels, and evaluate them using Lynis, OpenSCAP, and AIDE across 108 audit runs. To address the lack of a consistent interpretation across tools, we implement a Unified Compliance Aggregator (UCA) that parses tool outputs, normalizes scores to a common 0--100 scale, and combines them into a weighted metric augmented by a customizable rule engine for organization-specific security policies. Experimental results show that full hardening increases OpenSCAP compliance from 39.7 to 71.8, while custom rule compliance improves from 39.3\% to 83.6\%. The results demonstrate that UCA provides a clearer and more reproducible assessment of security posture than individual tools alone, enabling systematic evaluation of hardening effectiveness in programmable testbed environments.