Stephen Marcus McAleer

Yuanpei Chen, Tianhao Wu, Shengjie Wang et al. · baidu, pku

Achieving human-level dexterity is an important open problem in robotics. However, tasks of dexterous hand manipulation, even at the baby level, are challenging to solve through reinforcement learning (RL). The difficulty lies in the high degrees of freedom and the required cooperation among heterogeneous agents (e.g., joints of fingers). In this study, we propose the Bimanual Dexterous Hands Benchmark (Bi-DexHands), a simulator that involves two dexterous hands with tens of bimanual manipulation tasks and thousands of target objects. Specifically, tasks in Bi-DexHands are designed to match different levels of human motor skills according to cognitive science literature. We built Bi-DexHands in the Issac Gym; this enables highly efficient RL training, reaching 30,000+ FPS by only one single NVIDIA RTX 3090. We provide a comprehensive benchmark for popular RL algorithms under different settings; this includes Single-agent/Multi-agent RL, Offline RL, Multi-task RL, and Meta RL. Our results show that the PPO type of on-policy algorithms can master simple manipulation tasks that are equivalent up to 48-month human babies (e.g., catching a flying object, opening a bottle), while multi-agent RL can further help to master manipulations that require skilled bimanual cooperation (e.g., lifting a pot, stacking blocks). Despite the success on each single task, when it comes to acquiring multiple manipulation skills, existing RL algorithms fail to work in most of the multi-task and the few-shot learning settings, which calls for more substantial development from the RL community. Our project is open sourced at https://github.com/PKU-MARL/DexterousHands.

Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Anagnostides et al.

A mediator observes no-regret learners playing an extensive-form game repeatedly across $T$ rounds. The mediator attempts to steer players toward some desirable predetermined equilibrium by giving (nonnegative) payments to players. We call this the steering problem. The steering problem captures problems several problems of interest, among them equilibrium selection and information design (persuasion). If the mediator's budget is unbounded, steering is trivial because the mediator can simply pay the players to play desirable actions. We study two bounds on the mediator's payments: a total budget and a per-round budget. If the mediator's total budget does not grow with $T$, we show that steering is impossible. However, we show that it is enough for the total budget to grow sublinearly with $T$, that is, for the average payment to vanish. When players' full strategies are observed at each round, we show that constant per-round budgets permit steering. In the more challenging setting where only trajectories through the game tree are observable, we show that steering is impossible with constant per-round budgets in general extensive-form games, but possible in normal-form games or if the per-round budget may itself depend on $T$. We also show how our results can be generalized to the case when the equilibrium is being computed online while steering is happening. We supplement our theoretical positive results with experiments highlighting the efficacy of steering in large games.

Xidong Feng, Ziyu Wan, Muning Wen et al.

Recent works like Tree-of-Thought (ToT) and Reasoning via Planning (RAP) aim to augment the reasoning capabilities of LLMs by using tree-search algorithms to guide multi-step reasoning. These methods rely on prompting a pre-trained model to serve as a value function and focus on problems with low search depth. As a result, these methods will not work in domains where the pre-trained LLM does not have enough knowledge to serve as an effective value function or in domains that require long-horizon planning. To address these limitations, we present an AlphaZero-like tree-search learning framework for LLMs (termed TS-LLM), systematically illustrating how tree-search with a learned value function can guide LLM decoding. TS-LLM distinguishes itself in two key ways. (1) Leveraging a learned value function and AlphaZero-like algorithms, our approach can be generally adaptable to a wide range of tasks, language models of any size, and tasks of varying search depths. (2) Our approach can guide LLMs during both inference and training, iteratively improving the LLM. Empirical results across reasoning, planning, alignment, and decision-making tasks show that TS-LLM outperforms existing approaches and can handle trees with a depth of 64.

Oliver Slumbers, David Henry Mguni, Stephen Marcus McAleer et al.

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.