Côme Fiegel

Côme Fiegel, Pierre Ménard, Tadashi Kozuno et al.

Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current game state. We study how to learn $ε$-optimal strategies in a zero-sum IIG through self-play with trajectory feedback. We give a problem-independent lower bound $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(H(A_{\mathcal{X}}+B_{\mathcal{Y}})/ε^2)$ on the required number of realizations to learn these strategies with high probability, where $H$ is the length of the game, $A_{\mathcal{X}}$ and $B_{\mathcal{Y}}$ are the total number of actions for the two players. We also propose two Follow the Regularized leader (FTRL) algorithms for this setting: Balanced FTRL which matches this lower bound, but requires the knowledge of the information set structure beforehand to define the regularization; and Adaptive FTRL which needs $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(H^2(A_{\mathcal{X}}+B_{\mathcal{Y}})/ε^2)$ realizations without this requirement by progressively adapting the regularization to the observations.

Côme Fiegel, Pierre Ménard, Tadashi Kozuno et al.

We study the problem of learning in zero-sum matrix games with repeated play and bandit feedback. Specifically, we focus on developing uncoupled algorithms that guarantee, without communication between players, the convergence of the last-iterate to a Nash equilibrium. Although the non-bandit case has been studied extensively, this setting has only been explored recently, with a bound of $\mathcal{O}(T^{-1/8})$ on the exploitability gap. We show that, for uncoupled algorithms, guaranteeing convergence of the policy profiles to a Nash equilibrium is detrimental to the performance, with the best attainable rate being $Ω(T^{-1/4})$ in contrast to the usual $Ω(T^{-1/2})$ rate for convergence of the average iterates. We then propose two algorithms that achieve this optimal rate up to constant and logarithmic factors. The first algorithm leverages a straightforward trade-off between exploration and exploitation, while the second employs a regularization technique based on a two-step mirror descent approach.

Giovanni Montanari, Côme Fiegel, Corentin Pla et al.

We study the online resource allocation problem in which at each round, a budget $B$ must be allocated across $K$ arms under censored feedback. An arm yields a reward if and only if two conditions are satisfied: (i) the arm is activated according to an arm-specific Bernoulli random variable with unknown parameter, and (ii) the allocated budget exceeds a random threshold drawn from a parametric distribution with unknown parameter. Over $T$ rounds, the learner must jointly estimate the unknown parameters and allocate the budget so as to maximize cumulative reward facing the exploration--exploitation trade-off. We prove an information-theoretic regret lower bound $Ω(T^{1/3})$, demonstrating the intrinsic difficulty of the problem. We then propose RA-UCB, an optimistic algorithm that leverages non-trivial parameter estimation and confidence bounds. When the budget $B$ is known at the beginning of each round, RA-UCB achieves a regret of order $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T})$, and even $\mathcal{O}(\mathrm{poly}\text{-}\log T)$ under stronger assumptions. As for unknown, round dependent budget, we introduce MG-UCB, which allows within-round switching and infinitesimal allocations, and matches the regret guarantees of RA-UCB. We then validate our theoretical results through experiments on real-world datasets.

Côme Fiegel, Pierre Ménard, Tadashi Kozuno et al.

We study how to learn $ε$-optimal strategies in zero-sum imperfect information games (IIG) with trajectory feedback. In this setting, players update their policies sequentially based on their observations over a fixed number of episodes, denoted by $T$. Existing procedures suffer from high variance due to the use of importance sampling over sequences of actions (Steinberger et al., 2020; McAleer et al., 2022). To reduce this variance, we consider a fixed sampling approach, where players still update their policies over time, but with observations obtained through a given fixed sampling policy. Our approach is based on an adaptive Online Mirror Descent (OMD) algorithm that applies OMD locally to each information set, using individually decreasing learning rates and a regularized loss. We show that this approach guarantees a convergence rate of $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{-1/2})$ with high probability and has a near-optimal dependence on the game parameters when applied with the best theoretical choices of learning rates and sampling policies. To achieve these results, we generalize the notion of OMD stabilization, allowing for time-varying regularization with convex increments.