L. Elisa Celis

CY
3papers
8citations
Novelty53%
AI Score36

3 Papers

3.3CYJun 16, 2023Code
Subset Selection Based On Multiple Rankings in the Presence of Bias: Effectiveness of Fairness Constraints for Multiwinner Voting Score Functions

Niclas Boehmer, L. Elisa Celis, Lingxiao Huang et al.

We consider the problem of subset selection where one is given multiple rankings of items and the goal is to select the highest ``quality'' subset. Score functions from the multiwinner voting literature have been used to aggregate rankings into quality scores for subsets. We study this setting of subset selection problems when, in addition, rankings may contain systemic or unconscious biases toward a group of items. For a general model of input rankings and biases, we show that requiring the selected subset to satisfy group fairness constraints can improve the quality of the selection with respect to unbiased rankings. Importantly, we show that for fairness constraints to be effective, different multiwinner score functions may require a drastically different number of rankings: While for some functions, fairness constraints need an exponential number of rankings to recover a close-to-optimal solution, for others, this dependency is only polynomial. This result relies on a novel notion of ``smoothness'' of submodular functions in this setting that quantifies how well a function can ``correctly'' assess the quality of items in the presence of bias. The results in this paper can be used to guide the choice of multiwinner score functions for the subset selection setting considered here; we additionally provide a tool to empirically enable this.

3.3CYOct 26, 2023Code
Bias in Evaluation Processes: An Optimization-Based Model

L. Elisa Celis, Amit Kumar, Anay Mehrotra et al.

Biases with respect to socially-salient attributes of individuals have been well documented in evaluation processes used in settings such as admissions and hiring. We view such an evaluation process as a transformation of a distribution of the true utility of an individual for a task to an observed distribution and model it as a solution to a loss minimization problem subject to an information constraint. Our model has two parameters that have been identified as factors leading to biases: the resource-information trade-off parameter in the information constraint and the risk-averseness parameter in the loss function. We characterize the distributions that arise from our model and study the effect of the parameters on the observed distribution. The outputs of our model enrich the class of distributions that can be used to capture variation across groups in the observed evaluations. We empirically validate our model by fitting real-world datasets and use it to study the effect of interventions in a downstream selection task. These results contribute to an understanding of the emergence of bias in evaluation processes and provide tools to guide the deployment of interventions to mitigate biases.

1.2DSSep 7, 2024Code
Centralized Selection with Preferences in the Presence of Biases

L. Elisa Celis, Amit Kumar, Nisheeth K. Vishnoi et al.

This paper considers the scenario in which there are multiple institutions, each with a limited capacity for candidates, and candidates, each with preferences over the institutions. A central entity evaluates the utility of each candidate to the institutions, and the goal is to select candidates for each institution in a way that maximizes utility while also considering the candidates' preferences. The paper focuses on the setting in which candidates are divided into multiple groups and the observed utilities of candidates in some groups are biased--systematically lower than their true utilities. The first result is that, in these biased settings, prior algorithms can lead to selections with sub-optimal true utility and significant discrepancies in the fraction of candidates from each group that get their preferred choices. Subsequently, an algorithm is presented along with proof that it produces selections that achieve near-optimal group fairness with respect to preferences while also nearly maximizing the true utility under distributional assumptions. Further, extensive empirical validation of these results in real-world and synthetic settings, in which the distributional assumptions may not hold, are presented.