Guevara Noubir

Hai N. Nguyen, Guevara Noubir

Wireless links are increasingly used to deliver critical services, while intentional interference (jamming) remains a very serious threat to such services. In this paper, we are concerned with the design and evaluation of a universal anti-jamming building block, that is agnostic to the specifics of the communication link and can therefore be combined with existing technologies. We believe that such a block should not require explicit probes, sounding, training sequences, channel estimation, or even the cooperation of the transmitter. To meet these requirements, we propose an approach that relies on advances in Machine Learning, and the promises of neural accelerators and software defined radios. We identify and address multiple challenges, resulting in a convolutional neural network architecture and models for a multi-antenna system to infer the existence of interference, the number of interfering emissions and their respective phases. This information is continuously fed into an algorithm that cancels the interfering signal. We develop a two-antenna prototype system and evaluate our jamming cancellation approach in various environment settings and modulation schemes using Software Defined Radio platforms. We demonstrate that the receiving node equipped with our approach can detect a jammer with over 99% of accuracy and achieve a Bit Error Rate (BER) as low as $10^{-6}$ even when the jammer power is nearly two orders of magnitude (18 dB) higher than the legitimate signal, and without requiring modifications to the link modulation. In non-adversarial settings, our approach can have other advantages such as detecting and mitigating collisions.

Hai N. Nguyen, Guevara Noubir

We introduce, design, and evaluate a set of universal receiver beamforming techniques. Our approach and system DEFORM, a Deep Learning (DL) based RX beamforming achieves significant gain for multi antenna RF receivers while being agnostic to the transmitted signal features (e.g., modulation or bandwidth). It is well known that combining coherent RF signals from multiple antennas results in a beamforming gain proportional to the number of receiving elements. However in practice, this approach heavily relies on explicit channel estimation techniques, which are link specific and require significant communication overhead to be transmitted to the receiver. DEFORM addresses this challenge by leveraging Convolutional Neural Network to estimate the channel characteristics in particular the relative phase to antenna elements. It is specifically designed to address the unique features of wireless signals complex samples, such as the ambiguous $2π$ phase discontinuity and the high sensitivity of the link Bit Error Rate. The channel prediction is subsequently used in the Maximum Ratio Combining algorithm to achieve an optimal combination of the received signals. While being trained on a fixed, basic RF settings, we show that DEFORM DL model is universal, achieving up to 3 dB of SNR gain for a two antenna receiver in extensive experiments demonstrating various settings of modulations, bandwidths, and channels. The universality of DEFORM is demonstrated through joint beamforming relaying of LoRa (Chirp Spread Spectrum modulation) and ZigBee signals, achieving significant improvements to Packet Loss/Delivery Rates relatively to conventional Amplify and Forward (LoRa PLR reduced by 23 times and ZigBee PDR increased by 8 times).

Stavros Dimou, Guevara Noubir

Dynamic Spectrum Sharing (DSS) enables flexible activation of additional spectrum resources but leaves open a key runtime question: once new spectrum becomes available, which steering mechanism should migrate connected devices toward it with minimum service disruption? We present the first PHY-aware characterization of 3GPP-compliant UE steering mechanisms, including Bandwidth Part (BWP) reconfiguration, Carrier Aggregation (CA), E-UTRA-NR Dual Connectivity (EN-DC), Connected-Mode Handover (HO), and Release and Redirection (R&R), using modem-level traces from devices connected to operational networks, collected across 1,600 executions over four months in 12 urban areas. By mapping each mechanism to observable PHY-layer milestones, we decompose steering latency into intrinsic PHY-centric execution and RRC-to-PHY completion components, revealing substantial heterogeneity: NR BWP achieves 6.25 ms mean latency with zero tail exceedance above 50 ms, while CA exceeds 1225 ms; mobility procedures remain largely modem-bound, whereas discovery-driven mechanisms experience significant RRC-to-PHY completion amplification. Guided by these measurements, we design POLARIS, an O-RAN-based system that selects the least disruptive steering mechanism via a two-parameter disruption score. POLARIS reduces mean latency by up to 85.1% and T95 by 89.7% over static or non-adaptive baselines, eliminates tail exceedance above 50 ms, and avoids high-disruption mechanisms, demonstrating that PHY-layer execution profiling enables reliable and context-aware spectrum steering in DSS-enabled networks.

Hai N. Nguyen, Marinos Vomvas, Triet Vo-Huu et al.

RF emissions detection, classification, and spectro-temporal localization are crucial not only for tasks relating to understanding, managing, and protecting the RF spectrum, but also for safety and security applications such as detecting intruding drones or jammers. Achieving this goal for wideband spectrum and in real-time performance is a challenging problem. We present WRIST, a Wideband, Real-time RF Identification system with Spectro-Temporal detection, framework and system. Our resulting deep learning model is capable to detect, classify, and precisely locate RF emissions in time and frequency using RF samples of 100 MHz spectrum in real-time (over 6Gbps incoming I&Q streams). Such capabilities are made feasible by leveraging a deep-learning based one-stage object detection framework, and transfer learning to a multi-channel image-based RF signals representation. We also introduce an iterative training approach which leverages synthesized and augmented RF data to efficiently build large labelled datasets of RF emissions (SPREAD). WRIST detector achieves 90 mean Average Precision even in extremely congested environment in the wild. WRIST model classifies five technologies (Bluetooth, Lightbridge, Wi-Fi, XPD, and ZigBee) and is easily extendable to others. We are making our curated and annotated dataset available to the whole community. It consists of nearly 1 million fully labelled RF emissions collected from various off-the-shelf wireless radios in a range of environments and spanning the five classes of emissions.

Tien D. Vo-Huu, Triet D. Vo-Huu, Guevara Noubir

Secure ranging is poised to play a critical role in several emerging applications such as self-driving cars, unmanned aerial systems, wireless IoT devices, and augmented reality. In this paper, we propose a design of a secure broadcast ranging systems with unique features and techniques. Its spectral-flexibility, and low-power short ranging bursts enable co-existence with existing systems such as in the 2.4GHz ISM band. We exploit a set of RF techniques such as upsampling and successive interference cancellation to achieve high accuracy and scalability to tens of reflectors even when operating over narrow bands of spectrum. We demonstrate that it can be implemented on popular SDR platforms FPGA and/or hosts (with minimal FPGA modifications). The protocol design, and cryptographically generated/detected signals, and randomized timing of transmissions, provide stealth and security against denial of service, sniffing, and distance manipulation attacks. Through extensive experimental evaluations (and simulations for scalability to over 100 reflectors) we demonstrate an accuracy below 20cm on a wide range of SNR (as low as 0dB), spectrum 25MHz-100MHz, with bursts as short as 5us.

Amirali Sanatinia, Jeman Park, Erik-Oliver Blass et al.

Tor and hidden services have emerged as a practical solution to protect user privacy against tracking and censorship. At the same time, little is known about the lifetime and nature of hidden services. Data collection and study of Tor hidden services is challenging due to its nature of providing privacy. Studying the lifetime of hidden services provides several benefits. For example, it allows investigation of the maliciousness of domains based on their lifetime. Short-lived hidden services are more likely not to be legitimate domains, e.g., used by ransomware, as compared to long-lived domains. In this work, we investigate the lifetime of hidden services by collecting data from a small (2%) subset of all Tor HSDir relays in a privacy-preserving manner. Based on the data collected, we devise protocols and extrapolation techniques to infer the lifetime of hidden services. Moreover we show that, due to Tor's specifics, our small subset of HSDir relays is sufficient to extrapolate lifetime with high accuracy, while respecting Tor user and service privacy and following Tor's research safety guidelines. Our results indicate that a large majority of the hidden services have a very short lifetime. In particular, 50% of all current Tor hidden services have an estimate lifetime of only 10 days or less, and 80% have a lifetime of less than a month.

Sashank Narain, Guevara Noubir

We present the design, implementation and evaluation of a system, called MATRIX, developed to protect the privacy of mobile device users from location inference and sensor side-channel attacks. MATRIX gives users control and visibility over location and sensor (e.g., Accelerometers and Gyroscopes) accesses by mobile apps. It implements a PrivoScope service that audits all location and sensor accesses by apps on the device and generates real-time notifications and graphs for visualizing these accesses; and a Synthetic Location service to enable users to provide obfuscated or synthetic location trajectories or sensor traces to apps they find useful, but do not trust with their private information. The services are designed to be extensible and easy for users, hiding all of the underlying complexity from them. MATRIX also implements a Location Provider component that generates realistic privacy-preserving synthetic identities and trajectories for users by incorporating traffic information using historical data from Google Maps Directions API, and accelerations using statistical information from user driving experiments. The random traffic patterns are generated by modeling/solving user schedule using a randomized linear program and modeling/solving for user driving behavior using a quadratic program. We extensively evaluated MATRIX using user studies, popular location-driven apps and machine learning techniques, and demonstrate that it is portable to most Android devices globally, is reliable, has low-overhead, and generates synthetic trajectories that are difficult to differentiate from real mobility trajectories by an adversary.

Sashank Narain, Aanjhan Ranganathan, Guevara Noubir

Location information is critical to a wide-variety of navigation and tracking applications. Today, GPS is the de-facto outdoor localization system but has been shown to be vulnerable to signal spoofing attacks. Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) are emerging as a popular complementary system, especially in road transportation systems as they enable improved navigation and tracking as well as offer resilience to wireless signals spoofing, and jamming attacks. In this paper, we evaluate the security guarantees of INS-aided GPS tracking and navigation for road transportation systems. We consider an adversary required to travel from a source location to a destination, and monitored by a INS-aided GPS system. The goal of the adversary is to travel to alternate locations without being detected. We developed and evaluated algorithms that achieve such goal, providing the adversary significant latitude. Our algorithms build a graph model for a given road network and enable us to derive potential destinations an attacker can reach without raising alarms even with the INS-aided GPS tracking and navigation system. The algorithms render the gyroscope and accelerometer sensors useless as they generate road trajectories indistinguishable from plausible paths (both in terms of turn angles and roads curvature). We also designed, built, and demonstrated that the magnetometer can be actively spoofed using a combination of carefully controlled coils. We implemented and evaluated the impact of the attack using both real-world and simulated driving traces in more than 10 cities located around the world. Our evaluations show that it is possible for an attacker to reach destinations that are as far as 30 km away from the true destination without being detected. We also show that it is possible for the adversary to reach almost 60-80% of possible points within the target region in some cities.

Amirali Sanatinia, Guevara Noubir

In the last decade, Tor proved to be a very successful and widely popular system to protect users' anonymity. However, Tor remains a practical system with a variety of limitations, some of which were indeed exploited in the recent past. In particular, Tor's security relies on the fact that a substantial number of its nodes do not misbehave. In this work we introduce, the concept of honey onions, a framework to detect misbehaving Tor relays with HSDir capability. This allows to obtain lower bounds on misbehavior among relays. We propose algorithms to both estimate the number of snooping HSDirs and identify the most likely snoopers. Our experimental results indicate that during the period of the study (72 days) at least 110 such nodes were snooping information about hidden services they host. We reveal that more than half of them were hosted on cloud infrastructure and delayed the use of the learned information to prevent easy traceback.

Amirali Sanatinia, Guevara Noubir

Over the last decade botnets survived by adopting a sequence of increasingly sophisticated strategies to evade detection and take overs, and to monetize their infrastructure. At the same time, the success of privacy infrastructures such as Tor opened the door to illegal activities, including botnets, ransomware, and a marketplace for drugs and contraband. We contend that the next waves of botnets will extensively subvert privacy infrastructure and cryptographic mechanisms. In this work we propose to preemptively investigate the design and mitigation of such botnets. We first, introduce OnionBots, what we believe will be the next generation of resilient, stealthy botnets. OnionBots use privacy infrastructures for cyber attacks by completely decoupling their operation from the infected host IP address and by carrying traffic that does not leak information about its source, destination, and nature. Such bots live symbiotically within the privacy infrastructures to evade detection, measurement, scale estimation, observation, and in general all IP-based current mitigation techniques. Furthermore, we show that with an adequate self-healing network maintenance scheme, that is simple to implement, OnionBots achieve a low diameter and a low degree and are robust to partitioning under node deletions. We developed a mitigation technique, called SOAP, that neutralizes the nodes of the basic OnionBots. We also outline and discuss a set of techniques that can enable subsequent waves of Super OnionBots. In light of the potential of such botnets, we believe that the research community should proactively develop detection and mitigation methods to thwart OnionBots, potentially making adjustments to privacy infrastructure.

Triet D. Vo-Huu, Guevara Noubir

Exposing the rate information of wireless transmission enables highly efficient attacks that can severely degrade the performance of a network at very low cost. In this paper, we introduce an integrated solution to conceal the rate information of wireless transmissions while simultaneously boosting the resiliency against interference. The proposed solution is based on a generalization of Trellis Coded Modulation combined with Cryptographic Interleaving. We develop algorithms for discovering explicit codes for concealing any modulation in {BPSK, QPSK, 8-PSK, 16-QAM, 64-QAM}. We demonstrate that in most cases this modulation hiding scheme has the side effect of boosting resiliency by up to 8.5dB.