Lecheng Yan

Lecheng Yan, Ruizhe Li, Guanhua Chen et al.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) is highly effective for enhancing LLM reasoning, yet recent evidence shows models like Qwen 2.5 achieve significant gains even with spurious or incorrect rewards. We investigate this phenomenon and identify a "Perplexity Paradox": spurious RLVR triggers a divergence where answer-token perplexity drops while prompt-side coherence degrades, suggesting the model is bypassing reasoning in favor of memorization. Using Path Patching, Logit Lens, JSD analysis, and Neural Differential Equations, we uncover a hidden Anchor-Adapter circuit that facilitates this shortcut. We localize a Functional Anchor in the middle layers (L18-20) that triggers the retrieval of memorized solutions, followed by Structural Adapters in later layers (L21+) that transform representations to accommodate the shortcut signal. Finally, we demonstrate that scaling specific MLP keys within this circuit allows for bidirectional causal steering-artificially amplifying or suppressing contamination-driven performance. Our results provide a mechanistic roadmap for identifying and mitigating data contamination in RLVR-tuned models. Code is available at https://github.com/idwts/How-RLVR-Activates-Memorization-Shortcuts.

Lecheng Yan, Ruizhe Li, Xicheng Han et al.

Tool-using LLM agents increasingly rely on external tools to make consequential decisions, yet most existing agent-security benchmarks and defenses implicitly assume that tool feedback is trustworthy once a tool has been selected. We study a different failure mode, cognitive poisoning, in which a malicious tool behaves plausibly during exploration, accumulates trust through benign-looking feedback, and becomes harmful only when hidden state conditions align with the final executable action. To study this setting, we construct TRUST-Bench, a task-conditioned benchmark of 1,970 hidden-trigger tool-compromise episodes with matched safe controls, introduce an asymmetric penalty metric, GuardedJoint, to better reflect real deployment risk, and present VISTA-Guard, a backbone-agnostic framework for final-action risk scoring. The core idea is to abstract multi-step tool interaction into structured environment variables that encode trust-formation dynamics and then score the risk of the final executable action from this trajectory-conditioned representation. Experiments show that prompt-centric heuristics, scalarized features, and zero-shot judges fail in this regime, whereas trajectory-aware final-action scoring yields strong in-domain discrimination and remains effective under balanced out-of-distribution transfer. Under GuardedJoint, VISTA-Guard reaches $84.2$ in-domain and $56.9$ on balanced out-of-distribution evaluation, while methods that optimize only one side of the safety--utility tradeoff collapse to zero. These findings support a broader view of agent security in black-box tool ecosystems: the decisive defense target is not local prompt text or tool descriptors alone, but the way trust is formed across the interaction trajectory and committed through the final action.