Linan Huang

Linan Huang, Quanyan Zhu

Compliance management plays an important role in mitigating insider threats. Incentive design is a proactive and non-invasive approach to achieving compliance by aligning an insider's incentive with the defender's security objective, which motivates (rather than commands) an insider to act in the organization's interests. Controlling insiders' incentives for population-level compliance is challenging because they are neither precisely known nor directly controllable. To this end, we develop ZETAR, a zero-trust audit and recommendation framework, to provide a quantitative approach to model insiders' incentives and design customized recommendation policies to improve their compliance. We formulate primal and dual convex programs to compute the optimal bespoke recommendation policies. We create the theoretical underpinning for understanding trust, compliance, and satisfaction, which leads to scoring mechanisms of how compliant and persuadable an insider is. After classifying insiders as malicious, self-interested, or amenable based on their incentive misalignment levels with the defender, we establish bespoke information disclosure principles for these insiders of different incentive categories. We identify the policy separability principle and the set convexity, which enable finite-step algorithms to efficiently learn the Completely Trustworthy (CT) policy set when insiders' incentives are unknown. Finally, we present a case study to corroborate the design. Our results show that ZETAR can well adapt to insiders with different risk and compliance attitudes and significantly improve compliance. Moreover, trustworthy recommendations can provably promote cyber hygiene and insiders' satisfaction.

Linan Huang, Peilong Liu, Xi Chen et al.

Satellite constellations equipped with Inter-Satellite Links and onboard packet switching enable real-time Operation and Management across globally distributed satellites, but also broaden the attack surface and introduce unprecedented cybersecurity threats. Existing efforts mainly focus on cryptography for single-satellite point-to-point links, without considering constellation-level security. To address this gap, this article extends security research in two directions: from individual satellites to constellation-wide architectures, and from isolated cryptography to system-level security incorporating efficiency, resilience, and reliability. These extensions raise three key questions: how to design efficient security mechanisms for dynamic constellation topologies with adaptive onboard routing; how a constellation O&M system can recover resiliently under worst-case failures of onboard security functions; and how to improve the reliability of onboard security functions under stringent resource constraints. To address these challenges, we first construct a constellation-wide hybrid security framework that protects semantically sensitive content fields using End-to-End encryption, while safeguarding routing-related fields through Moving Target Defense. Next, we introduce a ciphered-mode and safe-mode management mechanism with an M-delayed fallback that balances recovery timeliness and exploitability. Finally, we propose security-aware routers that manage plaintext/ciphered modes and coordinate access to a shared pool of onboard cipher modules, enabling redundancy sharing across multiple endpoints and extending secure operation duration in ciphered mode. These solutions comply with existing standards defined by organizations including DVB and the CCSDS, while translating conceptual security principles into practical system-level mechanisms.

Linan Huang, Quanyan Zhu

Attacks exploiting human attentional vulnerability have posed severe threats to cybersecurity. In this work, we identify and formally define a new type of proactive attentional attacks called Informational Denial-of-Service (IDoS) attacks that generate a large volume of feint attacks to overload human operators and hide real attacks among feints. We incorporate human factors (e.g., levels of expertise, stress, and efficiency) and empirical psychological results (e.g., the Yerkes-Dodson law and the sunk cost fallacy) to model the operators' attention dynamics and their decision-making processes along with the real-time alert monitoring and inspection. To assist human operators in dismissing the feints and escalating the real attacks timely and accurately, we develop a Resilient and Adaptive Data-driven alert and Attention Management Strategy (RADAMS) that de-emphasizes alerts selectively based on the abstracted category labels of the alerts. RADAMS uses reinforcement learning to achieve a customized and transferable design for various human operators and evolving IDoS attacks. The integrated modeling and theoretical analysis lead to the Product Principle of Attention (PPoA), fundamental limits, and the tradeoff among crucial human and economic factors. Experimental results corroborate that the proposed strategy outperforms the default strategy and can reduce the IDoS risk by as much as 20%. Besides, the strategy is resilient to large variations of costs, attack frequencies, and human attention capacities. We have recognized interesting phenomena such as attentional risk equivalency, attacker's dilemma, and the half-truth optimal attack strategy.

Linan Huang, Quanyan Zhu

This work proposes a new class of proactive attacks called the Informational Denial-of-Service (IDoS) attacks that exploit the attentional human vulnerability. By generating a large volume of feints, IDoS attacks deplete the cognitive resources of human operators to prevent humans from identifying the real attacks hidden among feints. This work aims to formally define IDoS attacks, quantify their consequences, and develop human-assistive security technologies to mitigate the severity level and risks of IDoS attacks. To this end, we use the semi-Markov process to model the sequential arrivals of feints and real attacks with category labels attached in the associated alerts. The assistive technology strategically manages human attention by highlighting selective alerts periodically to prevent the distraction of other alerts. A data-driven approach is applied to evaluate human performance under different Attention Management (AM) strategies. Under a representative special case, we establish the computational equivalency between two dynamic programming representations to reduce the computation complexity and enable online learning with samples of reduced size and zero delays. A case study corroborates the effectiveness of the learning framework. The numerical results illustrate how AM strategies can alleviate the severity level and the risk of IDoS attacks. Furthermore, the results show that the minimum risk is achieved with a proper level of intentional inattention to alerts, which we refer to as the law of rational risk-reduction inattention.

Yunhan Huang, Linan Huang, Quanyan Zhu

Digitization and remote connectivity have enlarged the attack surface and made cyber systems more vulnerable. As attackers become increasingly sophisticated and resourceful, mere reliance on traditional cyber protection, such as intrusion detection, firewalls, and encryption, is insufficient to secure the cyber systems. Cyber resilience provides a new security paradigm that complements inadequate protection with resilience mechanisms. A Cyber-Resilient Mechanism (CRM) adapts to the known or zero-day threats and uncertainties in real-time and strategically responds to them to maintain critical functions of the cyber systems in the event of successful attacks. Feedback architectures play a pivotal role in enabling the online sensing, reasoning, and actuation process of the CRM. Reinforcement Learning (RL) is an essential tool that epitomizes the feedback architectures for cyber resilience. It allows the CRM to provide sequential responses to attacks with limited or without prior knowledge of the environment and the attacker. In this work, we review the literature on RL for cyber resilience and discuss cyber resilience against three major types of vulnerabilities, i.e., posture-related, information-related, and human-related vulnerabilities. We introduce three application domains of CRMs: moving target defense, defensive cyber deception, and assistive human security technologies. The RL algorithms also have vulnerabilities themselves. We explain the three vulnerabilities of RL and present attack models where the attacker targets the information exchanged between the environment and the agent: the rewards, the state observations, and the action commands. We show that the attacker can trick the RL agent into learning a nefarious policy with minimum attacking effort. Lastly, we discuss the future challenges of RL for cyber security and resilience and emerging applications of RL-based CRMs.

Linan Huang, Shumeng Jia, Emily Balcetis et al.

Attacks exploiting the innate and the acquired vulnerabilities of human users have posed severe threats to cybersecurity. This work proposes ADVERT, a human-technical solution that generates adaptive visual aids in real-time to prevent users from inadvertence and reduce their susceptibility to phishing attacks. Based on the eye-tracking data, we extract visual states and attention states as system-level sufficient statistics to characterize the user's visual behaviors and attention status. By adopting a data-driven approach and two learning feedback of different time scales, this work lays out a theoretical foundation to analyze, evaluate, and particularly modify humans' attention processes while they vet and recognize phishing emails. We corroborate the effectiveness, efficiency, and robustness of ADVERT through a case study based on the data set collected from human subject experiments conducted at New York University. The results show that the visual aids can statistically increase the attention level and improve the accuracy of phishing recognition from 74.6% to a minimum of 86%. The meta-adaptation can further improve the accuracy to 91.5% (resp. 93.7%) in less than 3 (resp. 50) tuning stages.

Linan Huang, Quanyan Zhu

Recent incidents such as the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack and the SolarWinds hack have shown that traditional defense techniques are becoming insufficient to deter adversaries of growing sophistication. Proactive and deceptive defenses are an emerging class of methods to defend against zero-day and advanced attacks. This work develops a new game-theoretic framework called the duplicity game to design deception mechanisms that consist of a generator, an incentive modulator, and a trust manipulator, referred to as the GMM mechanism. We formulate a mathematical programming problem to compute the optimal GMM mechanism, quantify the upper limit of enforceable security policies, and characterize conditions on user's identifiability and manageability for cyber attribution and user management. We develop a separation principle that decouples the design of the modulator from the GMM mechanism and an equivalence principle that turns the joint design of the generator and the manipulator into the single design of the manipulator. A case study of dynamic honeypot configurations is presented to mitigate insider threats. The numerical experiments corroborate the results that the optimal GMM mechanism can elicit desirable actions from both selfish and adversarial insiders and consequently improve the security posture of the insider network. In particular, a proper modulator can reduce the \textcolor{black}{incentive misalignment} between the players and achieve win-win situations for the selfish insider and the defender. Meanwhile, we observe that the defender always benefits from faking the percentage of honeypots when the optimal generator is presented.

Yunhan Huang, Juntao Chen, Linan Huang et al.

Modern control systems are featured by their hierarchical structure composing of cyber, physical, and human layers. The intricate dependencies among multiple layers and units of modern control systems require an integrated framework to address cross-layer design issues related to security and resilience challenges. To this end, game theory provides a bottom-up modeling paradigm to capture the strategic interactions among multiple components of the complex system and enables a holistic view to understand and design cyber-physical-human control systems. In this review, we first provide a multi-layer perspective toward increasingly complex and integrated control systems and then introduce several variants of dynamic games for modeling different layers of control systems. We present game-theoretic methods for understanding the fundamental tradeoffs of robustness, security, and resilience and developing a clean-slate cross-layer approach to enhance the system performance in various adversarial environments. This review also includes three quintessential research problems that represent three research directions where dynamic game approaches can bridge between multiple research areas and make significant contributions to the design of modern control systems. The paper is concluded with a discussion on emerging areas of research that crosscut dynamic games and control systems.

Linan Huang, Quanyan Zhu

The increasing instances of advanced attacks call for a new defense paradigm that is active, autonomous, and adaptive, named as the \texttt{`3A'} defense paradigm. This chapter introduces three defense schemes that actively interact with attackers to increase the attack cost and gather threat information, i.e., defensive deception for detection and counter-deception, feedback-driven Moving Target Defense (MTD), and adaptive honeypot engagement. Due to the cyber deception, external noise, and the absent knowledge of the other players' behaviors and goals, these schemes possess three progressive levels of information restrictions, i.e., from the parameter uncertainty, the payoff uncertainty, to the environmental uncertainty. To estimate the unknown and reduce uncertainty, we adopt three different strategic learning schemes that fit the associated information restrictions. All three learning schemes share the same feedback structure of sensation, estimation, and actions so that the most rewarding policies get reinforced and converge to the optimal ones in autonomous and adaptive fashions. This work aims to shed lights on proactive defense strategies, lay a solid foundation for strategic learning under incomplete information, and quantify the tradeoff between the security and costs.

Linan Huang, Quanyan Zhu

A honeynet is a promising active cyber defense mechanism. It reveals the fundamental Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) by luring attackers to conduct adversarial behaviors in a controlled and monitored environment. The active interaction at the honeynet brings a high reward but also introduces high implementation costs and risks of adversarial honeynet exploitation. In this work, we apply infinite-horizon Semi-Markov Decision Process (SMDP) to characterize a stochastic transition and sojourn time of attackers in the honeynet and quantify the reward-risk trade-off. In particular, we design adaptive long-term engagement policies shown to be risk-averse, cost-effective, and time-efficient. Numerical results have demonstrated that our adaptive engagement policies can quickly attract attackers to the target honeypot and engage them for a sufficiently long period to obtain worthy threat information. Meanwhile, the penetration probability is kept at a low level. The results show that the expected utility is robust against attackers of a large range of persistence and intelligence. Finally, we apply reinforcement learning to the SMDP to solve the curse of modeling. Under a prudent choice of the learning rate and exploration policy, we achieve a quick and robust convergence of the optimal policy and value.

Linan Huang, Quanyan Zhu

Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) have recently emerged as a significant security challenge for a cyber-physical system due to their stealthy, dynamic and adaptive nature. Proactive dynamic defenses provide a strategic and holistic security mechanism to increase the costs of attacks and mitigate the risks. This work proposes a dynamic game framework to model a long-term interaction between a stealthy attacker and a proactive defender. The stealthy and deceptive behaviors are captured by the multi-stage game of incomplete information, where each player has his own private information unknown to the other. Both players act strategically according to their beliefs which are formed by the multi-stage observation and learning. The perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium provides a useful prediction of both players' policies because no players benefit from unilateral deviations from the equilibrium. We propose an iterative algorithm to compute the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium and use the Tennessee Eastman process as a benchmark case study. Our numerical experiment corroborates the analytical results and provides further insights into the design of proactive defense-in-depth strategies.

Tao Zhang, Linan Huang, Jeffrey Pawlick et al.

Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. For the applications of cyber deception, non-cooperative games become a natural choice of models to capture the adversarial interactions between the players and quantitatively characterizes the conflicting incentives and strategic responses. In this chapter, we provide an overview of deception games in three different environments and extend the baseline signaling game models to include evidence through side-channel knowledge acquisition to capture the information asymmetry, dynamics, and strategic behaviors of deception. We analyze the deception in binary information space based on a signaling game framework with a detector that gives off probabilistic evidence of the deception when the sender acts deceptively. We then focus on a class of continuous one-dimensional information space and take into account the cost of deception in the signaling game. We finally explore the multi-stage incomplete-information Bayesian game model for defensive deception for advanced persistent threats (APTs). We use the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) as the solution concept for the deception games and analyze the strategic equilibrium behaviors for both the deceivers and the deceivees.

Linan Huang, Quanyan Zhu

Security challenges accompany the efficiency. The pervasive integration of information and communications technologies (ICTs) makes cyber-physical systems vulnerable to targeted attacks that are deceptive, persistent, adaptive and strategic. Attack instances such as Stuxnet, Dyn, and WannaCry ransomware have shown the insufficiency of off-the-shelf defensive methods including the firewall and intrusion detection systems. Hence, it is essential to design up-to-date security mechanisms that can mitigate the risks despite the successful infiltration and the strategic response of sophisticated attackers. In this chapter, we use game theory to model competitive interactions between defenders and attackers. First, we use the static Bayesian game to capture the stealthy and deceptive characteristics of the attacker. A random variable called the \textit{type} characterizes users' essences and objectives, e.g., a legitimate user or an attacker. The realization of the user's type is private information due to the cyber deception. Then, we extend the one-shot simultaneous interaction into the one-shot interaction with asymmetric information structure, i.e., the signaling game. Finally, we investigate the multi-stage transition under a case study of Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and Tennessee Eastman (TE) process. Two-Sided incomplete information is introduced because the defender can adopt defensive deception techniques such as honey files and honeypots to create sufficient amount of uncertainties for the attacker. Throughout this chapter, the analysis of the Nash equilibrium (NE), Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE), and perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) enables the policy prediction of the adversary and the design of proactive and strategic defenses to deter attackers and mitigate losses.

Linan Huang, Juntao Chen, Quanyan Zhu

The complex interconnections between heterogeneous critical infrastructure sectors make the system of systems (SoS) vulnerable to natural or human-made disasters and lead to cascading failures both within and across sectors. Hence, the robustness and resilience of the interdependent critical infrastructures (ICIs) against extreme events are essential for delivering reliable and efficient services to our society. To this end, we first establish a holistic probabilistic network model to model the interdependencies between infrastructure components. To capture the underlying failure and recovery dynamics of ICIs, we further propose a Markov decision processes (MDP) model in which the repair policy determines a long-term performance of the ICIs. To address the challenges that arise from the curse of dimensionality of the MDP, we reformulate the problem as an approximate linear program and then simplify it using factored graphs. We further obtain the distributed optimal control for ICIs under mild assumptions. Finally, we use a case study of the interdependent power and subway systems to corroborate the results and show that the optimal resilience resource planning and allocation can reduce the failure probability and mitigate the impact of failures caused by natural or artificial disasters.