Yunhui Long

Zhuowen Yuan, Fan Wu, Yunhui Long et al.

Transfer learning through the use of pre-trained models has become a growing trend for the machine learning community. Consequently, numerous pre-trained models are released online to facilitate further research. However, it raises extensive concerns on whether these pre-trained models would leak privacy-sensitive information of their training data. Thus, in this work, we aim to answer the following questions: "Can we effectively recover private information from these pre-trained models? What are the sufficient conditions to retrieve such sensitive information?" We first explore different statistical information which can discriminate the private training distribution from other distributions. Based on our observations, we propose a novel private data reconstruction framework, SecretGen, to effectively recover private information. Compared with previous methods which can recover private data with the ground true prediction of the targeted recovery instance, SecretGen does not require such prior knowledge, making it more practical. We conduct extensive experiments on different datasets under diverse scenarios to compare SecretGen with other baselines and provide a systematic benchmark to better understand the impact of different auxiliary information and optimization operations. We show that without prior knowledge about true class prediction, SecretGen is able to recover private data with similar performance compared with the ones that leverage such prior knowledge. If the prior knowledge is given, SecretGen will significantly outperform baseline methods. We also propose several quantitative metrics to further quantify the privacy vulnerability of pre-trained models, which will help the model selection for privacy-sensitive applications. Our code is available at: https://github.com/AI-secure/SecretGen.

Yuzheng Hu, Fan Wu, Qinbin Li et al.

As the prevalence of data analysis grows, safeguarding data privacy has become a paramount concern. Consequently, there has been an upsurge in the development of mechanisms aimed at privacy-preserving data analyses. However, these approaches are task-specific; designing algorithms for new tasks is a cumbersome process. As an alternative, one can create synthetic data that is (ideally) devoid of private information. This paper focuses on privacy-preserving data synthesis (PPDS) by providing a comprehensive overview, analysis, and discussion of the field. Specifically, we put forth a master recipe that unifies two prominent strands of research in PPDS: statistical methods and deep learning (DL)-based methods. Under the master recipe, we further dissect the statistical methods into choices of modeling and representation, and investigate the DL-based methods by different generative modeling principles. To consolidate our findings, we provide comprehensive reference tables, distill key takeaways, and identify open problems in the existing literature. In doing so, we aim to answer the following questions: What are the design principles behind different PPDS methods? How can we categorize these methods, and what are the advantages and disadvantages associated with each category? Can we provide guidelines for method selection in different real-world scenarios? We proceed to benchmark several prominent DL-based methods on the task of private image synthesis and conclude that DP-MERF is an all-purpose approach. Finally, upon systematizing the work over the past decade, we identify future directions and call for actions from researchers.

Chulin Xie, Zhong Cao, Yunhui Long et al.

Recent advances in machine learning have enabled its wide application in different domains, and one of the most exciting applications is autonomous vehicles (AVs), which have encouraged the development of a number of ML algorithms from perception to prediction to planning. However, training AVs usually requires a large amount of training data collected from different driving environments (e.g., cities) as well as different types of personal information (e.g., working hours and routes). Such collected large data, treated as the new oil for ML in the data-centric AI era, usually contains a large amount of privacy-sensitive information which is hard to remove or even audit. Although existing privacy protection approaches have achieved certain theoretical and empirical success, there is still a gap when applying them to real-world applications such as autonomous vehicles. For instance, when training AVs, not only can individually identifiable information reveal privacy-sensitive information, but also population-level information such as road construction within a city, and proprietary-level commercial secrets of AVs. Thus, it is critical to revisit the frontier of privacy risks and corresponding protection approaches in AVs to bridge this gap. Following this goal, in this work, we provide a new taxonomy for privacy risks and protection methods in AVs, and we categorize privacy in AVs into three levels: individual, population, and proprietary. We explicitly list out recent challenges to protect each of these levels of privacy, summarize existing solutions to these challenges, discuss the lessons and conclusions, and provide potential future directions and opportunities for both researchers and practitioners. We believe this work will help to shape the privacy research in AV and guide the privacy protection technology design.

Chulin Xie, Yunhui Long, Pin-Yu Chen et al.

Federated learning (FL) provides an efficient paradigm to jointly train a global model leveraging data from distributed users. As local training data comes from different users who may not be trustworthy, several studies have shown that FL is vulnerable to poisoning attacks. Meanwhile, to protect the privacy of local users, FL is usually trained in a differentially private way (DPFL). Thus, in this paper, we ask: What are the underlying connections between differential privacy and certified robustness in FL against poisoning attacks? Can we leverage the innate privacy property of DPFL to provide certified robustness for FL? Can we further improve the privacy of FL to improve such robustness certification? We first investigate both user-level and instance-level privacy of FL and provide formal privacy analysis to achieve improved instance-level privacy. We then provide two robustness certification criteria: certified prediction and certified attack inefficacy for DPFL on both user and instance levels. Theoretically, we provide the certified robustness of DPFL based on both criteria given a bounded number of adversarial users or instances. Empirically, we conduct extensive experiments to verify our theories under a range of poisoning attacks on different datasets. We find that increasing the level of privacy protection in DPFL results in stronger certified attack inefficacy; however, it does not necessarily lead to a stronger certified prediction. Thus, achieving the optimal certified prediction requires a proper balance between privacy and utility loss.

Boxin Wang, Fan Wu, Yunhui Long et al.

Recent success of deep neural networks (DNNs) hinges on the availability of large-scale dataset; however, training on such dataset often poses privacy risks for sensitive training information. In this paper, we aim to explore the power of generative models and gradient sparsity, and propose a scalable privacy-preserving generative model DATALENS. Comparing with the standard PATE privacy-preserving framework which allows teachers to vote on one-dimensional predictions, voting on the high dimensional gradient vectors is challenging in terms of privacy preservation. As dimension reduction techniques are required, we need to navigate a delicate tradeoff space between (1) the improvement of privacy preservation and (2) the slowdown of SGD convergence. To tackle this, we take advantage of communication efficient learning and propose a novel noise compression and aggregation approach TOPAGG by combining top-k compression for dimension reduction with a corresponding noise injection mechanism. We theoretically prove that the DATALENS framework guarantees differential privacy for its generated data, and provide analysis on its convergence. To demonstrate the practical usage of DATALENS, we conduct extensive experiments on diverse datasets including MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and high dimensional CelebA, and we show that, DATALENS significantly outperforms other baseline DP generative models. In addition, we adapt the proposed TOPAGG approach, which is one of the key building blocks in DATALENS, to DP SGD training, and show that it is able to achieve higher utility than the state-of-the-art DP SGD approach in most cases. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/AI-secure/DataLens.

Yunhui Long, Boxin Wang, Zhuolin Yang et al.

Recent advances in machine learning have largely benefited from the massive accessible training data. However, large-scale data sharing has raised great privacy concerns. In this work, we propose a novel privacy-preserving data Generative model based on the PATE framework (G-PATE), aiming to train a scalable differentially private data generator that preserves high generated data utility. Our approach leverages generative adversarial nets to generate data, combined with private aggregation among different discriminators to ensure strong privacy guarantees. Compared to existing approaches, G-PATE significantly improves the use of privacy budgets. In particular, we train a student data generator with an ensemble of teacher discriminators and propose a novel private gradient aggregation mechanism to ensure differential privacy on all information that flows from teacher discriminators to the student generator. In addition, with random projection and gradient discretization, the proposed gradient aggregation mechanism is able to effectively deal with high-dimensional gradient vectors. Theoretically, we prove that G-PATE ensures differential privacy for the data generator. Empirically, we demonstrate the superiority of G-PATE over prior work through extensive experiments. We show that G-PATE is the first work being able to generate high-dimensional image data with high data utility under limited privacy budgets ($ε\le 1$). Our code is available at https://github.com/AI-secure/G-PATE.

Fan Wu, Yunhui Long, Ce Zhang et al.

Graph structured data have enabled several successful applications such as recommendation systems and traffic prediction, given the rich node features and edges information. However, these high-dimensional features and high-order adjacency information are usually heterogeneous and held by different data holders in practice. Given such vertical data partition (e.g., one data holder will only own either the node features or edge information), different data holders have to develop efficient joint training protocols rather than directly transfer data to each other due to privacy concerns. In this paper, we focus on the edge privacy, and consider a training scenario where Bob with node features will first send training node features to Alice who owns the adjacency information. Alice will then train a graph neural network (GNN) with the joint information and release an inference API. During inference, Bob is able to provide test node features and query the API to obtain the predictions for test nodes. Under this setting, we first propose a privacy attack LinkTeller via influence analysis to infer the private edge information held by Alice via designing adversarial queries for Bob. We then empirically show that LinkTeller is able to recover a significant amount of private edges, outperforming existing baselines. To further evaluate the privacy leakage, we adapt an existing algorithm for differentially private graph convolutional network (DP GCN) training and propose a new DP GCN mechanism LapGraph. We show that these DP GCN mechanisms are not always resilient against LinkTeller empirically under mild privacy guarantees ($\varepsilon>5$). Our studies will shed light on future research towards designing more resilient privacy-preserving GCN models; in the meantime, provide an in-depth understanding of the tradeoff between GCN model utility and robustness against potential privacy attacks.

Vanishree Rao, Yunhui Long, Hoda Eldardiry et al.

In this work, we study how to securely evaluate the value of trading data without requiring a trusted third party. We focus on the important machine learning task of classification. This leads us to propose a provably secure four-round protocol that computes the value of the data to be traded without revealing the data to the potential acquirer. The theoretical results demonstrate a number of important properties of the proposed protocol. In particular, we prove the security of the proposed protocol in the honest-but-curious adversary model.

Yunhui Long, Tanmay Gangwani, Haris Mughees et al.

Privacy preserving multi-party computation has many applications in areas such as medicine and online advertisements. In this work, we propose a framework for distributed, secure machine learning among untrusted individuals. The framework consists of two parts: a two-step training protocol based on homomorphic addition and a zero knowledge proof for data validity. By combining these two techniques, our framework provides privacy of per-user data, prevents against a malicious user contributing corrupted data to the shared pool, enables each user to self-compute the results of the algorithm without relying on external trusted third parties, and requires no private channels between groups of users. We show how different ML algorithms such as Latent Dirichlet Allocation, Naive Bayes, Decision Trees etc. fit our framework for distributed, secure computing.

Yunhui Long, Vincent Bindschaedler, Lei Wang et al.

Membership Inference Attack (MIA) determines the presence of a record in a machine learning model's training data by querying the model. Prior work has shown that the attack is feasible when the model is overfitted to its training data or when the adversary controls the training algorithm. However, when the model is not overfitted and the adversary does not control the training algorithm, the threat is not well understood. In this paper, we report a study that discovers overfitting to be a sufficient but not a necessary condition for an MIA to succeed. More specifically, we demonstrate that even a well-generalized model contains vulnerable instances subject to a new generalized MIA (GMIA). In GMIA, we use novel techniques for selecting vulnerable instances and detecting their subtle influences ignored by overfitting metrics. Specifically, we successfully identify individual records with high precision in real-world datasets by querying black-box machine learning models. Further we show that a vulnerable record can even be indirectly attacked by querying other related records and existing generalization techniques are found to be less effective in protecting the vulnerable instances. Our findings sharpen the understanding of the fundamental cause of the problem: the unique influences the training instance may have on the model.

Xuejing Yuan, Yuxuan Chen, Yue Zhao et al.

The popularity of ASR (automatic speech recognition) systems, like Google Voice, Cortana, brings in security concerns, as demonstrated by recent attacks. The impacts of such threats, however, are less clear, since they are either less stealthy (producing noise-like voice commands) or requiring the physical presence of an attack device (using ultrasound). In this paper, we demonstrate that not only are more practical and surreptitious attacks feasible but they can even be automatically constructed. Specifically, we find that the voice commands can be stealthily embedded into songs, which, when played, can effectively control the target system through ASR without being noticed. For this purpose, we developed novel techniques that address a key technical challenge: integrating the commands into a song in a way that can be effectively recognized by ASR through the air, in the presence of background noise, while not being detected by a human listener. Our research shows that this can be done automatically against real world ASR applications. We also demonstrate that such CommanderSongs can be spread through Internet (e.g., YouTube) and radio, potentially affecting millions of ASR users. We further present a new mitigation technique that controls this threat.

Yunhui Long, Vincent Bindschaedler, Carl A. Gunter

Machine learning models are increasingly made available to the masses through public query interfaces. Recent academic work has demonstrated that malicious users who can query such models are able to infer sensitive information about records within the training data. Differential privacy can thwart such attacks, but not all models can be readily trained to achieve this guarantee or to achieve it with acceptable utility loss. As a result, if a model is trained without differential privacy guarantee, little is known or can be said about the privacy risk of releasing it. In this work, we investigate and analyze membership attacks to understand why and how they succeed. Based on this understanding, we propose Differential Training Privacy (DTP), an empirical metric to estimate the privacy risk of publishing a classier when methods such as differential privacy cannot be applied. DTP is a measure of a classier with respect to its training dataset, and we show that calculating DTP is efficient in many practical cases. We empirically validate DTP using state-of-the-art machine learning models such as neural networks trained on real-world datasets. Our results show that DTP is highly predictive of the success of membership attacks and therefore reducing DTP also reduces the privacy risk. We advocate for DTP to be used as part of the decision-making process when considering publishing a classifier. To this end, we also suggest adopting the DTP-1 hypothesis: if a classifier has a DTP value above 1, it should not be published.