Oliver Slumbers

David Mguni, Aivar Sootla, Juliusz Ziomek et al. · oxford

Many real-world settings involve costs for performing actions; transaction costs in financial systems and fuel costs being common examples. In these settings, performing actions at each time step quickly accumulates costs leading to vastly suboptimal outcomes. Additionally, repeatedly acting produces wear and tear and ultimately, damage. Determining \textit{when to act} is crucial for achieving successful outcomes and yet, the challenge of efficiently \textit{learning} to behave optimally when actions incur minimally bounded costs remains unresolved. In this paper, we introduce a reinforcement learning (RL) framework named \textbf{L}earnable \textbf{I}mpulse \textbf{C}ontrol \textbf{R}einforcement \textbf{A}lgorithm (LICRA), for learning to optimally select both when to act and which actions to take when actions incur costs. At the core of LICRA is a nested structure that combines RL and a form of policy known as \textit{impulse control} which learns to maximise objectives when actions incur costs. We prove that LICRA, which seamlessly adopts any RL method, converges to policies that optimally select when to perform actions and their optimal magnitudes. We then augment LICRA to handle problems in which the agent can perform at most $k<\infty$ actions and more generally, faces a budget constraint. We show LICRA learns the optimal value function and ensures budget constraints are satisfied almost surely. We demonstrate empirically LICRA's superior performance against benchmark RL methods in OpenAI gym's \textit{Lunar Lander} and in \textit{Highway} environments and a variant of the Merton portfolio problem within finance.

Lukas Schäfer, Oliver Slumbers, Stephen McAleer et al. · microsoft-research

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) requires agents to explore within a vast joint action space to find joint actions that lead to coordination. Existing value-based MARL algorithms commonly rely on random exploration, such as $ε$-greedy, to explore the environment which is not systematic and inefficient at identifying effective actions in multi-agent problems. Additionally, the concurrent training of the policies of multiple agents during training can render the optimisation non-stationary. This can lead to unstable value estimates, highly variant gradients, and ultimately hinder coordination between agents. To address these challenges, we propose ensemble value functions for multi-agent exploration (EMAX). EMAX is a framework to seamlessly extend value-based MARL algorithms. EMAX leverages an ensemble of value functions for each agent to guide their exploration, reduce the variance of their optimisation, and makes their policies more robust to miscoordination. EMAX achieves these benefits by (1) systematically guiding the exploration of agents with a UCB policy towards parts of the environment that require multiple agents to coordinate. (2) EMAX computes average value estimates across the ensemble as target values to reduce the variance of gradients and make optimisation more stable. (3) During evaluation, EMAX selects actions following a majority vote across the ensemble to reduce the likelihood of miscoordination. We first instantiate independent DQN with EMAX and evaluate it in 11 general-sum tasks with sparse rewards. We show that EMAX improves final evaluation returns by 185% across all tasks. We then evaluate EMAX on top of IDQN, VDN and QMIX in 21 common-reward tasks, and show that EMAX improves sample efficiency and final evaluation returns across all tasks over all three vanilla algorithms by 60%, 47%, and 538%, respectively.

Oliver Slumbers, David Henry Mguni, Stephen Marcus McAleer et al.

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

Chenguang Wang, Yaodong Yang, Oliver Slumbers et al.

In this paper, we introduce a two-player zero-sum framework between a trainable \emph{Solver} and a \emph{Data Generator} to improve the generalization ability of deep learning-based solvers for Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP). Grounded in \textsl{Policy Space Response Oracle} (PSRO) methods, our two-player framework outputs a population of best-responding Solvers, over which we can mix and output a combined model that achieves the least exploitability against the Generator, and thereby the most generalizable performance on different TSP tasks. We conduct experiments on a variety of TSP instances with different types and sizes. Results suggest that our Solvers achieve the state-of-the-art performance even on tasks the Solver never meets, whilst the performance of other deep learning-based Solvers drops sharply due to over-fitting. To demonstrate the principle of our framework, we study the learning outcome of the proposed two-player game and demonstrate that the exploitability of the Solver population decreases during training, and it eventually approximates the Nash equilibrium along with the Generator.

Xidong Feng, Oliver Slumbers, Ziyu Wan et al.

When solving two-player zero-sum games, multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms often create populations of agents where, at each iteration, a new agent is discovered as the best response to a mixture over the opponent population. Within such a process, the update rules of "who to compete with" (i.e., the opponent mixture) and "how to beat them" (i.e., finding best responses) are underpinned by manually developed game theoretical principles such as fictitious play and Double Oracle. In this paper, we introduce a novel framework -- Neural Auto-Curricula (NAC) -- that leverages meta-gradient descent to automate the discovery of the learning update rule without explicit human design. Specifically, we parameterise the opponent selection module by neural networks and the best-response module by optimisation subroutines, and update their parameters solely via interaction with the game engine, where both players aim to minimise their exploitability. Surprisingly, even without human design, the discovered MARL algorithms achieve competitive or even better performance with the state-of-the-art population-based game solvers (e.g., PSRO) on Games of Skill, differentiable Lotto, non-transitive Mixture Games, Iterated Matching Pennies, and Kuhn Poker. Additionally, we show that NAC is able to generalise from small games to large games, for example training on Kuhn Poker and outperforming PSRO on Leduc Poker. Our work inspires a promising future direction to discover general MARL algorithms solely from data.

Nicolas Perez Nieves, Yaodong Yang, Oliver Slumbers et al.

Promoting behavioural diversity is critical for solving games with non-transitive dynamics where strategic cycles exist, and there is no consistent winner (e.g., Rock-Paper-Scissors). Yet, there is a lack of rigorous treatment for defining diversity and constructing diversity-aware learning dynamics. In this work, we offer a geometric interpretation of behavioural diversity in games and introduce a novel diversity metric based on determinantal point processes (DPP). By incorporating the diversity metric into best-response dynamics, we develop diverse fictitious play and diverse policy-space response oracle for solving normal-form games and open-ended games. We prove the uniqueness of the diverse best response and the convergence of our algorithms on two-player games. Importantly, we show that maximising the DPP-based diversity metric guarantees to enlarge the gamescape -- convex polytopes spanned by agents' mixtures of strategies. To validate our diversity-aware solvers, we test on tens of games that show strong non-transitivity. Results suggest that our methods achieve at least the same, and in most games, lower exploitability than PSRO solvers by finding effective and diverse strategies.

Le Cong Dinh, Yaodong Yang, Stephen McAleer et al.

Solving strategic games with huge action space is a critical yet under-explored topic in economics, operations research and artificial intelligence. This paper proposes new learning algorithms for solving two-player zero-sum normal-form games where the number of pure strategies is prohibitively large. Specifically, we combine no-regret analysis from online learning with Double Oracle (DO) methods from game theory. Our method -- \emph{Online Double Oracle (ODO)} -- is provably convergent to a Nash equilibrium (NE). Most importantly, unlike normal DO methods, ODO is \emph{rationale} in the sense that each agent in ODO can exploit strategic adversary with a regret bound of $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T k \log(k)})$ where $k$ is not the total number of pure strategies, but rather the size of \emph{effective strategy set} that is linearly dependent on the support size of the NE. On tens of different real-world games, ODO outperforms DO, PSRO methods, and no-regret algorithms such as Multiplicative Weight Update by a significant margin, both in terms of convergence rate to a NE and average payoff against strategic adversaries.

Yaodong Yang, Jun Luo, Ying Wen et al.

Multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) has achieved a remarkable amount of success in solving various types of video games. A cornerstone of this success is the auto-curriculum framework, which shapes the learning process by continually creating new challenging tasks for agents to adapt to, thereby facilitating the acquisition of new skills. In order to extend MARL methods to real-world domains outside of video games, we envision in this blue sky paper that maintaining a diversity-aware auto-curriculum is critical for successful MARL applications. Specifically, we argue that \emph{behavioural diversity} is a pivotal, yet under-explored, component for real-world multiagent learning systems, and that significant work remains in understanding how to design a diversity-aware auto-curriculum. We list four open challenges for auto-curriculum techniques, which we believe deserve more attention from this community. Towards validating our vision, we recommend modelling realistic interactive behaviours in autonomous driving as an important test bed, and recommend the SMARTS/ULTRA benchmark.