Aiden Gabriel

Dongwoo Kang, Akhil Perincherry, Zachary Coalson et al.

An emerging paradigm in vision-and-language navigation (VLN) is the use of history-aware multi-modal transformer models. Given a language instruction, these models process observation and navigation history to predict the most appropriate action for an agent. While they have significantly improved performance, the scale of these models can be a bottleneck in practical settings with limited computational resources. In this work, we propose a novel input-adaptive navigation method to enhance VLN model efficiency. We first show that existing input-adaptive mechanisms fail to reduce computations without substantial performance degradation. To address this, we introduce three adaptive algorithms, each deployed at a different level: (1) To improve spatial efficiency, we selectively process panoramic views at each observation of an agent. (2) To improve intra-model efficiency, we propose importance-based adaptive thresholding for the early-exit methods. (3) To improve temporal efficiency, we implement a caching mechanism that prevents reprocessing of views previously seen by the agent. In evaluations on seven VLN benchmarks, we demonstrate over a 2$\times$ reduction in computation across three off-the-shelf agents in both standard and continuous environments. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/secure-ai-systems-group/adaptive-vision-and-language-navigation.

Zachary Coalson, Beth Sohler, Aiden Gabriel et al.

We identify a structural weakness in current large language model (LLM) alignment: modern refusal mechanisms are fail-open. While existing approaches encode refusal behaviors across multiple latent features, suppressing a single dominant feature$-$via prompt-based jailbreaks$-$can cause alignment to collapse, leading to unsafe generation. Motivated by this, we propose fail-closed alignment as a design principle for robust LLM safety: refusal mechanisms should remain effective even under partial failures via redundant, independent causal pathways. We present a concrete instantiation of this principle: a progressive alignment framework that iteratively identifies and ablates previously learned refusal directions, forcing the model to reconstruct safety along new, independent subspaces. Across four jailbreak attacks, we achieve the strongest overall robustness while mitigating over-refusal and preserving generation quality, with small computational overhead. Our mechanistic analyses confirm that models trained with our method encode multiple, causally independent refusal directions that prompt-based jailbreaks cannot suppress simultaneously, providing empirical support for fail-closed alignment as a principled foundation for robust LLM safety.