Marta C. Couto

Gabriella D. Franco, Marta C. Couto, Vítor V. Vasconcelos et al.

Recommendation algorithms, used in online social networks, shape interactions between users. In particular, link-recommendation algorithms suggest new connections and affect how individuals interact and exchange information. These algorithms' efficacy relies on key mechanisms governing the creation of social ties, such as triadic closure and homophily. The first is achieved through structural similarity and represents a heightened chance of recommending users to one another given mutual friends; the second is related to opinion similarity and conveys an increased chance of recommending a connection given similar individual characteristics. These two mechanisms jointly shape the evolution of social networks and behaviors unfolding over them. Their combined effect on the co-evolution of opinion and structure dynamics remains, however, poorly understood. Here, we study how social networks and opinions co-evolve given the joint effect of rewiring based on opinion and structural similarity. We show that both similarity metrics lead to polarized states, but differ in how they impact network fragmentation and opinion diversity. While strongly relying on opinion similarity leads to a higher variation of opinion, rewiring via network similarity leads to a larger number of (dis)connected components, resulting in fragmented networks that lean towards one of the signed opinions. Under strong homophilic settings, introducing a weak dependence on structural similarity prevents network fragmentation and favors moderate opinions. This work can inform the design of new recommender algorithms that explicitly account for interacting social and recommendation mechanisms, with the potential to foster moderate opinion coexistence even in inherently polarizing settings.

Marta C. Couto, Flavia Barsotti, Fernando P. Santos

Classification algorithms based on Artificial Intelligence (AI) are nowadays applied in high-stakes decisions in finance, healthcare, criminal justice, or education. Individuals can strategically adapt to the information gathered about classifiers, which in turn may require algorithms to be re-trained. Which collective dynamics will result from users' adaptation and algorithms' retraining? We apply evolutionary game theory to address this question. Our framework provides a mathematically rigorous way of treating the problem of feedback loops between collectives of users and institutions, allowing to test interventions to mitigate the adverse effects of strategic adaptation. As a case study, we consider institutions deploying algorithms for credit lending. We consider several scenarios, each representing different interaction paradigms. When algorithms are not robust against strategic manipulation, we are able to capture previous challenges discussed in the strategic classification literature, whereby users either pay excessive costs to meet the institutions' expectations (leading to high social costs) or game the algorithm (e.g., provide fake information). From this baseline setting, we test the role of improving gaming detection and providing algorithmic recourse. We show that increased detection capabilities reduce social costs and could lead to users' improvement; when perfect classifiers are not feasible (likely to occur in practice), algorithmic recourse can steer the dynamics towards high users' improvement rates. The speed at which the institutions re-adapt to the user's population plays a role in the final outcome. Finally, we explore a scenario where strict institutions provide actionable recourse to their unsuccessful users and observe cycling dynamics so far unnoticed in the literature.